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Event log messages are currently the only genuine interface through which computer sys-
tems administrators can eﬀectively monitor their systems and assemble a mental percep-
tion of system state. The popularisation of the Internet and the accompanying meteoric
growth of business-critical systems has resulted in an overwhelming volume of event log
messages, channeled through mechanisms whose designers could not have envisaged the
scale of the problem. Messages regarding intrusion detection, hardware status, operating
system status changes, database tablespaces, and so on, are being produced at the rate
of many gigabytes per day for a signiﬁcant computing environment.
Filtering technologies have not been able to keep up. Most messages go unnoticed; no
ﬁltering whatsoever is performed on them, at least in part due to the diﬃculty of im-
plementing and maintaining an eﬀective ﬁltering solution. The most commonly-deployed
ﬁltering alternatives rely on regular expressions to match pre-deﬁned strings, with 100%
accuracy, which can then become ineﬀective as the code base for the software producing
the messages `drifts' away from those strings. The exactness requirement means all pos-
sible failure scenarios must be accurately anticipated and their events catered for with
regular expressions, in order to make full use of this technique.
Alternatives to regular expressions remain largely academic. Data mining, automated
corpus construction, and neural networks, to name the highest-proﬁle ones, only produce
probabilistic results and are either diﬃcult or impossible to alter in any deterministic way.
Policies are therefore not supported under these alternatives.
This thesis explores a new architecture which utilises rich metadata in order to avoid the
burden of message interpretation. The metadata itself is based on an intention to improve
end-to-end communication and reduce ambiguity. A simple yet eﬀective ﬁltering scheme
is also presented which ﬁlters log messages through a short and easily-customisable set
of rules. With such an architecture, it is envisaged that systems administrators could
signiﬁcantly improve their awareness of their systems while avoiding many of the false-
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The following terms are often used synonymously within this thesis:
 designer, programmer, developer
 program, (system) daemon
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Computer systems administrators, as a part of their job function, must monitor event logs
generated by their systems for signs of failure, impending failure, or security breaches.
Many of these systems are simplistic in nature and produce well-deﬁned output that can
be easily ﬁltered for important events. Many others, however, are inordinately complex,
a situation increasingly common with the advent of multi-tier systems aimed at Inter-
net commerce. This thesis will establish the position that this complexity is negatively
aﬀecting the ability of human operators to eﬀectively monitor such systems, and that a
fundamentally diﬀerent approach is required to improve the situation.
The sheer volume of event log messages generated by today's Internet-connected systems
is far beyond what was envisaged when system loggers were ﬁrst conceptualised and
implemented. It is entirely possible for one web portal system at a mid-sized university
to generate at least 250MB of text in the form of log messages, every single day. The
problem is akin to being assigned the task of checking the spelling and grammar in yet-
to-be-published novels. This wouldn't be so bad if (1) much of the text wasn't replicated
yet still superﬁcially diﬀerent, (2) you weren't being asked to check ﬁve novels per day,
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, (3) the accepted spellings and grammars
weren't changing on a daily basis, or (4) it wasn't possible that massive ﬁnancial losses
could occur, or even lives lost, if one single mistake made it through. The situation,
though, is that all those four conditions can be true in the case of event log messages.
And they're certainly not novels written for a general audience; the vast majority of
possible messages are only able to be interpreted by the software author themselves, but
we have no mechanism for deﬁnitively determining which ones those are. In fact, there
is no existing way for any machine to genuinely decide whether or not a certain message
really does warrant human attention within an organisational context. The result is
that human systems administrators are bombarded daily with vast numbers of spurious
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messages that obscure the few ones of real value. These are the salient messages: those
which humans would care about if only their attention could be properly brought to bear.
1.1 Salience in event log messages
Real-world computer systems administrators are professionals dealing most often with
two broad categories of tasks: they have to contribute to, facilitate, or lead, the eﬀorts
involved with the implementation of new systems; and additionally they must maintain
existing systems. The ﬁrst focus for this thesis will be exposing the awareness an individual
administrator must possess in regards to system state  such an awareness would include
a working knowledge of the system components, as well as past, current, and potential
future threats to the operational status of those parts. The only existing mechanism by
which they can exercise such vigilance, other than point-in-time manual checks of resource
usage (such as the disk space remaining, CPU load, etc.) is through monitoring of system
events via event logs, or their synthesised, visual brethren in the form of `dashboards' -
as portrayed by Stephen Few in [14]. A measure of how well such monitoring works is
the degree to which it assists the systems administrator in highlighting the salient events
where a salient event is one that is prominent or useful in identifying potentially-abnormal
system behaviour.
Using the open-source community as an example, the only widespread method of monitor-
ing system event logs is that of ﬁltering through regular expressions categorised into black-
or white-lists: black-lists ﬂag known-bad messages while white-lists allow innocuous ones
to pass through. The remainder are typically e-mailed to the administrator as possibly-
suspicious events. Anomaly-detection tools [15] using primarily-statistical routines also
exist and have much academic work invested into them (e.g. [16, 17, 18]), but due to their
relative rarity in actual deployments, the emphasis here will be on policy-based/ﬁltering
methods. The LogWatch [19] and Logcheck [20] projects typify this approach. Even
though these capabilities exist and are free software, the Debian Linux Project [19] lists
them as installed on only 3.2% and 3.9% of machines, respectively, from an `opt-in' sam-
ple size of 91395 as of this writing [21]. On the commercial side, NMS [22], Snare Server
[23] and Splunk [24] (among many others) also provide such functionality as part of their
oﬀerings.
The quality and consistency of input to any automated system (such as those mentioned
above) is critical to the quality of its output, for it is here that the established log-
monitoring solutions hit their ﬁrst problem. In reality, systems administrators are called
upon to upgrade software on a daily basis, even if only to implement ﬁxes for identiﬁed
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Listing 1.1 Selected examples of event log messages
Feb 3 12:35:56 gateway openvpn -server [2080]: 123.234.147.159:39936 TLS Error: TLS
handshake failed
Feb 3 12:36:16 gateway openvpn -server [2080]: 123.234.147.159:40014 Authenticate/Decrypt
packet error: packet HMAC authentication failed
Feb 3 12:36:16 gateway openvpn -server [2080]: 123.234.147.159:40014 TLS Error: incoming
packet authentication failed from 123.234.147.159:40014
Feb 3 14:38:25 gateway kernel: ATM dev 0: error -110 fetching device status
Feb 3 14:38:44 gateway kernel: ATM dev 0: usbatm_complete: urb 0xdef9f2a0 failed (-84)!
Feb 3 15:12:32 server1 krb5kdc [4196]: TGS_REQ (3 etypes {16 1 3}) 192.168.1.100:
PROCESS_TGS: authtime 0, <unknown client > for host/server1.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM ,
Request is a replay
Feb 4 13:06:42 gateway named [23870]: clients -per -query decreased to 10
security risks, and such changes impact on the eﬀectiveness of an automated ﬁlter. An
updated version of the popular Apache web server or of Microsoft Exchange, for example,
is likely to produce event log output which is not identical to the prior revision. With no
notiﬁcation of the problematic change provided to a busy administrator (changes to log
messages are typically not reported in the 'changelog' list provided with software; such lists
usually contain new features, conﬁguration ﬁle format changes, and the like), a critical
log message may no longer exactly match the violation black-list regular expression
written to ﬂag it. On the other hand, the white-list may not function correctly either,
increasing the occurrence of distracting but legitimate messages in the daily report. It
is not diﬃcult to imagine the maintenance burden [10] incurred by major upgrades such
as an entire operating system. Indeed, in this regard the particular technology used
is practically irrelevant, whether it be data-mining, automated corpus construction or
another alternative because, as re-iterated by Buckley & Siewiorek [25] in an extensive
paper, analysis algorithms can only be as good as the quality of their input data. When
that input data is modiﬁed and the ﬁlters are updated/trained/veriﬁed either at a later
date, poorly, or not at all, the quality of the resulting (ﬁltered) output is reduced.
This automated output, meant for administrators to review on a daily basis, suﬀers further
from fundamental weaknesses stemming from the process by which event logs have evolved
rather than having been designed, a lack of foresight by programmers as to how the
logs would be used [26], and the almost-imperceptible fusing of human assumptions with
genuine information in the output [25]. The vast and overwhelming number of messages
alone is an intimidating challenge in many cases [27], even when visualisation is considered
[28]. This is without the additional diﬃculties of parsing their hugely diverse range of
message formats, types and schema [29] and performing the semantic reconciliation that is
therefore necessary [30]. All of these factors are detrimental to a systems administrator's
eﬀorts towards understanding the current state of the systems under their control.
The most visible outcome is the regular monitoring e-mail, a selected sample of which
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can be seen in Listing 1.1. Such messages require an extreme level of domain expertise
to decipher; without solutions available even from a modern search engine (the author
has repeatedly attempted to ﬁnd a deﬁnitive explanation of clients-per-query..., without
success). Coupled with the high rate of unpredictable change and the potential for new or
unanticipated situations to produce never-before-seen messages, the existing arrangement
serves both as a impeding factor for systems administration, and an intimidating barrier
to entry for those not 'skilled in the art'. Salience is an attribute added by an experienced
human to the messages; it is not readily encoded for us to extract any more than artistic
merit can be mechanistically deduced from a painting. Art does not even require the
extreme depths of domain expertise that log messages do in order to be appreciated, yet
we persist with the log message 'interface' with its burdensome cognitive and memory
workload, in the hope of cobbling together a mental perception of system state - which
at its highest level of abstraction is either nominal or in fault to some degree.
1.2 Impediments for automated ﬁltering
The cryptic natural-language nature of event log messages is not only a problem for
systems administrators, but also for those designing automated ﬁltering solutions. As
mentioned above, regular expressions (or an equivalent technology) are the most common
ﬁltering technology in active use. Their complexity and syntax, however, makes them
diﬃcult to generate correctly - as Salzter & Schroeder said of access control mechanisms
in 1975, if the user must translate his image of his protection needs into a radically
diﬀerent speciﬁcation language, he will make errors.[31, p.5]. Some examples of regular
expressions (or regexes) used with the Logcheck [20] package under Debian Linux v5.0
can be seen in Listing 1.2. These regexes were included with the Debian OpenVPN [13]
package - a GPL-licensed, open source Virtual Private Network (VPN) service - in order
to extend Logcheck's capabilities, and are from the white-list, meaning that all matching
messages will be discarded, irrespective of their quantity.
Note that binary matching with a regular expression is an out-of-context, line-by-line
mechanistic process which does not take into account any surrounding inﬂuences which
might increase the salience of an otherwise unimportant message. Such ﬁltering mecha-
nisms obtain one and only one piece of information from a regular expression: it either
matches or does not match a given line of event log output. A machine cannot determine
the category to which any given message should belong, nor can it cope with unantic-
ipated situations or messages. When the regular expressions for message matching are
maintained separately from the codebase generating those very messages, keeping the two
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Listing 1.2 Examples of Logcheck rules (regular expressions) used for event log message
ﬁltering [13]
^\w{3} [ :0 -9]{11} [._[: alnum :]-]+ (openvpn|ovpn -[._[:alnum :]-]+) \[[0 -9]+\]: (Outgo|Incom
)ing Control Channel Authentication: Using [[: digit :]]+ bit message hash '(SHA1|MD5)'
for HMAC authentication$
^\w{3} [ :0 -9]{11} [._[: alnum :]-]+ (openvpn|ovpn -[._[:alnum :]-]+) \[[0 -9]+\]:( ([-_.[:
alnum :]]+/) ?[.[: digit :]]{7 ,15}:
[[: digit :]]{2 ,5})? Connection reset , restarting \[[[: digit :]]+\]$
^\w{3} [ :0 -9]{11} [._[: alnum :]-]+ (openvpn|ovpn -[._[:alnum :]-]+) \[[0 -9]+\]:( ([-_.[:
alnum :]]+/) ?[.[: digit :]]{7 ,15}:
[[: digit :]]{2 ,5})? (Data|Control) Channel MTU parms \[[[: upper :]:0 -9/ ]+\]$
^\w{3} [ :0 -9]{11} [._[: alnum :]-]+ (openvpn|ovpn -[._[:alnum :]-]+) \[[0 -9]+\]:( ([-_.[:
alnum :]]+/) ?[.[: digit :]]{7 ,15}:
[[: digit :]]{2 ,5})? TLS Error: Unknown data channel key ID or IP address received from
[0 -9.]{7 ,15}:[0 -9]+: [0-9]+ \(see FAQ for more info on this error \)$
^\w{3} [ :0 -9]{11} [._[: alnum :]-]+ (openvpn|ovpn -[._[:alnum :]-]+) \[[0 -9]+\]:( ([-_.[:
alnum :]]+/) ?[.[: digit :]]{7 ,15}:
[[: digit :]]{2 ,5})? TLS Error: local/remote TLS keys are out of sync: [0 -9.]{7 ,15}:[0 -9]+
\[1\]$
synchronised is a formidable challenge in itself, and one which (in this author's experience
with these tools) has not come close to being achieved. Furthermore, the large number
of unhandled messages prevents any meaningful statistical analysis of handled-message
counts due to incomplete information; given that the unhandled messages likely contain
relevant events which haven't been handled, simply due to the limitations of the ﬁltering
mechanism itself.
One must also consider that an inherent `lag' exists in any solution which requires (or even
beneﬁts from) maintenance or training, in that any new/unhandled message which passes
through the ﬁlter must be either manually added to the ﬁlter, or achieve enough statistical
signiﬁcance to warrant exclusion by a data-mining or machine-learning algorithm. In
a sense, even manual addition is the result of a form of statistical signiﬁcance, as a
message will usually only be added by a systems administrator once its occurrences pass
an arbitrary 'annoyance' threshold. Thus, the unhandled messages which are e-mailed on
a daily basis are the most common output of such tools.
The bad-event detection scenario presents a danger, too, in that any reliance on black-lists
(i.e. attack signatures) by virtue of relying on an exact match to those signatures can
result in a false sense of security when no match is found. A lack of usable metadata
has lead to results which are not reached by an evaluation of whether the message is
important or not, but rather by static string matches which drift away from commonality
with the codebase over time. It is therefore obvious that a never-before-seen message
is considered on a basis of newness rather than whether a human needs to see it; all
unanticipated events are presented as equals, irrespective of actual priority. Current
systems are severely limited by the natural language content of these messages; there is
no useful, easily-accessible metadata that can read both by machines and humans.
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1.3 Research criteria for an improved alternative
Metadata that is machine-readable oﬀers the tantalising possibility of deterministic ﬁlter-
ing without the need to actively interpret and make poorly-informed decisions regarding
the input data. While the input data should ideally be communicating the programmer's
or program-designer's well-informed thoughts on the event in question, and be doing so
in an eﬀective manner, we only receive truncated and barely-descriptive messages such as
those displayed in Figure 1.1 - crippled communication by any measure if we consider the
saying a picture is worth a thousand words.
The metadata also has to survive the ﬁltering process itself - even if only to inform that
process. When we accept as a premise that the systems administrator needs the latitude
to adjust their ﬁltering solution, it becomes clear that the metadata has to be trivially
simple to view; not obscured in a binary bit-packed form - as RFC 5424's severity ﬁeld
[11] currently is. Tuning a system for better performance (performance being regarded
here as the quality or usefulness of the output) naturally requires knowledge of the input
to that system, and in the case of ﬁltering event log messages based on metadata, that
input is the metadata.
Furthermore, there is a limitation currently present in event log messaging systems which
may or or may not have been obvious in the examples above: the diﬃculty (some might
say impossibility) of specifying policies that accurately reﬂect the concerns of a person
and/or their organisation. Incorporating these realities with regular expressions requires a
duplication and line-by-line customisation of the rule base for each object (e.g. application
daemon, physical server, etc). Data mining algorithms face enough challenges as it is,
with the ﬁltering of log messages against policy, let alone the burden of ﬁltering with
gradiated responses, explicit conﬁdence levels and varying methods of communication.
Neural networks present no details of their internal workings; one would presumably
require a separate network for each policy, and their results would likely be inconsistent.
The metadata, in whichever form it takes, therefore needs to facilitate the automated
application of real-world policies, so that the capabilities of this alternative ﬁltering ap-
proach prove suﬃciently advantageous to justify the eﬀort involved in its implementation.
Policies are not supported by any of the log message related literature reviewed in Chapter
2; their only appearance is in heavily-instrumented industrial plant monitoring solutions.
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1.4 Potential improvements to software systems
If the problems above can be dealt with, the implication is that a result from this work
would be software which fulﬁlls the following aims:
 reduced duplication-of-eﬀort
 deterministic and reproducible output
 minimised maintenance requirement in normal operation
 customisable policies that manipulate the output according to personal/organisa-
tional preferences and support multiple modes of communication determined by an
event's real-world priority
 improved communication, with greatly reduced ambiguity, from programmer/pro-
gram designer to end-user/systems administrator.
All these aims are held in contrast with the current situation in event log message ﬁl-
tering. The vast majority of log messages are never observed, either by humans or any
automated process, and the automated tools that are employed entail their own substan-
tial maintenance and implementation burdens. No end-to-end approach yet encountered
has ever attempted to improve the source data of the log messages in question - prior
eﬀorts such as the Syslog protocol documented in RFC 5424 [11] have instead focussed
on message routing and storage. As will be examined in detail, the entire architecture
of logging and ﬁltering, as it stands today, requires deep reconsideration in order to im-
prove the monitoring of computing systems which are having to cope with ever-increasing
challenges.
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Chapter 2
Literature review
lp1 on fire (One of the more obfuscated kernel messages)
 fortune package from Debian Linux v5.0
The amount of literature on the speciﬁc topic of event log system design is scant at best;
only two papers could be located which pertained directly to the problem at hand, and
both lamented this scarcity [25, 32]. Buckley & Siewiorek performed an in-depth analysis
of the event logs produced by VAX/VMS systems and found that even a tightly-controlled
platform/codebase managed by one entity (Digital Equipment Corporation, in this case)
suﬀered from inconsistencies and generally lower-than-expected quality in the event logs,
despite being one of the best examples of its day [25]. They witnessed a self-centred design
philosophy wherein the only non-end-user output from the system or system daemons was
in the form of event log messages, yet the programmers writing the code that issued the
messages were doing so exclusively for their own beneﬁt. Debugging code remained in
shipping products and polluted the event logs. Genuine events were populated with
undocumented, personally-assigned codes. The systems administrator was the intended
user of the product (with non-technical purposes catered for with their own applications
abstracted from the OS) yet was not factored into any interface decisions beyond the
command-line shell. In short, the programmers/designers appeared to be demanding the
administrator possess their level of domain knowledge.
Etalle, Massacci & Yautsiukhin took a security/privacy-oriented look at the landscape;
their framework allows one to formally ascertain the qualiﬁcations of an actual system,
weighing up audit integrity and privacy. Unfortunately, some of their suggestions exem-
pliﬁed a `security through obscurity' mindset, such as denying access to the /etc/passwd
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ﬁle in a Linux system with the goal of hiding usernames and therefore preserving privacy
[32]. Etalle et al. had a focus on evaluating existing or proposed systems with a temporal
bent; their criteria included such factors as partial completeness, context independence,
chaining and exactness. Their eﬀorts to 'straddle the fence' on privacy-vs-usefulness
in log ﬁles revolved around disposable pseudonyms for the most part. In any case, their
research did not consider usability for the systems administrator or actual selection of one
or a set of messages from a set of thousands or millions.
Simultaneously, however, there is substantial literature dealing with the formalisation of
the analytical side of logging/event handling systems [5, 33, 17, 34]; such papers most
often attempt to reduce false-positive/negative rates by applying improved data-mining
techniques. Their outcomes are typically characterised as 'probabilistic' and admit that
false-positives and -negatives will occur; eﬀort continues in this direction and a break-
through cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, the task these researchers have set
themselves boils down to constructing a strong artiﬁcial intelligence, in that they aim to
convincingly interpret natural language (i.e. the text contained in the log messages) using
experience, such that novel information can also be handled as though human intuition
were present. The well-known and rocky history of AI suggests that such success may
be either in the distant future, or perhaps impossible with current or even currently-
foreseeable technology.
Other eﬀorts have emerged with diﬀering priorities and design emphases, which led to
results satisfying other goals, such as a logging format for digital libraries using XML
(e.g. [35] and to a large extent [36]), encrypted yet searchable logs (possibly utilising
pseudonyms as well) that deal with the issue of privacy during audits (e.g. [37, 38, 39])
and the statistical analysis of alarms via machine-learning from a trouble-ticket database
[10]. Entire grammars have been proposed, ranging from the building of parsers for audit
logs [40], to the GEM language for coding and dealing with the log messages themselves
[41]. GEM is an interesting case in that the authors' examples appear to rely on a
level of instrumentation that simply has never been present for most events occurring
in distributed systems. GEM also seems to require ﬂawless parsing of messages and
equally superb anticipation of scenarios, in order to reach its true potential. Nonetheless
it represents a thoughtful eﬀort that could be of use with higher-quality event log messages
as an input.
What can be readily observed is that the vast majority of literature related to the topic
of event logging accepts the current state of poor and inconsistent input from system
processes. Buckley [26] in his PhD thesis, and when writing with Siewiorek [25], appears
to be practically alone in his calls for higher quality event log messages. Instead, attempts
to enhance the quality of the analysed/ﬁltered output via the well-established academic
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doctrine of incremental, iterative improvement, appear to be the academic `norm'. These
enhancement eﬀorts, including those cited in the paragraphs above, typically come in
the form of new or revised analysis algorithms (i.e. entirely post-collection improvement),
ideas for corpus construction (i.e. improving analysis through the incorporation of another
vetted input, as in [42]), or architectures/frameworks - either pre-collection (e.g. [36]) or
formally assessing a logging system after the fact (e.g. [32, 40]).
What appears to be lacking in the literature is any examination of event logging from
a usability perspective, other than when the topic was brushed against by Buckley &
Siewiorek [25]. Event logs are apparently accepted as-is by authors, without critical
analysis as to their suitability for purpose. In particular, the question that has not been
considered is: how do we deterministically select the `necessary' messages, when we don't
even know the criteria for which ones are necessary?
2.1 Discovering salience
Applied models of salience in computer science are thin on the ground, and none could
be located which were directly relevant to one-line event messages. Salience as a concept
seems to be limited to the pure HCI domain; it has been explored in relation to games and
graphical interfaces, but sadly not in textual analysis. The closest equivalent in logging
systems is the notion of `severity' which is encapsulated in the de-facto standard RFC
5424 [11], or perhaps the `perceived severity' of the ITU's X.733 standard [43]. Severity
by itself has become limited to a very local scope (that of the issuing program itself); this
illustrates the point-of-view of the programmer or designer of the program. Indeed, RFC
5424 accepts that severities are very subjective, a relay or collector should not assume
that all originators have the same deﬁnition of severity [11, pg. 36], reinforcing the
impression that event log messages are written for the programmer/designer rather than
eﬀective, i.e. calibrated, communication to another audience.
The severity levels are shown in Table 2.1. In practice, they are conveyed in a `priority'
value which is a bitwise combination of the severity and `facility' values - facility being the
number used to route the message into a particular destination ﬁle - and the priority is
discarded (by default) after message routing has been completed [11]. Newer software such
as Rsyslog [44] is capable of displaying the severity value but again this is not the default
behaviour. The RFC 5424 approach is to consider the type of output (i.e. the facility
number which is intended to categorise messages into authentication, e-mail, CRON, etc
ﬁles) and the severity as (together) indicating an absolute priority.
Given the well-known UNIX security/ring-domain approach, from a systems point of view
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Numerical code Severity
0 Emergency: system is unusable
1 Alert: action must be taken immediately
2 Critical: critical conditions
3 Error: error conditions
4 Warning: warning conditions
5 Notice: normal but signiﬁcant condition
6 Informational: informational messages
7 Debug: debug-level messages
Table 2.1: Syslog severity levels as deﬁned in RFC 5424 [11]
only the kernel could ever issue a severity 0 message. Other programs, however, would
certainly consider some of their events to be emergencies, such as a daemon monitoring a
pool of redundant disks for failures. In terms of the severity levels forming a linear-numeric
scale, each program tends to align the extremes of the scale with the limits of its own
scope, regardless of whether it is a mission-critical database or a frivolous chess-by-email
service.
The X.733 perceived severity concept [43], however, gets closer to a notion of salience. It
includes the idea of user perception. Many event messages issued (e-mail server daemons
are a good example) may be consequential to the systems administrator (e.g. the failure
of an indexing mechanism meant to improve scalability) but entirely inconsequential to a
user whose only concern is whether or not their e-mail appears in a timely manner. Even
perceived severity, though, is entirely service-oriented and built from a one-size-ﬁts-all
perspective. It is also reliant on a static list of probable causes which are technology-
speciﬁc and therefore immediately outdated. X.733 was ﬁnalised in 1992 and the list
includes items such as multiplexers and DCE-DTE Interface Error [43, pg. 15] which
may be of limited utility as of this writing.
A NASA paper [45] by Schreckenghost et al., that was primarily concerned with HCI
issues for astronauts, made signiﬁcant mentions of `notiﬁcation saliency' but never oﬀered
a formal deﬁnition. Schreckenghost et al. also relied heavily on a static ontology (similar
in nature to X733) as well as information unavailable to an event logging system, such as
a person's physical location, daily schedule, and so on.
Game theory is perhaps the next best example of an area of study concerned with
individual events that are part of a greater whole. Andrew Colman's article on salience in
pure-coordination games [46] points out that humans are intuitively drawn to perceived
common touchstones based on knowledge of shared cultural understanding, among other
factors. While this represents an insight into binary decision making in a competition, it
also shows that an implied cultural context is necessary for such systems to be balanced.
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The nature of this context is meant to be shared, but unspoken, by all concerned - meaning
that salience can be viewed (in game theory, at least) as predominantly a human factor
overlaid onto an otherwise rational game of pure chance. As Colman explains, the fact is
that British and American players of heads or tails? choose heads 87% and 86% of the
time, respectively, regardless of the even probability of outcome. That they regard heads
as a salient focusing point is a given, but the exact reasons are not yet adequately known
[46].
A more ﬁne-grained scale can be found in the C Language Integrated Production System
(CLIPS) - an expert system framework by Gary Riley - in the form of its salience rule
property [47]. CLIPS can interpret a per-rule salience value as a run-time ranking order,
meaning that rules with higher salience will be executed before rules with lower salience.
The scale is given as a range of -10000 to +10000, with a default of zero being assigned if
salience is left undeﬁned, and this is meant to be interpreted by the person implementing
CLIPS as a priority indicator [47]. Its utility is obvious in the context of an expert system.
An expert system, at least in 1991 when CLIPS was made available, is supposed to present
a linear series of questions to a user in order to aid them in root-cause discovery, decision
making, or the like.
An unambiguous method of ranking is therefore advantageous when considering such a
one-dimensional (i.e. sequence in time) interface presentation. As discussed above in
regards to the RFC 5424 syslog severity scale, the concepts of `severity' and `priority'
have in the past been combined, and the CLIPS salience value appears to be something
which could more properly be termed as a priority value, given that it is referred to as such
in documentation, and used exclusively for ranking. The nature of such ranking schemes
(as in CLIPS) implies that no two alternatives should have an identical priority. This
clashes somewhat with the human notion of salience; one of the more diﬃcult moments
faced in reality by a systems administrator is when two ore more items are competing for
their attention but choosing between them is impossible - i.e. the items' salience cannot
be adequately distinguished.
2.1.1 A further exploration of `priority'
Prioritisation, though, was the primary focus of an extensive article by Wallin, Leijon
and Landén. Their stated aim was to automatically prioritise the multiple hundreds of
thousands of alarms which were daily swamping a telecommunications network operation
centre (NOC) [10]. Like event log messages, these alarms had a very low signal-to-noise
ratio. Very high levels of domain expertise were required, leading to a heavy and repetitive
workload for the few so endowed. The alarms were also heavily standardised and therefore
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quite static in their presentation - a point of diﬀerence with event log messages which are
often free-form text and prone to un-notiﬁed change - Wallin et al.'s additional text ﬁeld
contained a mere 3500 unique values [10, pg. 9].
Log messages have the further distinction of not retaining or indicating state, which is
a common feature of the alarms used by Wallin et al. Their approach was to clean the
data ﬂow (consisting of alarms and trouble tickets), turn a data-mining algorithm loose
on the cleaned data set, and feed the results to a neural network, in the hope of creating
a hybrid ﬁltering/expert-system which would utilise information from the trouble-ticket
database to assign correct priorities to new alarms.
Wallin et al., as part of their data analysis, identiﬁed that the correlation between alarm
`severity' and manually-assigned `priority' (by their deﬁnition of priority as used in the
telecommunications NOC) was very weak, leading them to conclude that severities can-
not be used as priorities [10, pg. 14]. This is a key point to remember with regard to
vocabulary overloading: priority is often used in several diﬀerent senses. In RFC 5424 it
refers to severity+facility; in X.733 as more of a perceived severity; and in expert systems
and Wallin et al. as ranking data. What Wallin et al. are pointing out is the mismatch
caused by the programmer/designer deciding upon severity within the context/scope of
the program's functionality whereas the systems/network administrator assigns priority
based upon a wider context that considers the program's role in terms of achieving or-
ganisational goals1. While there is undoubted value in each diﬀerent interpretation, they
cannot and should not be equated, as is so often done.
The conclusion reached by Wallin et al. was that their neural network could correctly
assign priorities to 50% of incoming alarms. This is an improvement over their naïve
approach with its 17% success rate [10]. It does, however, leave 50% incorrectly clas-
siﬁed - meaning none of its output could be trusted by humans and would inevitably
be disregarded. Note that a human expert was required to determine the percentage of
correct vs incorrect.
The neural network approach also relies on the trouble-ticket database, leaving it un-
equipped to deal with novel situations, such as those that might be encountered with
a router OS upgrade, a routing topology change, or a malicious network attack like a
distributed denial-of-service. New issues must achieve statistical signiﬁcance before any
data-miner will regard them as anything other than spurious noise, then be learned by
the neural network; leaving a considerable time lag in which humans must deal with the
1The programmer/designer point-of-view includes severity data: i.e. a narrower focus on the program
being worked on; product/code context. The systems/network administrator point-of-view on the other
hand includes priority data: i.e. a broader focus on the organisation they belong to, end-to-end Service
Level Agreements, etc; organisational context.
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unﬁltered alarms as they do now, and create and solve the related trouble tickets (in
Wallin et al.'s NOC), all with no deterministic reassurance that their eﬀorts will ever
result in correct classiﬁcation. If the neural network does begin to classify the new alarms
correctly, it cannot even provide a notiﬁcation of doing so. Such a system is the archetypal
`black box'.
2.1.2 The psychological point of view
This story, of over-reliance on terms such as severity or priority, leaves those of the hu-
manist philosophy distinctly unsatisﬁed. It would surely be folly to entirely ignore the
large body of related psychological research. J. Richard Eiser, in a 1971 article on individ-
uals' perceptions, mentions that the concept of salience, like the concept of a stimulus, is
more easily employed than deﬁned. [48, pg. 444] Eiser's primary investigation was into
the correlation between the strength with which an opinion is held, and the increasing
extremity of that opinion.
That is, an opinion or reaction which is more forceful in its expression will tend to be an
opinion or reaction which is further away from the `middle ground' of society's norms, i.e.
towards either end of a response/survey dimension. In the process of his research, Eiser
had to formulate a concept of dimensional salience - and concluded that the various
dimensions that are found to be relevant to a given conceptual idea will be evaluated
diﬀerently by individuals. In other words, the dimensions themselves possess a salience
attribute; [t]he individual's frame of reference must therefore be deﬁned in terms of the
dimension or dimensions he regards as most important or `salient'.[48, pg. 443]
We could perhaps therefore beneﬁt by evaluating the salience of dimensions, rather than
simply accepting dimensions as though they were set in stone. The declaration of a
dimension (for example, severity, or priority) as the single measure of how salient an
event log message actually is, therefore ﬂies in the face of Eiser's recommendation. It
may very well be that program designers, or programmers, generally ﬁnd the concept of
severity ﬁts their purposes; that it makes doing their jobs that little bit easier. Eiser
queries: ...which dimensions will be salient to a particular individual? [48, pg. 443] but
it appears that question has not yet been asked with regard to event log messages, Syslog
standards, or the like. Systems administrators have to suﬀer the consequences of such
declarations and appear to have minimal, if any, ability to specify how well their primary
interface into a system's inner workings actually functions.
Certainly it is clear that one dimension will not ﬁt all individuals when it comes to a con-
cept as amorphous as salience. An emerging theory belonging to management psychology,
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stakeholder salience, seeks to establish the idea that there are several dimensions which
managers use to judge how they should allocate their ﬁnite time when dealing with stake-
holders in their businesses. Systems administrators, too, have to make very similar value
judgements on a daily basis, especially in the more outsourced environments. A very
widely-cited 1997 article by Mitchell, Agle and Wood [1] oﬀers a logical process of de-
duction for the three dimensions they select for consideration: `power', `legitimacy', and
`urgency'. All three are optional, i.e. not all stakeholders will possess all three. They
use a Venn diagram, shown in Figure 2.1, to illustrate the concept; the `most salient'
stakeholders possess all three attributes and therefore reside in the central union.
Mitchell et al. proposed these three dimensions in an attempt to delineate the factors
people use in their evaluations of claims on their time - the multi-dimensional scale is
a response to their premise of no one attribute being reliable enough to capture the
complexity inherent in identifying stakeholders, as well as in the agency, behavioral,
ecological, institutional, resource dependence, and transactional cost theories of the ﬁrm.
[1, pg. 854]
Mitchell et al. began with Freeman's broad deﬁnition of a stakeholder: any group or
individual who can aﬀect or is aﬀected by the achievement of the organization's objec-
tives [1, pg. 854], which they acknowledge as so broad as to not exclude any potential
candidates. Such a deﬁnition ﬁnds much in common (in scope, at least) with my own
working deﬁnition of message salience. It should be emphasised here, as Mitchell et al.
themselves emphasise, that the idea of stakeholder salience is not to provide advice or a
framework to deal with future situations, but to reliably identify what factors are used in
reality as people make decisions.
The notion of `power' is the ability for one stakeholder to change outcomes in favour of
their own preferences, i.e. to impose their will [1, pg. 865]. It revolves around coercion,
regardless of the tactics used to achieve that coercion. In scope, `power' appears to be
limited to individual parties in a relationship, i.e. few actors, as power could be said
to become increasingly diﬀuse as more actors are involved. `Legitimacy' represents what
some might say is the other side of power's coin: it is the degree to which an action might
be considered acceptable in a larger context, and is judged according to the perceptions
of others [1]. Consequently, those who consistently violate the norms of an organisation
or society-at-large tend to ﬁnd their legitimacy weakened to some degree or another.
Furthermore, Mitchell et al. recall Weber in using the term `authority' to communicate
the legitimate use of power.
Whereas power and legitimacy are distinct, yet inter-related, `urgency' ﬁnds itself inter-
nally cleaved in two: the ideas of criticality/importance and time-sensitivity encompass
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Figure 2.1: Dimensions inﬂuential to management decisions [1] (numerals removed)
(potential) exposure with the entailing risk, and the pressures of timeliness/deadlines,
respectively [1]. That is, for a stakeholder's demands to be considered urgent, they must
possess both those features. Validity is perhaps another word that can clarify this po-
sition; the stakeholder's stated requirement of immediate action cannot be valid without
a truly critical situation and genuine time pressure. It is not a large leap to the posi-
tion that `urgency' is the most granular of the dimensions - while power and legitimacy
(possibly combined as `authority') tend to be amorphous and diﬃcult/impossible to nail
down to particular action items, `urgency' is often tied to a speciﬁc goal or requirement.
In summary. power and legitimacy are most often thought of as personal attributes; `ur-
gency' on the other hand is attached to outcomes. Taken together, these dimensions form
a measure of salience for stakeholder claims [ibid].
The idea of the three dimensions for management is Mitchell et al.'s response to their
perception of scholarly calls for stakeholder theory to articulate a normative core [1, pg.
882], which they deﬁne as the search for reasons why some claims and some relationships
are legitimate and worthy of management attention and why others are not. [ibid]. Event
log messages require similar investigation, but unlike Mitchell et al. where human nature
was being looked at, such an investigation would have to juxtapose human nature on the
one hand and chaotic log messages on the other - considering the junction where the two
interact.
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2.1.3 A successful measure developed in medicine
The discovery of a three-dimensional scale for ennumerating demands on one's time re-
called a system used in medicine, structured along similar lines. The modern triage process
in hospitals relies in part on the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS): a set of three dimensions
for assessing and communicating a patient's neurological condition [49]. Medical profes-
sionals have embraced the scale since its debut in 1974 [12]. It ennumerates the motor
responses, verbal capability, and eye-opening characteristics of a patient; optionally these
numbers can be combined into one, ranging from zero (i.e. dead) to 15 (normal healthy
adult).
Although the GCS is not without its weaknesses, mostly related to the practice of adding
the dimensions together [12], it deals neatly with the clinical need to dependably commu-
nicate important information from one human to another. The GCS score presented by a
paramedic upon delivering a new patient may be written on a chart and later referred to
by doctors and nurses to judge the patient's improvement or decline since presentation.
Departments within a hospital, and across hospitals, all rely on the same scale.
A low GCS score automatically raises the patient's priority for receiving treatment - a
critical part of the triage process, especially in a busy hospital. Every medical institution
is limited to a ﬁnite set of resources and must apportion those resources according to
genuine need. This need usually cannot be assessed by the patient themselves; after
all, most people would assign a higher-than-necessary priority to their own situation
because they are considering a local, self-centred scope (much like the earlier concept of
severity). The correct priority can only be assigned by an individual with knowledge of
the organisational situation: load vs capability, as well as an absolute assessment of the
problem based on experience of the breadth of possibilities, from the most trivial to the
worst-case.
In essence, the GCS assigns a salience value (from the point of view of the medical
professionals) to each individual patient. It is worth noting that the range of diagnoses
it covers has changed only slightly since 1974, and that it is considered a discriminative
(between causes), predictive (of outcome) and evaluative (of present condition) scale [12].
The GCS has been thoroughly tested in the medical environment and is now generally
considered indispensible.
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Figure 2.2: The `representational triangle' [2, 3]
2.2 Commonality of meaning
As identiﬁed by Prasad, the GCS actually scores highly in terms of common understand-
ing, with the primary discriminator being experience with its use [12]. Given the concrete
nature of human medical treatment and common, undoubted motivation among those
involved, such a result is not surprising. This commonality of meaning, though, is by no
means assured simply by the use of scales, whether single- or multi-dimensional [50]. Scale
response is fundamentally a categorisation exercise and it has been posited that we can
never prove identical eﬃcacy across individuals simply because the absolute meanings of
the response categories are unknown. [50, pg. 244] As Cook & Campbell also remind us,
experimentation in this (human) domain must be acknowledged as being at the mercy of
innumerable unknown and unaccounted-for factors [51], one of which is simply meaning
- always communicated indirectly through the use of signs. The very idea of a common
meaning is imperiled in event log messages because of their frequently absurd complexity,
with few common signs.
2.2.1 Semiotics: the study of signs
The use of semiotics in computer science has generally been limited to the human-
computer interaction (HCI) area, or attempts to deal with terminology. An example of
the latter would be Barron et al.'s article [2] on terminology used to identify and classify
various breeds of information system, such as `decision support system', `expert system',
and so on. Such jargon can represent an almost-impenetrable professional dialect, much
like that used by doctors in concert with the Glasgow Coma Scale discussed above. Bar-
ron et al. draw on Stamper's [3] work on semiotics in representing the context around
terminology with a triangle (Figure 2.2) which dates back to Charles Peirce's seminal
work in the early 20th century .
Accepted semiotics theory elucidates that signs are abstract terms representing various
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Feature Basis in semiotics
Application domain







Real world relationship Semantics
Representation Syntactics
Table 2.2: 10 features of every Information System [2]
aspects of real-world objects and social norms. That is, a sign has no meaning without
knowledge of what it represents. Additionally, signs not only signify things or actions
in the real world, but rely entirely on the social reality [2] that is understood between
individuals and groups of individuals. One could perhaps characterise signs as labels for
discrete chunks of context. That context is not static  the use of a sign can inﬂuence it,
after all  but instead is part of the ever-changing present and future of our world. When
the topic of this thesis is applied to the representational triangle, the Observers/Users
are the systems administrators; the Real World Objects are the machines and programs
which are being administered, and the Signs are the administration interface, in this case
event log messages. Again, none of them are truly static for any signiﬁcant length of time.
Barron et al.'s terminology clariﬁcation attempt further deﬁned 10 features which they
considered to be the deﬁning aspects of any information system. These features are given
in Table 2.2 along with their natural ﬁt in the representational triangle. The ﬁrst three
root the system in its social context, the next ﬁve are to do with the links between
Observers/Users, and Real World Objects and Signs. The illustration is nearly complete
once the depiction of the relationship between RWOs and the Signs is included, with
those ﬁnal representations as the instantiation of the knowledge gathered into one or
more syntactically representative languages (such as a programming language)[2]. The
primary beneﬁt of the representational triangle is its ability to divide the representation
of a system from the system itself and depict the diﬀerent approaches taken by users to
those two separate things, as well as providing the `big picture' of the social cause and
eﬀect. Barron et al. have therefore provided a framework which includes context, i.e. the
world in which we live.
The lack of social context or user recognition in event log message systems spurred this
search for examples of thought into interfaces. Bear in mind that event log messages
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consist of textual content and have no graphical element, so interface research into GUIs
was not relevant. The iterative processes of reﬁnement that have improved GUIs over the
years have not occurred with textual interfaces. This point was made clear by a diagram
in Barr's thesis [4] depicting the dichotomy between the designer's mindset and that of
the end-user, shown in Figure 2.3 on the next page.
While Barr was looking at metaphorical interface elements in computer games, the di-
agram shows the same gulf that exists in event log message systems; that of a de-
signer (and/or programmer) with a scope that is entirely separate from that of the user.
Metaphors such as icons are used to bridge the gap, yet there is an undeniable possibility
of miscommunication. As the representational triangle illustrates, all signs are bedded in
social/cultural context, and derive their meaning from it as well as feeding back into the
context. An example might be the ﬂoppy-disk icon, which has become synonymous with
the save function of desktop software despite actual ﬂoppy disks becoming practically
extinct. The ﬂoppy disk still lives on as part of the social context - a sign which has
meaning separate from its real world object, and gains value simply from its uniqueness
[6].
The disappointing conclusion here is: event log messages have not beneﬁtted from any
of the considerations presented so far. Those examples in Figure 1.1 on page 23 are
brutal evidence of a world-view where the User portion of Barr's dichotomy (Figure
2.3) does not even exist. No attempt has been made to embed those signs in a social or
organisational context, or even to adapt them for a non-programmer (of that particular
program) audience. The language chosen has no standardised interpretation, and comes
from an almost inﬁnite set of choices because there is no `ontology' capable enough.
2.2.2 Ontologies: applying semiotics to, and providing structure
for, vocabularies
According to the literature surveyed, the most common application of ontologies appears
to be the provision of a set of signs for a speciﬁc purpose, all of which are then strictly
deﬁned and provided with a degree of context. This approach is evident in Bunch et al.
[52], a paper on the monitoring set-up within a rocket-fuel manufacturing plant, where
ontologies are provided for notiﬁcation scenarios and incorporated into their KAoS policy
tool. The primary purpose of ITIL [53] (a set vocabulary and standardised best-practice
procedures for information technology management) could be said to be the same thing.
Matheus et al. use the deﬁnition of a speciﬁcation of concepts and relationships among
the concepts that can exist in a given setting [9, pg. 547] and inform us that ontologies
are well-established in the disciplines of philosophy and linguistics.
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Figure 2.3: The dichotomy between designer and user [4]
While applying an ontological approach to event log messages could be beneﬁcial, it would
be premature to do so without even brieﬂy considering that approach's rich background.
Stephen Littlejohn, in his book Theories of human communication [54], outlines the two
main schools of thought as actional and non-actional. The actional school takes a more
humanist stand and denies the idea of destiny: people create meanings, have intentions
and make real choices. [54, pg. 29] They recognise that change is inevitable and that
there is an element of chaos in life which leads to diﬀering decisions even in (apparently)
identical circumstances.
Non-actional adherents, however, hold a pre-destined view [54]. According to this camp,
one's DNA and surroundings can deterministically produce a result, i.e. a law could be
written that X+Y=Z where `Z' is a resulting human being which conforms to a template,
created from `X' DNA and brought up in a given situation, `Y'. This point of view may
appeal to rationalists who might then disagree with Derrida's criticism of philosophy on
the basis of logocentrism, the supposed rational power of the word to explain the world
[6, pg. 88], in other words, the belief that words or signs represent a super-set of reality.
An example of non-actional thought might be Doeben-Henisch and Wagner's argument
[5] in favour of formalising models of natural language and the representational triangle in
order to produce `provable' models. Their Required Domain Model, shown in Figure 2.4
on the next page, is an example of the emphasis on observation and ennumeration of
factors in relation to a human being. It demonstrates a positivist/essentialist mindset in
which only directly-observed factors may be taken into account.
Considering again the actional side of the debate; remember that here we espouse that
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Figure 2.4: The Required Domain Model [5]
people bring their own meanings to signs/words rather than those same items being
deﬁned on a more absolute scale. Cobley and Jansz reside in this school of thought -
they chronicle the thoughts of Jacques Lacan in writing; the phenomenon of `diﬀérance'
encapsulates quite nicely the way in which we delude ourselves into thinking we are
rational beings with a ﬁrm grip on the process of signiﬁcation. . . `Diﬀérance', by its
very nature, resists attempts to halt its ﬂow [6, pg. 98], going on to state that such
ideas can be upsetting to those who desire to sit outside the `social level' (see Figure 2.2
on page 39) and manipulate semiotics as though they were independent of culture and
human nature. Umberto Eco is also cited, in particular his `arctic civilization' example
of mis-interpretation, wherein a civilization which survived a future apocalyptic event by
living under the ice cap later drew absurd conclusions in their archeological research when
pondering the meanings of our artifacts (i.e. our `signs') [6]. This example demonstrates
the extent to which our signs rely on contextual awareness and knowledge.
Any application of ontologies to event log messages would therefore have to deal with the
breadth and skill level of the audience, somehow ﬁnding a small set of words (remember-
ing that it is a purely textual interface) to act as unambiguous signs. The ﬁrst, and most
obvious road-block, is the language barrier: there are systems administrators speaking
practically every language on Earth, with a small percentage of them having (currently
internationally-dominant) English as their ﬁrst language. The nuances of English vocab-
ulary are often lost on non-native speakers through no fault of their own - asking them
to distinguish between the relative merits of critical vs alert or warning is imposing
a hefty burden. Then there is the issue of creating a monotonically-increasing scale from
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words (such as those just given) and achieving consensus on their meanings, even for
native speakers of any language. This is a global problem simply because software is used
and standardised across almost all cultures and languages existing today.
Ontologies therefore likely have limited potential in this area (i.e. especially open-source
software). Buckley and Siewiorek [25] were disappointed by the poor quality and incon-
sistencies of logging systems under the control of one organisation (Digital Equipment
Corporation), so the likelihood of a word-based scale showing good results is poor when
dealing with volunteers from far-ﬂung locations around the world.
2.2.3 Semiotic engineering: tips for creating commonality
Semiotic engineering (SE) is a relative newcomer to the HCI arena and focuses on the end-
to-end communication between the program designer and the user. This idea relegates
the actual computer interface to a `designer's deputy'; a proxy which communicates the
decisions taken by, and the world view of, the designer [55]. Semiotic engineering therefore
regards itself as much more all-encompassing than User-Centred Design and cognitive
models, with De Souza and Leitao writing that such established theories only deal with
the user's actions, not the designer's [55, pg. 3], and likening the learning of a new
interface to gaining ﬂuency in a human language, albeit with vastly lessened combinatorial
complexity. The root cause of these challenges, they allege, is the lack of consideration
given to the designer's goal of communication, i.e. the degree to which the user actually
received the message being sent.
The basis of SE is the explicit recognition that the role of the receiver is as important
as that of the sender [55, pg. 16] - another result of Peirce's representational triangle -
because designers/programmers can only communicate via signs and the receiver brings
their own interpretation to each sign. This is made even more challenging by the notion
(from semiotics, as applied by De Souza and Leitao) that human meanings evolve over
time but meanings/signs encoded into a computer program remain static at least as long
as that software revision is used, which in some cases may be decades. These static signs
are then further limited by the mechanistic methods available for their portrayal. The
upside is that static signs can be inspected and evaluated in great depth. But what should
they be compared to? Each and every human being represents a moving target when it
comes to sign interpretation (and creation of internal meaning) [ibid]. This is the core
diﬃculty in creating a common meaning.
De Souza and Leitao oﬀer a considered retreat from this seeming impossibility. They
deﬁne `communicability' as the capacity for the deputy to communicate the essence of the
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designer's idea, perhaps at the cost of detail. The following quote (emphasis De Souza and
Leitao's) outlines how the eﬀectiveness of such `metacommunication' can be observed:
... it suﬃces that one of two things happen (sic) when users interact
with computer systems: either that designers mean to tell something to
users (i.e., to get users to behave in a particular way as a result of being
exposed to intentionally produced signs); or that users take a particular
course of action because they believe they are being told something that
justiﬁes their behavior. [55, pg. 17]
In other words, the (meta)communication is eﬀective to the extent that it results in the
user receiving a message, or even thinking that they are being given a message, but always
with an outcome of action (note that this does not have to be exactly the intended action).
Taken in this light, the overwhelming majority of event log messages are pointless because
(a) the systems administrator either never sees the signs, or (b) does not believe/has great
uncertainty about whether they are being given any message, and so takes no action.
The barrier of manual interpretation without any reference scale for importance actually
hides the designer's/programmer's message. A slightly cynical response might be that
those involved in producing the software used by systems administrators actually view
themselves as the consumers of event log messages, but such a view would implicitly leave
no interface for an administrator - rendering the software a `black box'.
Another take on the quote above might be: if systems administrators are to believe they
are being told something [55, pg. 17], then that belief must rest not only on an objective
and absolute set of signs (i.e. non-word signs: hopefully free of issues to do with inter-
pretation), but also has to [justify] their behavior [ibid] in an organisational and human
sense. That is, an objective and absolute scale (for the programmer/designer/sender to
indicate their message) must be rendered relative to organisational and human demands
(the sysadmin/user/receiver's world view). A number scale is also indicated as a result
of the ﬁnding that interpretable signs change over time with regard to the human mean-
ings attached to them [55]. This seems to be the best alternative towards the goal of
establishing a commonality of meaning.
2.3 Domain-speciﬁc limitations
The image appearing here is one of a data set which is subject to semiotic diﬃculties
(from the point of view of ﬁltering tools), most often through a rapid (and usually undoc-
umented) change, but also from diﬀering understandings between the programmer/de-
signer and their audience, systems administrators. The tools available to us for dealing
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with these issues are inadequate; relying either on absolutely exact matching either for
elimination or ﬂagging (i.e. regular expressions) or producing probabilistic results (i.e.
data mining, neural networks).
2.3.1 An external examination
The only recent academic critique found of the methods we are using was in the ﬁeld of
bioinformatics; Terri Atwood lamented the unsuitability of exact matching techniques,
including regular expressions, ﬁngerprinting, etc, as well as probabilistic methods like
Hidden Markov Models (HMM), for the purpose of searching genetic-sequence databases
[56]. Like event log messages, a genetic-sequence data set is often enormous and repetitive.
Conversely, they possess the advantage of being able to take `snapshots' that remain static.
Atwood's external and frank examination of the tools produced by the computer science
establishment unfortunately concluded that none are suﬃcient for the task at hand.
Atwood identiﬁes reliability as lacking in all approaches, while making the case for relia-
bility as a crucial requirement, given the high cost of false negatives and the overwhelming
quantity of false-positives the moment that search terms are relaxed. In fact, the issues she
faced were remarkably similar to those involved in event log message analysis, especially
the way in which the desired search result may very well contain a tiny and otherwise
inconsequential corruption/mutation, rendering highly-deterministic discriminators use-
less.
An interesting distinction exists in Atwood's proposal to resolve the situation. Unlike the
classical computer science approach, i.e. improve the tool/algorithm while not touching
the source data, she advocates the manual annotation of genetic sequence databases and
then searching the annotations together with the raw data. In other words, Atwood
remains open to algorithmic improvements but would prefer improvements in the source
data (via metadata), as painstaking and time-consuming as that may be. While not noting
salience per se, Atwood's contribution may be in pointing out that we can only locate
the most relevant records by actually searching information about relevance, instead of
wasting time trying to mechanistically infer such an index from raw data.
2.3.2 Lack of state
To further illustrate Atwood's conclusion; other industries have managed much better in
their management of events and the construction of a `nominal state'. Event log messages
tend to not indicate or contain state information  in many cases they are received after
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the event has been completed  which prohibits the construction of a Finite State Machine
to represent a system. Even the entire concept of a `nominal state' is absent. Nominal
state refers to the ability to portray a system as either nominal or in fault to some degree,
most often via a traﬃc-light metaphor.
Bunch et al. detailed a NASA research program implementing the KAos Reactive Moni-
toring and Event Notiﬁcation (KARMEN) from 2002 onwards, at a hydrogen rocket fuel
production plant [52]. Using a subscription model, KARMEN incorporates organisational
policies and rules about groups of alarms (i.e. individual alarms occurring together may
indicate an overall state) into a structure using independent software agents. In compari-
son with RFC 5424, only four levels of severity are used: Critical, Warning, Advisory,
and Log. In addition, the well-understood nature of the industrial plant allowed Bunch
et al. to construct thorough and hierarchical ontologies of known failure modes and their
prerequisites.
There are, however, three main glaring diﬀerences between the NASA fuel plant scenario
and that of Unix event log messages: (1) the fuel production plant is a relatively static
collection of machinery which operates under largely the same physical principles and
designs as used for many years, and (2) all inputs to the KARMEN monitoring system
are quantiﬁed, numeric scale measurements. Every input has a lower bound, a nominal
range, and an upper bound. The plant operators do not have to decide whether or not
Request is a replay is an important message. Finally, (3) the inputs reﬂect a physical
state read at a particular point in time.
This level of quantiﬁed monitoring permits sections of plant, or even the entire complex,
to produce a `traﬃc light' status indicator which can communicate an overall situation at
a glance. Of course, we must bear in mind that an actual system such as a rocket fuel
plant largely possesses complexities that are physical in nature. They are therefore more
amenable to human intuition in spotting and ﬁxing bugs long before the entire complex
is brought on-line, although deep domain knowledge and experience are often required.
Unlike software code, the range of outcomes is considerably more limited, the domain is
not one of abstraction, and therefore a `lurking timebomb' is less likely.
The use of monitoring systems for industrial plants is not a new idea. Eﬀorts date back at
least as far as the 1960s; W. E. Willison produced a comprehensive architecture for power-
generating stations in 1963 [57], for example. Willison's article speciﬁes many analogue
mechanisms, as digital interfaces were only just appearing on the market at the time,
but many of the hazards we face today were identiﬁed, such as rare failures making it
diﬃcult for technicians to retain necessary knowledge and the potential cognitive overload
associated with too many data sources. Willison outlined the ways in which a nominal
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state could be bounded within maxima and minima and methods for aggregating alarms
- techniques available in 1963 for industrial monitoring but still not possible for the vast
majority of event log messages in 2011. It is clear that a quantiﬁcation eﬀort, and even
more importantly, improved instrumentation, are the only ways to achieve manageability.
Note that improved should not be read as more.
2.3.3 Human factors
Willison's fears about the tendency of automation to result in overwhelming amounts of
data being collected have certainly played out in other industries. Molloy and Parasur-
aman's work on vigilance in aviation [58] identiﬁed the same issue. Pilot workload has
only increased over the years as more instruments have been added to aircraft cockpits,
with human intuition being sidelined in favour of automated data collection, the moni-
toring of which is a task we humans are not optimised for [ibid]. Speciﬁcally, the problem
revolves around the repetitive observation of hundreds or thousands of variables, which
can completely saturate a human's cognitive abilities when a failure occurs (even when
alarms are automatically issued as the parameters breach nominal limits).
The very rarity of failures actually makes the necessary level of vigilance much more dif-
ﬁcult to achieve [58, 57]. The combinatorial complexity of the data collection/monitoring
system itself means the data cannot be assumed as correct, leading to second-guessing of
the output, i.e. false-positives due to a failure in the monitoring system designed to alert
operators to failures. In relation to systems administrators, the outcome is one of disregard
for the data, as it often represents either no correlation or only a weak correlation with
reality. A prime example of this can be seen in Pinheiro et al.'s study of Self-Monitoring,
Analysis, and Reporting Technology (SMART) data [59] which was harvested from the
hard disk drives (reported as more than one hundred thousand [59, pg. 3]) in Google's
data centres. SMART is an industry standard intended to improve diagnostic commu-
nication between the hardware (i.e. hard disk drive) and the operating system software,
for the purpose of early detection or even prediction of hard drive failures. In this case,
the failure mode is not usually one of false-positives, but false-negatives: SMART data
overall provides practically no useful/reliable warning of impending disk failure [ibid].
While it is true that a select few SMART parameters do correlate highly with 60-day
failure rates, around 36% of disk drives fail catastrophically with no warning whatsoever
[59]. It is easy to see, therefore, how sysadmins in charge of over 100,000 disk drives
would come to disregard SMART data - in eﬀect it becomes a distraction. This is not a
case for eliminating such data collection, but it is one for allowing humans to utilise their
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intuition for weighting the data ﬁelds. It also makes a good illustration for the diﬀerence
between active and latent errors.
In his inﬂuential book Human Error [60], James Reason lays out the distinction. Active
errors are high-proﬁle, obvious failures or mistakes [ibid]. They tend to be localised and
individual in nature - often epitomising the military refrain everything has to go perfectly
right for something to go perfectly wrong. Their `solutions' are most frequently attempts
to remove one or several of those factors that contributed to the `perfectly right' situation.
Indeed, Reason mentions that after-the-fact accident inquiries tend to focus on the active
side of the equation.
Latent errors, on the other hand, can lie dormant, unnoticed for decades [60]. The
most frequent cause of these errors are assumptions and mistakes by designers, those
in positions of power, or maintenance personnel [ibid]. Latent errors tend not to have
immediate eﬀects but their consequences can be much more severe - active errors often
rely on latent ones, i.e. without the latent, we would have fewer active. Under-design,
cost-cutting, over-optimising; these are some of the names assigned to latent errors if
they are un-earthed. The Y2K issue was a classic latent error. The desire to optimise
and save individual bits led, decades later, to billions being spent in an eﬀort to update
both software and hardware.
The diﬀerence between the two categories can be most easily seen by comparing their cir-
cumstances. Active errors are most frequently errors of judgement in situations of great
pressure and distraction, i.e. we are often unsure whether we could have made better
choices under the circumstances. Latent errors, meanwhile, mostly involve a concious,
rationalised decision often in full knowledge of the potential consequences. If a server
hard disk crashes and this results in data loss, there are many possible errors to consider.
Active: a systems administrator not noticing the pre-failure messages in an event log mes-
sage report, or perhaps not acting fast enough to restore a degraded array of (redundant)
disks so that redundancy was restored. Latent: a sysadmin not doing/testing backups, an
equipment vendor cutting corners on voltage-smoothing componentry, or perhaps most
likely; the disk vendor performing inadequate testing, relaxing quality standards, or not
suﬃciently funding the research and programming that is required for an eﬀective set of
SMART algorithms and disk ﬁrmware.
Reason has several theories that relate to such issues. He writes that much of the work
of human-factors specialists has been directed at improving the immediate human-system
interface (i.e. the control room or cockpit). [60, pg. 173] While not diminishing the
importance of this work, Reason believes it is aimed primarily at reducing the [visible]
`active failure' tip of the causal iceberg. [60, pg. 173-174] Experience has shown that
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Note: numerals added for clarity
Figure 2.5: Shannon & Weaver's communications model [6, 7, 8]
those `closest to the coal-face' are not the primary threat to any system - indeed, they are
the ones most likely to bear the consequences of any obvious, active errors - but that the
risk a person represents rises as their degree of separation to an implemented system rises
[60]. The greater this degree of separation, the more obscured and unaccountable their
decisions are/were. To put it less ominously, a person far up the causal chain from an
implemented system simply has a greatly curtailed ability to clearly communicate their
concerns and reservations with those much more closely involved.
2.4 Communications theory
Further to Reason's rationale on causal chains, the communications process itself can be
analysed for its role in creating errors. Claude Shannon conceived the communications
model [7] in Figure 2.5 to deal with the challenges of radio communication in the late 1940s:
a time of entirely-analogue communications technology. Warren Weaver subsequently
used it in the context of semiotics and human communication [8], helping to formalise the
notion that information was encoded in a lossy manner every time it was communicated
[6].
Shannon's and Weaver's fundamental proposition was that the message being sent was
rarely (if ever) the message being received. Weaver in particular applied this logic to
all human communication regardless of technology; a semiotics problem engendered by
language and its shortcomings, but also images or any other form of imperfect communi-
cation. The following item explanations are drawn from Weaver [8].
1. Information source: The source has a ﬁnite number of possible alternative mes-
sages from which to choose, due to the limits of any established vocabulary or symbol
recognition. Once chosen, this message is sent via the transmitter.
2. Transmitter: The transmitter encodes the message into a signal so that it is then
capable of crossing a medium.
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3. Noise source: Noise encapsulates all the unintended alterations made to the signal
before it reaches the receiver.
4. Receiver: An inverse transmitter which decodes the signal and produces a mes-
sage (note: this is not necessarily the same message as that transmitted).
5. Destination: A parallel to the information source which should be able to make
sense of the message.
As Weaver put it: [w]hen I talk to you, my brain is the information source, yours the
destination; my vocal system is the transmitter, and your ear and the associated eighth
nerve is the receiver. [8, pg. 4] Shannon's and Weaver's communications model neatly
portrays the ambiguity that inevitably arises from the use of a ﬁnite set of messages, such
as a word vocabulary, for communication.
2.5 Summary
This chapter reviewed the most relevant literature around communication via event log
messages. Salience was outlined and deﬁnitions from other ﬁelds of research examined.
Methods for establishing common meanings have been considered (including their com-
munication) and the limitations peculiar to the event logging environment presented. It is
clear that the salience of events and information has received considerable attention but
not in the computer science discipline  rather, we have inherited the legacy of ad-hoc
standards which now govern us by virtue of their well-established code bases, the pre-
sumptions of which are not being challenged by academia. The Glasgow Coma Scale and
stakeholder salience are but two examples of revolutionary thought that can lead to real
improvements in how we deal with constant ﬂows information of which some is relatively
more important.
In order to cope with the lack of obviously- and directly-applicable literature, it is neces-
sary at this time to construct a basis for further reasoning. The problem must be clearly
deﬁned. That deﬁnition has to be embedded in an appropriate context. From there, a
foundation can be established using the scaﬀolding of literature surrounding the issue: is
there a promising way to improve the salience of event log messages that result from an
automated ﬁltering process? This will be the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Resorting to ﬁrst principles
How can we directly and deterministically improve the salience of event log messages that
are the result of an automated ﬁltering process? That is, exactly what is it that systems
administrators, i.e. the audience for any deployed system event log, actually consider to
be important? The previous chapter informed us that other disciplines have established
a notion of salience, that multiple dimensions can be better than one, and that it seems
that any solution should allow the observer's own context to be applied when determining
salience.
The salience of the content emerging from previous eﬀorts has been subjected to only the
most simplistic of tests (if any), such as a small number of `domain experts' that oﬀer
their opinions on how good or useful the output is to them. For example, Saniefar
et al. utilised two unidentiﬁed people to determine the percentage of terms that were
really relevant [42, pg. 775]; whereas Wallin et al. were advised by only a single
network operator, stating that [the operator] indicated that priority estimates that were
within one step of the true value would be useful [10, pg. 19]. It barely needs to
be mentioned that these reference sources do not meet any known scientiﬁc standard
in terms of the sample taken, the miscellaneous factors inﬂuencing the decisions of the
domain experts (which should be controlled for), or repeatability  their advice embodies
the term `unproven presumptions' [51].
In one ﬁnal case, the rationale for a crucial decision was left entirely unexplained by Ya-
manishi & Maruyama: [h]ence in the evaluation of this experiment we formally deﬁne
a failure symptom as any alarm that is raised within one week before `lock-up'. This
deﬁnition seems reasonable from the standpoint of network operation [18, pg. 504] (em-
phasis mine), illustrating a (stated) presumption that alarms are no longer salient after a
period of one week. They also relied on a single human operator for manual assignment of
salience to events, to wit: the `lock up' was the failure which a network operator taking
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care of the network systems thought most critical and was mainly concerned with [ibid].
To be fair, however, there is no available research on the salience of event log messages,
leading to the use of these unscientiﬁc sources.
Flack & Atallah [40] came at the problem from a diﬀerent angle: their paper dealt in part
with the preservation of information from audit logs, as they were parsed into canonical
forms using various approaches. Flack & Atallah were concerned that the parsing process
was discarding a degree of the semantic value contained in log messages - making future
analysis that much more diﬃcult and error-prone [ibid]. They identiﬁed the fact that
messages contain meaning which is embedded in their grammatical form alone, and that
it can be imperilled even by the ﬁrst step of any solution that requires parsing (i.e.
anomaly detectors), leading to a situation where such solutions are working oﬀ of a `lossy'
input. When a message is parsed, it is usually split up into constituent ﬁelds and such a
separation of data points represents a loss of information; much like the pieces of a jigsaw
puzzle versus the completed whole.
Flack & Atallah proceeded to iteratively develop a grammar-based parser for Sun Mi-
crosystem's BSM audit log format to the point where it could interpret almost every
possible message [40]. Note that an audit log is a strictly-deﬁned log format that only
records explicit user actions transiting through the system kernel - such as deleting a ﬁle
or listing a directory of ﬁles. The set of possible actions is comparatively small, thus audit
logs are not as complex as the free-form natural language content of event log messages.
Essentially, their eﬀorts revolved around catering for all identiﬁable special cases and re-
solving ambiguity wherever possible. One problem, however, with such an approach is
that it rapidly approaches or even exceeds the maintenance burden of a policy/signature-
based ﬁlter, in terms of coping with the inevitable system or software changes. This
is even before the anomaly detection stage, and its associated algorithmic challenges, is
considered. The result: salient messages require yet more time investment to identify.
3.1 So, what is a `salient' message?
What can be deduced is this: researchers have always had to check with real people
about whether a given event log message is salient or not, since there is no mathematical
model for determining message salience. It therefore follows that the researchers did not
believe their own level of domain expertise or experience to be suﬃcient. After all, the
consultation of one or two people does not constitute evidence per se. A Flack & Atallah-
like exception illustrates that mechanised interpretation principles for log messages cannot
be generalised and the parser has to comprise an expert system, eﬀectively creating a
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policy engine for responding to every possible outcome (which is barely feasible even in a
strictly-deﬁned, single-source domain like audit logs). The X.733 standard [43] attempted
such an approach for event log messages and was obsolete even before it was released. A
state of continual change does not permit static handling.
To follow a simplistic behaviouralist model for the time being, as well as considering
De Souza and Leitao [55], information considered salient by humans is information that
either initiates, or inﬂuences the path of, action. It is clear from the prior examination of
semiotics that this salient information will change because it is composed of signs (words)
which are dynamic by nature. To simultaneously narrow down the problem and give it
relevance, context must be introduced.
The context of this investigation is the role of a systems administrator working with
open-source software. Often a professional, the sysadmin is responsible for maintaining,
and where-possible, improving, business continuity and capability (this aspect has not
changed in decades). Any failure of a critical system will result in urgent work being
undertaken and a likely investigation into any active errors committed [60]. In addition,
the proliferation and pervasiveness of modern computing is in stark contrast to the 1970s
era of perhaps a single-digit number of computers in each organisation (and this is the
environment in which event log messages were ﬁrst conceived), resulting in many simul-
taneous pressures on an administrator, thereby decreasing vigilance against failures [58].
Sysadmins therefore sometimes ﬁnd themselves in `survival mode' - spending all their time
maintaining the status quo, with no resources for improvement of the situation.
Informed by context, it is now possible to state that systems administrators consider
information to be salient if it requires or inﬂuences their action with regard to their
responsibilities in the organisation. Salient information would therefore be anything that
impacts on business continuity or capability; it takes the form of simultaneous pressures
and can unfortunately lead to `survival mode' if it overwhelms an individual's capabilities.
Information that is not salient does not have these impacts, exerts pressure only in the
sense that its salience has to ﬁrst be identiﬁed, and should not push one into `survival
mode'. It is necessary to bear in mind, though, that each organisation and each individual
sysadmin have diﬀering standards and requirements for the services they rely on and these
may change over time (some use the term intrinsically non-stationary, e.g. [18, pg. 499]
to describe the event-logging environment). Any salience threshold is therefore a moving
target and more can perhaps be gained by using the salient/non-salient distinctions as
end-points on a sliding scale, in agreement with Buckley's premises in [26].
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3.2 Modelling the end-to-end lifecycle of an event log
message
To set the scene for the lifecycle of a message, it is important to consider some statistical
likelihoods. An exaggerated form of the Pareto principle has previously been located
in statistical analyses of event data [10]; simply put, a very few distinct events happen
frequently, while the bulk (more than 95%) occur rarely or even only a handful of times
over several years. Following a `low-hanging fruit' approach, the nature of humans is
to ﬁlter the most common events ﬁrst, and when the most straightforward solution is a
simplistic and deterministic regular expression, the elimination of known events (whether
known-good or known-bad) is the path of least resistance. This leaves behind a pool
of unknown events which belong to either or both of these categories: `unknown due to
rarity or ﬁrst sighting' and `common but unknown due to insuﬃcient system knowledge
or familiarity'. Such a quandary exists independent of any current ﬁltering technology.
Digging deeper, the issue with the automated ﬁltering stage (in whichever form it may
take) between humans and the event log message-generating systems comes from the very
nature of the solutions implemented. Humans are poorly adapted to deal with the ﬂood
of messages that even one busy system can produce, so the normal coping strategy is to
reduce the cognitive load by selectively excluding most or all of the surrounding contextual
information on oﬀer, simply to avoid overload. Yet there is one contextual area currently
being entirely neglected: the software code itself.
Event log messages are issued from code, of course, but they then have to rely on lossy
and ambiguous natural language to communicate as the `designer's deputy' (see page 44).
Code represents the designer/programmer's most direct instantiation of their ideas [61];
it contains (among other things) comments, conditional testing structures, mathematical
algorithms and loops. As a formalised representation it is already a limited subset of the
thoughts inside the head of the designer/programmer. A million-line program may then
cut this back even further, only ever issuing a few thousand diﬀerent log messages: for
example, OpenVPN version 2.1.4 [13] contains 79,710 lines of code, of which 1,311 are for
issuing non-debugging event log messages, making for a ratio of roughly 1:61. The cycle
of restriction continues with every step, continuously losing context and paring back the
value of whatever semiotic signs eventually make it to the other end of the communication
process: the mind of a systems administrator.
A model for such fundamentally lossy communication has not previously been applied to
a unidirectional interface such as event log messages. Shannon and Weaver's communica-
tions model is presented here once again for the beneﬁt of the reader. The model helps
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Note: numerals added for clarity
Figure 3.1: Shannon & Weaver's communications model [6, 7, 8]
to visualise Weaver's notion that information was encoded in a lossy manner every time
it was communicated [6]. Here I will attempt to further adapt the model - this time into
the semiotic context of event logging (see [62]).
1. The information source is deﬁned as the original intention or thoughts of the
programmer and/or program designer; those individuals editing source code that
later becomes the binary executable, libraries, scripts, etc running on systems. The
programmer is the person best informed about the situations leading to an event
log message being issued  their mental model of the problem domain is the most
detailed and in-depth of the actors in this context  and originally creates the
sequence of conditionals leading to such an issuing. Semiotics informs us that this
level of conciousness cannot ever be communicated without loss because no sign is
entirely adequate (the `picture worth a thousand words' premise). The thoughts
of the programmer are often most candidly portrayed in code comments, such as
should never get to here! or probably going to fail, but we'll try to recover anyway,
for what it's worth. The message represents the transition stage of writing code.
Limitations: human competence, memory, decision-making, clarity, rationality, in-
tuition, reasoning.
Information state: context-rich, vague, informal human thought processes.
Example: Hypothetical OpenVPN programmer: We need to initialise the network
tunnel adapters using the operating system - there is no other way.
Errors have to be catered for and we have to inform the user if there is
an error. This all has to be done in a cross-platform manner with as few
platform-speciﬁc clauses as possible.
2. The transmitter is deﬁned as the encoded thought process of the programmer, i.e.
the source code which is then (most often) compiled into binary machine code. Such
information is a subset of the original intention of the `information source', having
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been formalised and revised into a Turing-complete grammar, following absolute
rules of logic and with conditionals that are machine-testable. Thus the human
thought processes have transitioned from poorly-deﬁned but context-rich, to well-
deﬁned, testable and context-poor. The transmitter is therefore the implemented
mechanism which `transmits' the event log message when all the (machine-testable)
conditions for doing so have been met. The signal is an individual log message
sent by the binary program in question.
Limitations: grammar expressiveness, human language ability (i.e. a native speaker
of the applicable natural language, the individual's level of education).
Information state: formalised, testable grammar, probably in a binary form.
Example: shows three message-issuing lines (40, 45, 48) in all of the platform-
speciﬁc tunnel initialisation code (partial listing in Listing 3.1 on page 60).
OpenVPN itself only issues messages in the Win32 platform section, or a
generic `giving up' message if the platform is unsupported. For all other
platforms it relies on piping any errors from the ifconfig command
it runs, which is supposed to conﬁgure the VPN tunnel interface in a
command-line shell, back to the user (these lines are omitted because
they do not have any content of their own). It is easy to perceive that a
user might be bewildered by such an error message, presented as-is with-
out reasons or interpretation - as OpenVPN is not creating the message
itself and the semiotic context is therefore diﬀerent. When ifconfig is
run, it of course does not change its output to match the style of Open-
VPN's and most users would likely not be aware that ifconfig is being
utilised at all.
Another point to note in Listing 3.1 is the nested conditionals consisting
of a switch-case, an if statement and numerous variations of #if.
These conditionals create their own context which is omitted from the is-
sued message, perhaps wisely, but omitted nonetheless. The message on
line 45 could be suﬃxed with the following: This message was issued
because the Win32 API returned a null value in response to your
`--ip-win32 netsh' parameter. Similarly, the message on line 48
could oﬀer more information on the various platforms that it tried to
match already, i.e. explain which conditionals it tested, that then led to
issuing the message.
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It is true that speciﬁc debugging messages can help with these situa-
tions, but the use of debugging techniques requires deliberate and fo-
cussed action to be taken (i.e. enabling the debug messages, which may
be a drawn-out operation on a change-controlled system that is already
deployed in production) which can only happen once that action has
been identiﬁed as a necessary step. For eﬀective communication to take
place, the error message would have to explicitly stipulate one or all of
the following: the reading of the source code, the enabling of debug mes-
sages, or telling the user that the message is not important and can be
discarded. As a designer's deputy, the code must highlight salient mes-
sages that it issues, and when a message is salient it must facilitate the
user's understanding of why - a line of reasoning which needs to draw
on programmatic context as background for the situation. Otherwise
the signs being used are semiotically-impotent because no `real-world
objects' (see Figure 2.2 on page 39) are being oﬀered - only isolated and
cryptic snippets, analogous to hearing only a single sentence from a long
discussion.
3. The noise source is deﬁned as both the sources of other disparate messages and
unrelated messages from our own binary, as well as any packet loss related to the
commonplace use of the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) with logging daemons.
Thankfully, Shannon & Weaver's concept of `engineering noise' has largely been
nulliﬁed in our domain due to the layering of digital communications, the Transmis-
sion Control Protocol (TCP) and packet checksums. TCP is being standardised for
event-logging purposes by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as demand
grows for a reliable network transport, despite TCP itself not being ideally suited to
the job [63]. The use of UDP as a transport for messages has its advocates too, and
their justiﬁcations are valid: lossy or congested networks can prevent session-based
protocols from working [64, 63], simplicity can be invaluable in emergencies, and
UDP retransmission can be tailored to each individual situation [64]. Malicious at-
tacks such as man-in-the-middle (MitM), intentional spurious distractions or merely
simple mistakes with ﬁrewall rules also cannot be entirely ruled out with any trans-
port and lead to imperfect information (or none at all) being received: these have to
be considered as noise contributing to what Weaver calls undesirable uncertainty
[8].
Complex multi-tier systems, clusters of machines issuing identical messages, denial-
60 CHAPTER 3. RESORTING TO FIRST PRINCIPLES
Listing 3.1 tun.c selective snippet from OpenVPN version 2.1.4 [13]
1 /*
2 * Platform specific tun initializations
3 */
4 void
5 init_tun_post (struct tuntap *tt,
6 ...
7 {






14 /* execute the ifconfig command through the shell */
15 void

















33 #elif defined(TARGET_FREEBSD)|| defined(TARGET_DRAGONFLY)
34 ...





40 msg (M_INFO , "******** NOTE:  Please manually set the IP/netmask of '%s' to %
s/%s (if it is not already set)",
41 actual , ifconfig_local , print_in_addr_t (tt->adapter_netmask , 0, &gc));
42 break;
43 case IPW32_SET_NETSH:
44 if (! strcmp (actual , "NULL"))
45 msg (M_FATAL , "Error: When using --ip -win32 netsh , if you have more than 
one TAP -Win32 adapter , you must also specify --dev -node");
46 ...
47 #else
48 msg (M_FATAL , "Sorry , but I don't know how to do 'ifconfig ' commands on this 
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of-service attacks, continual change and poor documentation: all of these aspects
make it more diﬃcult for an administrator to locate a problem signature, and to iso-
late it from the continuous ﬂow of information; a task not dissimilar to siphoning oﬀ
one particular drop whilst drinking from a ﬁre hose. Such problems are exacerbated
by undesirable uncertainty - the perpetual requirement for a systems administrator
to second-guess the validity of data. Weaver envisaged yet another noise source:
semantic noise, contributing perturbations or distortions of meaning which are
not intended by the source but which inescapably aﬀect the destination [8, pg.
15]. This is at least partially catered for above, in the message transition between
thought-processes and code.
The `received signal' is the combination of all these possibilities ﬂowing into a cen-
tralised log collector, i.e. a logging server. The hundreds-of-megabytes ﬁgures men-
tioned on page 21 are measured at this point. A factor that must be remembered is
that the systems administrator may not have any control over the devices sending
event log messages to their central collection server.
Limitations imposed: incomplete information which has possibly been deliberately
manipulated or omitted, spurious information (also possibly injected as
a distraction tactic).
Information state of the `received signal': possibly-salient content submerged in a
ﬂood of distractions.
Example: a 9-second snapshot on a lightly-loaded system shows an OpenVPN ses-
sion re-initalisation, shown in Listing 3.2 on the next page. The example
is quite `kind' in that the messages are contiguous in this case. On a
highly-loaded system in a large production environment, it is unlikely
that they would be contiguous simply because of the volume being re-
ceived. There is also no relationship between the OpenVPN messages
and those surrounding them, but such a data point should not form the
basis of any assumption that this would always be the case. Root causes
can produce errors further up `the stack', for example, disk read errors
on a database server causing a client on another machine to issue event
log messages about database timeouts.
4. The receiver is deﬁned as the system processes or daemons which both receive
messages, and then perform ﬁltering on them. The ﬁltering process may appear
out of place, but is similar in its intention to Weaver's semantic receiver which
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Listing 3.2 Some OpenVPN messages embedded in a log message ﬂow
1 ...
2 Dec 16 17:35:16 host named [3898]: automatic empty zone: A.E.F.IP6.ARPA
3 Dec 16 17:35:16 host named [3898]: automatic empty zone: B.E.F.IP6.ARPA
4 Dec 16 17:35:16 host named [3898]: command channel listening on 127.0.0.1#953
5 Dec 16 17:35:16 host named [3898]: zone 0.in-addr.arpa/IN: loaded serial 1
6 Dec 16 17:35:16 host named [3898]: zone 127.in -addr.arpa/IN: loaded serial 1
7 Dec 16 17:35:17 host named [3898]: zone 16.172.in-addr.arpa/IN: loaded serial 2010042601
8 Dec 16 17:35:17 host named [3898]: zone 255.in -addr.arpa/IN: loaded serial 1
9 Dec 16 17:35:17 host named [3898]: zone localhost/IN: loaded serial 2
10 Dec 16 17:35:17 host named [3898]: zone example.com/IN: loaded serial 2010071901
11 Dec 16 17:35:17 host named [3898]: running
12 Dec 16 17:35:17 host ovpn -server [3912]: OpenVPN 2.1 _rc11 i486 -pc-linux -gnu [SSL] [LZO2] [
EPOLL] [PKCS11] built on Sep 18 2008
13 Dec 16 17:35:18 host ovpn -server [3912]: /usr/bin/openssl -vulnkey -q -b 2048 -m <modulus
omitted >
14 Dec 16 17:35:20 host ovpn -server [3912]: Control Channel Authentication: using 'tls -auth.
key ' as a OpenVPN static key file
15 Dec 16 17:35:20 host ovpn -server [3912]: WARNING: normally if you use --mssfix and/or --
fragment , you should also set --tun -mtu 1500 (currently it is 1442)
16 Dec 16 17:35:20 host ovpn -server [3912]: TUN/TAP device tun0 opened
17 Dec 16 17:35:20 host ovpn -server [3912]: /sbin/ifconfig tun0 172.16.201.1 pointopoint
172.16.201.2 mtu 1442
18 Dec 16 17:35:20 host ovpn -server [3921]: GID set to nobody
19 Dec 16 17:35:20 host ovpn -server [3921]: UID set to nobody
20 Dec 16 17:35:20 host ovpn -server [3921]: UDPv4 link local (bound): [undef ]:1194
21 Dec 16 17:35:20 host ovpn -server [3921]: UDPv4 link remote: [undef]
22 Dec 16 17:35:20 host ovpn -server [3921]: Initialization Sequence Completed
23 Dec 16 17:35:25 host sensord: sensord started
24 Dec 16 17:35:25 host sensord: Chip: acpitz -virtual -0
25 Dec 16 17:35:25 host sensord: Adapter: Virtual device
26 Dec 16 17:35:25 host sensord: temp1: 32.0 C
27 Dec 16 17:35:25 host sensord: Chip: vt8231 -isa -6000
28 Dec 16 17:35:25 host sensord: Adapter: ISA adapter
29 Dec 16 17:35:25 host sensord: +3.3V: +3.27 V (min = +3.13 V, max = +3.45 V)
30 Dec 16 17:35:25 host sensord: +2.5V: +2.47 V (min = +2.37 V, max = +2.62 V)
31 Dec 16 17:35:25 host sensord: VCore: +2.08 V (min = +1.89 V, max = +2.39 V)
32 Dec 16 17:35:25 host sensord: +5V: +4.96 V (min = +4.71 V, max = +5.22 V)
33 ...
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he imagined sitting between the receiver and the destination, the diﬀerence being
that the semantic receiver was to cater to the varying characteristics of each poten-
tial receiver device [8]. Receiving Syslog daemons, however, are relatively simple
automata which currently do little more than appending the contents of network
packets to an appropriate log ﬁle.
Here it is useful to step back for a moment and reconsider the state of the informa-
tion in the ﬂow which has been received. As Weaver speciﬁed, the word information
as used here is distinct from meaning, in that the very notion of meaning has disap-
peared by this stage and must be reconstructed from scratch from mere information
(akin to data). Information [represents] freedom of choice and hence uncertainty
as to what choice has been made [8, pg. 11] - which tells us that more information
can mean more uncertainty but this can still be desirable. Consider the example of
audio CD sampling rates: the virtue of the 16-bit wave format is excellent descrip-
tiveness in that there are so many values with which to describe an analogue audio
wave. Compared to a 4-bit wave format, 16-bit is clearly superior. Yet 16-bit creates
much more uncertainty in that the probability of any given value being received is
greatly reduced.
The automata handling the ﬂow, though, cannot determine a meaningful message
from nonsense, with the result that messages like those in Figure 1.1 on page 23
are (by default) piped into a few broadly-speciﬁed ﬁles, dependent on their Syslog
facility value. The common Linux/open-source ﬁles would be auth.log, messages,
syslog, daemon.log, mail.log, and so on. On Windows operating systems the
three logging categories are Security, System and Application. From the point of
view of automata, the only reliable method for determining where a message should
be delivered is for the programmer/designer to pre-decide this via the facility value.
RFC 5424 standardises these but does not broach the topic of reliably determining
which messages a human should see.
The task of reverse-engineering salience into the messages is bequeathed to the
ﬁltering process, and this task has thus far been performed with the (valid) assump-
tion that since a message's meaning cannot yet be determined by a machine, we
have to make do with matching regular expressions (e.g. Listing 1.2 on page 25),
or using statistical methods  usually boiling down to trained data mining. This
is a crucial weakness of the natural-language nature of log messages. Furthermore,
their unpredictable yet often rapid rate of change means most solutions are obsolete
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even before coding begins. Whereas message routing was accepted as a function
of metadata set into source code, the human-interface side was apparently never
considered beyond the very locally-focussed severity levels. We might as well turn
our tools to bear on a newspaper's website and rely on them to tell us the `impor-
tant' headlines, along with succinct and relevant quotes from the articles, for all the
real-world success witnessed to date in the log analysis ﬁeld.
Limitations: static or trained ﬁltering tools that must assess salience based on pre-
deﬁned rules or trends, probabilistic factors in neural networks, and/or
signatures.
Information state: out-of-context messages, littered with potential false-positives
and -negatives, and most importantly, devoid of any organisationally-
useful or machine-readable indicator of salience.
Example: A centralised log-collection server running software which is almost in-
evitably using regular expressions (or a comparable variant of static
string-matching ﬁlters) such as those in Listing 1.2 on page 25. The
software detailed in Section 3.3.1 on page 67 is one example. This point
of the ﬂow is therefore purely automatic and handled by a ﬁnite state
machine. Challenging aspects like encryption, authentication, session
management and others outside the scope of this thesis are dealt with
here.
5. Predictably, the destination is deﬁned to be the systems administrator. This role
is ﬁlled by a human who must make critical decisions on a daily basis, often using
the information presented by the various automated monitoring processes. Such a
role requires vigilance  a diﬃcult and error-prone task when there might be only
one failure indicator amid the logs, and the administrator has other business tasks
to complete [58]. There can be no guarantee of the administrator being a speciﬁc
domain expert, let alone being experienced with any particular (sub-)system - an
administrator `covering' for another who is on vacation is but one counter-example.
Limitations: busy human with other priorities competing for their attention, ex-
perience level and language ability of said administrator. Uncertainty
about the method of information presentation (E-mail? Website? How
often is it checked? How much time or opportunity is there for a human
to verify the information?), i.e. interface assumptions that may not be
suitable for the end-user.
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Information state: mental impressions formed by the information of questionable
salience that has made it through the ﬁltering process.
Example: any systems administrator who may or may not take action as a result
of a message reported to them. In this OpenVPN working example,
the sysadmin has to decide the importance of the message WARNING:
normally if you use --mssfix and/or --fragment, you should also
set --tun-mtu 1500 (currently it is 1442) and proceed from there.
The real-world system this message was taken from has been running
an OpenVPN server daemon for over six years, during which the warn-
ing message has been displayed around twice a week (on average). No
problems have ever been noticed as a result of the warning.
Speciﬁcally, the message relates to where IP packets will be fragmented:
either 1500-byte data packets will be cut up to ﬁt into valid VPN packets
which then travel over a layer-2 media with a maximum packet size of
1500 bytes, or the data packets are packed into >1500 byte VPN packets
which themselves then have to be fragmented to ﬁt on the media. In
the implementation examined, the former alternative was chosen, but
OpenVPN issues the warning message despite no problems being evi-
dent. A design (i.e. Syslog) requiring this level of detailed consideration
for every possible log message, including ones that have yet to be issued,
is not feasible in today's environments, and even less so in tomorrow's.
Figure 3.2: Adapted version of Shannon & Weaver's communications model; for event log
messaging
It is clear from the process above, depicted in an adapted form in Figure 3.2, that a
communication deﬁcit develops between the source and the destination. The argument
presented here is that this deﬁcit is a factor in dulling the vigilance of administrators;
creating a risk of latent failures [60]. Merely learning the nominal state of systems
becomes an exercise in futility, as can be seen in the many `dashboards' that seek to
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visually portray a current state and yet fail utterly to do so [14]  and through such a
systemic lack of awareness, failures can result [58].
3.3 Mechanistically interpreting natural-language mes-
sages
A common thread among the academic literature is the diﬃculty involved in interpreting
natural-language portions of event log messages. Not only is there the immense challenge
of parsing a language itself, but the complications arising from non-standard formats,
non-native users of any given language, in consistencies across and within products (e.g.
[25]), and even spelling mistakes, are far from trivial. The general approach to anomaly
detection can thus be summed up as rare == bad (which can be observed in [65, 17, 18]);
an assumption that results from the abandonment of the actual interpretation of meaning.
Such an approach is not reﬂected in other well-established disciplines that were detailed
earlier (industrial chemical plant monitoring failure [52], failure monitoring in aviation
[58], and electricity-generation equipment monitoring [57]) that tend to focus on nominal
states, rates of change and threshold trips. Those examples rely on quantiﬁed measure-
ments wherein the scales themselves depict salient points. That is, the scales have meaning
in and of themselves. Without quantiﬁed and useful scales available to us, the approaches
taken to event log messages universally rely on identifying `bad' messages; in isolation to
begin with and occasionally seeking correlations with other messages at a later point in
time.
It is true that policy/signature-based tools can complement the results of frequent-pattern
data mining, which left to its own devices would consider a weekly time-synchronisation
issue to be more serious than one hundred disk-write failures every day, but the results
of such regular-expression ﬁlters still fundamentally reﬂect the competence of the ﬁlter
set and not an objective, or even subjective, evaluation of importance. The statistical
or neural-network approaches feature only probabilistic outcomes and a need for training
which, even when drawing from knowledge bases, seems unable to surpass a 50%-correct
threshold (as in [10]).
These issues resonate with Atwood's ﬁndings [56], and those of a large-scale literature
survey (of more than 150 published papers) by Facca and Lanzi which concluded that the
most promising approach for useful Web usage data mining was an end-to-end conceptual
schema that improved the quality of the source data [66]. Filters which use a statistical
or neural-network technique also tend to be limited to academic settings. In summary,
eﬀective ﬁltering is still a `hard' problem [67].
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3.3.1 Examining a common deployment: Logcheck
To know where one is going, one ﬁrst has to know where one has come from. For a work-
ing example, an unmodiﬁed installation of Logcheck v1.2.69 [20], the most-often installed
policy/signature-based alternative [21] under Debian Linux v5.0 [68] was examined. In
this context, white-listing refers to matching for the purpose of discarding a message as
unnecessary/known-good/routine, while black-listing is the opposite practice of match-
ing known-bad messages explicitly for notiﬁcation purposes.
The `server' monitoring proﬁle contains 1324 lines of regular expressions for white-listing
innocuous event log messages, 47 lines termed cracking that black-list suspicious mes-
sages, 12 lines for violations black-listing (often used for ﬂagging emergency conditions
such as disk failure) and 155 violation-ignore lines that white-list speciﬁc cases other-
wise ﬂagged as violations. These numbers are from the rules shipped with the Logcheck
package - they do not include any rules added by other software packages. The Logcheck
software uses this repository of regular expressions to ﬁlter event log messages, which by
default it does daily, resulting in an e-mail to the administrator. This e-mail contains all
the messages which either matched a black-list expression or did not match a white-list
one.
It should be noted here that there are several issues with this simplistic approach: there
is a presumption that all unanticipated `bad' messages will pass through the ﬁltering
process; that all high-priority messages will be ﬂagged by the violations or cracking
black-lists; and that the white-list will be maintained so as to reduce `noise' in the daily
report and therefore call attention only to genuine issues. Noise generally consists of the
non-salient and/or duplicated messages created by node 3 in Figure 3.2 on page 65.
Rules such as the small sample in Listing 1.2 on page 25 are typical of the mechanism
used for policy/signature-based tools. These particular rules are representative of the
enumerated whitelist that removes messages which administrators do not need to be made
aware of  every line represents a special case deemed to be acceptable. The blacklist rules
are written identically and are only identiﬁed as `bad' by the ﬁle they are stored in.
The ratios of whitelist-to-blacklist rules are indicative of the potential for regular expres-
sions to cope with unanticipated situations. Logcheck's `server' proﬁle possesses a total
of 1479 message whitelist rules that eliminate known-good messages, compared to only
59 blacklist rules that highlight known-bad messages. This ratio of roughly 25:1 clearly
illustrates the usefulness of the regular expression mechanism: when it comes to system
failures, it is only possible to anticipate highly-speciﬁc cases, and indeed Logcheck (as of
v1.2.69 in Debian v5.0) only does so with disk monitoring errors and a very few cases of
kernel events. An anonymized sample of real events which didn't match any of the default
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Logcheck ﬁlter sets is shown in Listing 1.1 on page 23. These lines were e-mailed to the
system administrator as possibly-serious events.
Notably, compared to the `server' proﬁle characteristic, the `paranoid' monitoring pro-
ﬁle caters for increased administrator paranoia by removing whitelist elimination rules,
without adding blacklist rules. Choosing this proﬁle results in a daily e-mail with an
increased number of spurious events. As another point of comparison, the LogWatch [19]
package in Debian Linux v5.0 contains a default ﬁlter set of 1104 regular expressions, the
vast majority of which are used to count event `hits' in log ﬁles and whether a given hit
is considered harmless or not is particular to each log ﬁle input. In only 39 cases is a
bad counter incremented. This represents a whitelist:blacklist ratio of roughly 27:1, as
of LogWatch v7.3.6.cvs20080702-2.
3.3.2 Problems with the current approach
A fundamental issue with the policy/signature-based situation as it stands, is the emphasis
on removing known-good event log messages, ﬂagging or counting known-bad messages,
and the implicit assumption that an acceptable outcome is for any remaining events to
fall into a category of `unknown'. The number of unknowns can be iteratively reduced
with the addition of regular expressions to the ﬁlter set, but this is a considerable mainte-
nance burden in modern environments [10] and any automated attempt to generate these
expressions has a signiﬁcant and unavoidable risk in regard to false positives/negatives
[56].
Human involvement cannot be avoided altogether [56, 65]: although an algorithm can
identify trends in data, it does not and cannot know exactly what a human observer is
interested in. Worse yet, this eﬀort is being repeated in parallel in every organisation
which utilises log analysis tools, as the ﬁnal burden of interpretation and ﬁltering is on
the end-user (i.e. systems administrators). To a limited degree, however, the ﬁltering
eﬀort always has to be customised according to the needs, policies and priorities of each
organisation, and thus this capability should not be removed, but instead the need for its
use minimised.
Whichever approach is used, it can be diﬃcult to categorically justify the addition of such
unknown events to a white- or blacklist, leading to a situation where the distraction `noise'
level in a ﬁltered event log incrementally builds over time as the software base changes.
An example of this dilemma is a message from the Berkeley Internet Name Daemon
(BIND) [69]: clients-per-query decreased to [a two-digit number], for which
this author has not been able to locate a conclusive result regarding severity or priority,
despite many searches.
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Such a known vs unknown conﬂict is not helped when the data input source represents a
continuous ﬂow that is continuously changing (chaotic in nature), incomplete, inconsistent
[25] and semantically heterogeneous [70]  thereby defying any attempt to reliably/deter-
ministically correlate events, such as [15] but especially ontological eﬀorts such as [71, 70]
(see Section 2.2.2 on page 41 for more details of ontologies). Event correlation relies on
a relatively static and well-understood environment; for the purposes of identifying root
causes [72], and optimally, downstream impacts. Indeed, Yamanishi & Maruyama use the
term intrinsically non-stationary [18] to describe the modern situations within which
event logging systems exist.
This `moving target' becomes even more relevant when considering research in the health-
care sector which asserts that interoperability between disparate systems cannot take place
in a meaningful manner unless valid relationships are identiﬁed between the systems' on-
tologies [73], simply because ontologies that are continually in ﬂux cannot maintain those
relationships in stasis (by deﬁnition). Current automated techniques to cope with this
reconciliation challenge are far from complete [30] and event correlation (in the sense of
automatically linking events across and between systems) remains a `hard' problem [18].
Other attempts at automatically and independently assigning priorities to events have not
met any greater success: the correlations between system-assigned problem severity and
actual real-world problem priority appear to be weak at best, and practically non-existent
when examining event type versus real-world priority [10]. Such a disparity is partly due
to a given device or system daemon issuing event log messages with no knowledge of, or
regard to, its own place in an organisation's infrastructure. In short, a piece of computer
code is written with only an awareness of the component's functionality, and not with any
prescient foresight as to how salient its messages will be to the administrators receiving
them. This information, an indexed indicator of salience (as opposed to severity), is
absent in every event log message yet seen.
As somewhat-anecdotally identiﬁed by Wallin et al. in [10], systems administrators utilise
their domain expert knowledge of the object in question (this author would add that this
includes a historical perspective of system issues) and its infrastructural importance, as
well as the time and type of the event, when evaluating importance/relevance/priority
on a per-event basis. This is of course contingent on being able to reduce the volume
of messages to a reasonable level [63]. And yet, as identiﬁed earlier, there are messages
which even experienced administrators are bewildered by due to the pace of change in the
computing sector and the depth of knowledge required.
With their neural network and trouble-ticket database combination (i.e. attempting to
make use of organisational knowledge derived from tickets), Wallin et al. found a statis-
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tically signiﬁcant improvement for operators compared with the currently available alarm
severity [10, pg. 19]. By their own admission though, the outcomes were probabilistic
rather than deterministic, and the system could provide no justiﬁcation whatsoever for
why a particular alarm had been highlighted. The neural network remained a `black box'.
Another point of failure is the trouble-ticket database: Wallin et al. make optimistic
assumptions regarding the validity of the information here, and as covered earlier, deter-
mining the true salience of an alarm often requires knowledge and expertise which may
not be available within any given organisation. As such, the solution posited by Wallen et
al. attempts to `make do' with information that is, from a semiotics point of view, incom-
plete and likely misconceived. It does not attempt to improve information quality, convey
meaning from the program developer, or otherwise support human decision making.
A natural upper bound therefore exists on the usefulness of expert systems, neural net-
works, customised policy/signature-based tools, data-mining and machine-learning, when
the role of the veriﬁer or trainer is taken by people who themselves cannot categorically
determine the desired outcome in all cases. Fundamentally this comes back to the com-
petence of those who choose or clean the training data set  and this is a weakness of
many academic studies, e.g. [15, 10, 16, 17, 18], which proceed with a static, vetted data
set, rather than one in a constant state of random ﬂux. It is all very well to optimise an
algorithm (in the broadest sense) for messages that are two years old, but quite another
to engineer one that can adapt to new and unforeseen situations without a specialised
team of researchers on-hand.
Log messages cannot be classiﬁed with the same simplistic, binary strategy as e-mail
spam. Regarding the problem as information triage is more valid. The current solutions
do not recognise and cannot cope with the constraining factor of limited human attention,
so it follows that they are inadequate at triaging event log messages. Would any reader
of this thesis be genuinely comfortable with the scenario of being wheeled into a hospital
emergency department and having their Glasgow Coma Scale assigned by a computer
running an expert system based on regular expressions, or a data mining algorithm with
only probablistic results?
3.4 Quantifying information saturation
To quantify the problem at hand, and due to the apparent lack of any prior such work, the
raw information content of event log messages from a Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) Cray XT supercomputer [74] were analyzed using Weaver's information theorem,
shown in Algorithm 3.1. This is to demonstrate the scale of information that the current
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Algorithm 3.1 Weaver's information theorem [8]
H = −[p1logp1 + p2logp2 + ...+ pnlogpn]
solutions are attempting to handle. The `syslog' ﬁle (named messages.sdb), which receives
all kernel and daemon messages, was used for the analysis.
It is important to remember that Weaver deﬁned `information' in this context as freedom
of choice. The set of all possible values that may be received is indicative of the depth of
information; when this set is larger, a set of data can contain more information. Binary is
thus the practical minimum as far as `information' goes. Trinary or quaternary (e.g. DNA)
codes can contain more information in the same number of bits. The more possible values
there are, the more uncertainty there is about which value was sent from sender to receiver
- this can be considered `good' because the greater freedom of choice enables a more
descriptive communication about an analogue world. Noise also increases uncertainty but
simply in a `bad' sense; the result (an increase in uncertainty) can be identical but from
a diﬀerent cause, yet the receiver cannot distinguish between causes [8].
The natural counter is redundancy - and indeed Weaver states the redundancy of the
English language as around 50%, which enables us to communicate even when words are
lost or misheard. That redundancy in natural language is an advantage for a human
listener with a `wet-ware' brain to eﬀortlessly process it. The same redundancy is a
liability for algorithmic computing, however, as algorithms cannot discard it and instead
ﬂag even tiny, semantically-trivial alterations as diﬀerences just as signiﬁcant as any other.
From a semiotics point of view (see Figure 2.2 on page 39) algorithms process signs as, and
only as, data; they have no genuine experience as observers, nor any genuine knowledge
of real-world objects, i.e. context. After all, signs are the only interface for algorithms.
Human-level language interpretation is still a problem reserved for strong AI.
3.4.1 Saturation results
Since it is the information of the messages themselves that concerns us rather than any
artiﬁcial uniqueness, the ﬁrst ﬁve columns of event-log data (time-stamp and machine
name) from LANL's Cray XT [74] log ﬁles were removed. All 621494 messages in the
event log ﬁle were considered, with the most frequent occurring 9804 times. Using each
message's probability of occurrence (p1...pn) produced a value for H of 16.126 (3 d.p.).
The maximum attainable value of H for 621494 records (i.e. each record having equal
probability) is 18.552 (3 d.p.). This gives a ratio of roughly 0.869 (3 d.p.), meaning
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`Typical' Munin monitoring tool 18,931,584 0.512
`Typical' Debian v5.0 e-mail servers 41,080 0.922
Default Ubuntu 10.04 desktop 24,947 0.926
Table 3.1: Other ratios obtained with Weaver's theorem
aNumbered sources are available from [74]
that the variability/freedom-of-choice in the event log ﬁle was 86.9% of the theoretical
maximum.
To verify the results of the initial experiment, subsequent runs were performed, some
with data from sources other than LANL's Cray XT. The additional results are shown in
Table 3.1. Note that input data was only obtained from systems running a Linux kernel;
this was to reduce skew from the diﬀerent kernel logging frequency one might encounter
with a proprietary UNIX or open-source BSD kernel. Time-stamps and machine names
were consistently pruned at the ﬁrst stage.
The one application-speciﬁc log ﬁle examined was from an open-source statistical moni-
toring tool named Munin [75], which graphs metrics such as hard disk temperatures. As
expected, the variation in messages was greatly reduced in such a speciﬁc domain, which
consists entirely of highly-repetitive messages concerning graph generation and authenti-
cation to hosts for the purposes of statistics collection. The `typical' Debian v5.0 setup
was a two-machine cluster running Postﬁx, Cyrus IMAP and Spamassassin. The Debian
and Ubuntu systems only retained their /var/log/syslog ﬁles for seven days, as per
default settings, so all the available contents were analyzed.
While the results show some variation amongst similar systems (i.e. Linux kernels with a
largely-to-entirely GNU userland), and a much more signiﬁcant gap to the more uniform
sample (Munin), we can be conﬁdent that the generally high ratios show a highly-packed
information space. In other words, they indicate that event log messages represent a
remarkably rich source of `information' (by Weaver's deﬁnition of information representing
freedom of choice), due to a high uncertainty of which message may arrive next.
The uncertainty referred to here is `desirable' in that it results from the vast array of
choices available to the sender [8], yet it makes the ﬁltering task a hard problem. Simply
put, the burden of automated log ﬁltering could be greatly eased by reducing H, meaning
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the destruction of information, by cutting the number of choices available to any program
issuing log messages. Strangling the event log output like this could only be achieved by
permitting a certain (restricted) selection of words and phrases to be used - a technique
which culminates in immediate or even pre-empted obsolesence, as in the case of X.733
[43].
Systems are only becoming more complex and permanently `strangling' them would
inevitably cut information vital to those with suﬃcient domain expertise, when trou-
bleshooting is necessary. The author and Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) contrib-
utor Marshall T. Rose put it best when he stated that troubleshooting is a `ﬁre-ﬁghting'
operation and that what is appreciated during those times is an unobscured simplicity[64].
The aim here is not to obscure information or reduce communication via a restricted vo-
cabulary, but rather to enable salient information to be automatically recognised.
3.4.2 Implications
The situation systems administrators ﬁnd themselves in is that the sender's information
represents a large proportion of non-incidental noise; the noise source is largely the sender
itself, or groups of other senders (see Figure 3.2 on page 65). The underlying-yet-unstated
assumption that the receiver wants all the information transmitted by the sender, though,
is ﬂawed in this case. Weaver suggested the concept of semantic noise in part to deal
with such issues  the perturbations or distortions of meaning which are not intended by
the source but which inescapably aﬀect the destination [8, pg. 15]: a concept which ﬁnds
echoes in Buckley & Siewiorek's observation that event log messages represent information
fused with assumptions [25].
The underlying subtext in such messages is the assumption of equivalent knowledge on
the part of the consumer (here, the systems administrator) compared to the programmer
or program designer. No metric, other than the coarse and ambiguously-worded Syslog
severity scale (Table 2.1 on page 32), exists to alleviate the burden of such source-code-
level knowledge acquisition. Many would opine that critical is worse than alert, as
might error be, but the Syslog scale disagrees. Wallin et al. wrote that the system-
determined severity correlates poorly with priorities in organisations, so much so that it
is largely disregarded [10]. This is not to say that the scale is without its uses, however.
The Syslog scale is indeed the closest that systems have come to quantifying their log
output, but it limits output to an entirely component-centric view and does not deal with
several important aspects: how the component ﬁts into the organization's infrastructure
(i.e. important vs superﬂuous); the impact an event could have on that infrastructure; or
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the certainty of the programmer/program designer about the situation surrounding the
issuing of the log message. These issues imply that we need to add metadata (as Atwood
[56] advised for genetic sequence databases) so that events that systems administrators
consider to be important, i.e. salient messages, can be more easily distinguished from
noise.
Moreover, we have been attempting to ﬁlter data based on the data itself. This is analo-
gous to categorising news stories into current events, sports, lifestyle, and so on, by
searching for signature phrases or using a data-mining algorithm. Much of the event-log-
message job is little more than a matter of opinion, e.g. bad, don't care, normal,
crisis but this is perhaps the most diﬃcult task of all for a machine ﬁlter. It is simply
easier and vastly more accurate with such a data-set for a human to provide categorisation
metadata, via tags or the like. The ﬁltering of event log message data is not generally
a problem involving potential adversaries, as it is in web censorship (e.g. [67]) or spam
ﬁltering, since the programs running on one's systems are not assumed to be malicious
and in the event of a system being compromised, no output (i.e. data or metadata) could
be trusted anyway.
If the metadata can be trusted, then the task of interpreting the natural-language portion
of the message can be largely discarded. Such a highly-packed and redundant information
space could be left for those best suited to deal with it: humans; while machine-readable
metadata is used to trivially whittle down and tune the volume received. The reader may
view this as a `retreat' from the problem of language analysis, and it is, but such a retreat
is a necessary step given the explosion of operational systems and their log output over
the past 15-20 years, a period during which minimal advances have been made in textual
analysis. The advent of strong AI would likely permit this ground to be re-taken - after
all, what else could acceptably handle Weaver's concept of semantic noise?
3.5 Summary
This chapter has attempted to illustrate the event log message problem from ﬁrst prin-
ciples. The lack of relevant literature stipulates a more adventurous approach and sig-
niﬁcant reasoning to reach the point where established literature can again be drawn on.
A working deﬁnition of salience has therefore been presented in the context of a message
lifecycle, followed by a real-world example of message ﬁltering, and ﬁnally the immense
density of information that must be dealt with. This leaves the question: where do we go
from here?
Chapter 4
Seeking an organisational context
How should I know if it works? That's what beta testers are for. I only coded it.
 Attributed to Linus Torvalds, somewhere in a posting
- fortune package from Debian Linux v5.0
Wallin et al. [10] described system-assigned `severity' as correlating poorly with `priority'
in a larger context. But what is `priority'? For their part, Wallin et al. only oﬀered
one anecdote of the network provider they studied: the event time, managed object, and
alarm type attributes in combination with [the individual's] own experience and lookups
in support systems [10, pg. 8]. The most directly relevant theories actually come from
the business disciplines, speciﬁcally management.
Stakeholder salience (ﬁrst introduced on page 36) is the notion of assigning priorities
to competing demands for one's time when dealing with external inﬂuences. Mitchell
et al. deﬁned a three-dimensional scale to recognise and quantify the pressures which
inﬂuence decisions made about the claims of stakeholders. `Power' is the ability of a
stakeholder to cause a change in their favour, `legitimacy' measures the wider perception
of a stakeholder's actions, from the point of view of established societal and cultural
norms, and `urgency' communicates the genuine need of the stakeholder for their claim
to be looked at. In this chapter, the stakeholder salience concept will be applied to the
comparable factors weighed up by systems administrators - although a critical divide does
exist in the sense of agency. Agency is used here with the sense of autonomy, in that an
agent can perform actions according to beliefs and for its own beneﬁt [76, 77]. Logging
systems are simplistic message routers and lack any notion of agency (by this deﬁnition).
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Table 4.1: Relation between the measures of stakeholder salience [1] and event log message
salience
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4.1 Power  severity
The ﬁrst dimension in Table 4.1, `power', has a straightforward parallel in the existing
severity scale. Mostly obviously, the scope is similar in that power is vested in individuals
and severity is assessed within the context of an individual daemon. Each of these has its
own context, or `ecosystem', of factors, assumptions and priorities. Just as `power' can
be perceived by and in a person - and therefore calibrated by that person's experience -
`severity' is calibrated according the extremes encountered in a given program. Buckley
commented on this pecularity of scales; they tend to be deﬁned by their endpoints, with
`normalcy' residing at the mid-point of the range [26].
4.2 Legitimacy impact
To discover a parallel for `legitimacy' the parameters must ﬁrst be deﬁned; here we are
searching for the characteristics of salience when it comes to the real-world impact or rel-
evance of an event log message. Not the message itself; but rather the event it was issued
to describe and communicate. The event has some level of impact on the organisation(s)
within its range. Mitchell et al. quote Suchman for their working deﬁnition of legiti-
macy: a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable,
proper, or appropriate within some socially-constructed system of norms, values, beliefs
and deﬁnitions [1, pg. 866].
If we subsititute an automated system for the entity in question, we can say that a `legit-
imate' system is one that acts in a desirable manner, calibrated by a socially-constructed
and established set of norms, etc. But the system/entity itself is not the intended target
of this application; the event notiﬁcations the system generates are to be measured in-
dividually against a calibrated scale. The system can be classiﬁed in typologies such as
[2] and judged in a larger social context as set out in [78] given that it is a (relatively)
static entity with the resulting distinct attributes. Event log messages merely give wit-
ness to events that the system's programmers/designers thought notable for any number
of reasons, and as single lines of free-form textual content, do not have distinct attributes
beyond character counts and character set/encoding.
It therefore follows that the primary parameter in the social/organisational context is the
perceived impact of events which result from the formalised programming of the automated
system. Despite the immediate semantic disconnect, this concept is remarkably similar
to the perceived severity [43] of X.733, in which it is the perception of those interacting
with the system that matters. These ideas revolve around the real-world impact of events,
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i.e. the cumulative outcomes, rather than the severity of each particular data point. A
disk fault may be a particularly severe error simply because a physical piece of equipment
needs to be replaced, but when it occurs in a redundant disk array (i.e. RAID) speciﬁcally
set-up and conﬁgured to cope with that problem, user perception of the fault is likely to
be entirely absent. Redundant RAID features exist to maximise system availability by
allowing faulty disks to be dealt with in a timely manner, with no interruption to service
and therefore no impact. Essentially these arrangements allow for faults without ﬂow-on
errors or failures. The fault is catered for just as error-correcting-codes exist to cope with
inevitable errors in data transmission or storage.
`Impact' is not a measure of potential consequences should a machine or service fail.
Mitchell et al.'s `legitimacy' doesn't work in such a way either. Their scale is for assessing
the cumulative standing of an external claim on managers' time; `impact' quantiﬁes the
cumulative estimation of an event's eﬀects as described. The process for determining
an event message's impact value therefore excludes speculation  the generation of false
positives must be avoided  and includes these factors:
1. The known/expected (not speculative) functionality consequences for the entire soft-
ware and/or hardware stack to which the event's component belongs. The `compo-
nent' is the item of software or hardware to which the event has happened.
2. The (non-)existence of redundancy or comparable measures to cope with errors or
failures. This requires ennumerated conﬁguration knowledge to be available to the
decision tree issuing messages. Eﬀectively this factor encompasses the capability to
avoid a decrease in service levels which could be perceived by a system user.
3. Knowledge of organisational priorities for the event's component. Such priorities,
by deﬁnition, will be diﬀerent for each organisation. This is perhaps the most
important factor, because it is the strongest break with severity; it widens the scope
of existing logging techniques to include a human norm/value system; and allows
complex relationships between components to be expressed via the assignment of
similar prioritisation levels.
One factor explicitly not included is the likelihood of the estimated impact. To combine
the estimate and the certainty of that estimate would be overloading the scale, resembling
a statement such as the ﬂood will have a likely peak and variable range within three
metres rather than the ﬂood will likely peak at three metres, plus or minus half a
metre, the latter being rather more useful.
4.3. URGENCY CERTAINTY 79
4.3 Urgency certainty
So far the concepts of severity and impact have been divorced through recognising their
diﬀering scopes and contextual demands. As amply demonstrated by the quote at the
beginning of this chapter, though, programmers and designers often entertain doubt due
to external factors beyond their control or knowledge of the assumptions embedded within
their code.
The notion of certainty in this work was originally inspired by literature on, perhaps
surprisingly, ontologies for enhancing military battleﬁeld awareness. An early distinction
to bear in mind is the nature of the problem when dealing with battleﬁeld events: a
situation is bookended by event notices with their own timestamps, requiring a system
which regards events as entities: long-lived and possessing their own attributes [9]. Event
log messages, on the other hand, tend to be instantaneous notiﬁcations of events which
are usually completed within nanoseconds, so the notiﬁcation is only written to disk (at
best) tens of milliseconds later, i.e. an eternity in computing time.
Matheus, Kokar and Baclawski introduced their core ontology for situational awareness
[9] with the goal of improving situational awareness through making salient information
easier to identify. Their conceptual result is shown in Figure 4.1 on the following page.
The certainty attribute of PropertyValue is one they justiﬁed as so:
In real-world situations sensory information is not always accurate. To
account for this there needs to be a way to represent the certainty/uncer-
tainty inherent in sensory data; this becomes particularly important if
the system using the data intends to perform data fusion or higher-order
reasoning [9, pg. 549]
Matheus et al. apply their concept of certainty to individual attributes; meaning that
they assign varying certainties to values from diﬀerent sources. The underlying purpose
is to portray the unavoidable margin of error that accompanies quantiﬁcation rather
than discarding such information. Margins of error, of course, surround any variable
which purports to exactly represents an analogue or subjective source. These margins are
naturally expanded when a variable is used outside its original purpose, as can happen
when re-purposing a data source; for example, the infamous Imperial vs metric units
conversion issue which led to the loss of the Mars Climate Orbiter spacecraft. Data
intended for one purpose was re-used without an adequate veriﬁcation of its properties
(in the case of MCO, the unit). Such a veriﬁcation would have increased the certainty of
receiving valid data from that source.
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Figure 4.1: Core SAW Ontology [9, pg. 547]
4.3.1 Certainty as validity, or conﬁdence in assumptions
The `certainty' measure appeals because it can convey information that has never be-
fore been codiﬁed by the programmer/designer. Every conditional structure is built on
the assumption that the variables being tested are appropriate for their purpose; such
as in industrial plant design, where measurements like pressures and temperatures can
be delivered correctly by the sensor but unintended outcomes can still result if other
unanticipated factors contribute to a problem. The Three-Mile Island nuclear accident,
for example, was in large part caused by an operator assumption that the reactor vessel
relief valve would close when power was cut to its solenoid (an active error [60]). In
fact there was no sensor to detect whether the valve was closed or not - the manufacturer
had also assumed the valve would close in the absence of solenoid activation, and also
assumed that the operators would be suﬃciently experienced to incorporate temperature
and pressure readings from the pressure-relief piping that the valve controlled, into their
determination of correct operation (a latent error [ibid]).
Retaining an indicator of certainty in such cases would retain the inﬂuence of doubt, a
factor which some consider to be invaluable, as explored in [79]. Airline pilots are another
case, often being required to corroborate instrument readings with information from other
sources [58] as an explicit admission that doubt exists in instrument readings. Indeed,
programmers and designers incorporate such techniques as far as they are able; this is
sometimes betrayed by their informal comments in source code. The Linux kernel is a
ﬁne example - many device drivers must cater for tremendous levels of doubt when ini-
tialising or reconﬁguring hardware which contains foibles/bugs or simply doesn't follow
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established standards. One of the greatest throwbacks in PC architecture is the Basic In-
put/Output System (BIOS): it is a well-known source of surprise issues, compounded by
non-standard implementations of such standards as Advanced Conﬁguration and Power
Interface (ACPI), themselves comprised of assumptions built on older assumptions. Any-
one who has experienced hibernate or suspend problems (i.e. notebook/laptop power
management) with an open-source operating system has seen the results of compounded
assumptions ﬁrst-hand. To act as though doubt does not exist, or to proclaim that it can
be ignored, is to invite future error.
At a more basic level, consider that every situation-dependent event log message is, by
deﬁnition, issued as the result of conditional tests. An if statement comparing the
variables RealTimeClockRate (i.e. RTC) and HighPrecisionClockRate (i.e. HPET) for
equality may then result in the issuing of a success (or failure) message. But how valid is
the test to begin with? Any pre-determined tolerance threshold carries with it personal
evaluations that should be expressed. Not only that, but the sampled measurements
may not suﬃciently cater for ﬂuctuations in the instantaneous clock rate, and if they
do, how certain can we be of what is suﬃcient? Entertaining doubt like this entails the
acknowledgement of risk. Ignoring doubt is tantamount to taking the risk of painting over
rusted metal: sooner or later, reality catches up with us. The `certainty' measure attempts
to convey this contextual information to the end-user (i.e. systems administrator).
These everyday decisions made by program creators may seem insigniﬁcant, but their
event log messages still clutter up log ﬁles on innumerable systems. The higher-order
reasoning Matheus et al. write of is exactly what today's log ﬁltering systems attempt to
do, though without any knowledge of certainty. Particularly concerning is the requirement
for program code to issue messages (for later ﬁltering) in situations which have not yet
occurred. This is the second hurdle for the concept of certainty in logging systems.
4.3.2 . . . as anticipation of the future
The second aspect of certainty is not concerned with the immediate validity of data and
assumptions, but rather the applicability of the reasoning itself, regarding the troublesome
tendency of `real life' to alter situations and make them inconceivable to past anticipation.
The recent Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster in Japan is a ﬁne example of this if
only we had done X quandary. To an extent this uncertainty can never be ameliorated
because it involves a degree of crystal-ball gazing. Many applications, though, are written
in environments where the designer/programmer is aware that the `rules of the game' may
very well change.
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The question the program writer needs to consider is this: how certain am I that the
situation this test is predicated on will always hold? An author of a anti-virus program,
or intrusion-detection system (IDS), may choose to automatically categorise all detected
attacks. Some examples might be SYN packet ﬂood, port knocking attempt, buﬀer-
overﬂow attempt, Trojan horse, privilege escalation, or the like, all of which are well-
known techniques. There is of course no natural law which prevents an entirely new form
of attack being devised - one which then could not be automatically categorised as the
appropriate conditionals couldn't be envisaged ahead of time.
A conditional structure in this sense (e.g. a nested switch-case) is limited not only by
the input variables being tested, as discussed above in section 4.3.1, but by the very code
it is composed of. Anti-virus `engines' are frequently updated to deal with exactly this
problem. Anti-virus signatures, on the other hand, are analogous to the input variables.
If we accept source code as a static snapshot of an individual's or team's impressions
at the time, it is easy to perceive that such a snapshot will inevitably drift from reality
as reality moves on; a problem also faced by practitioners of semiotics, especially those
whose attempts are aimed at freezing an absolute set of deﬁnitions [6].
4.3.3 . . . as a parallel of `urgency'
Urgency as presented in Mitchell et al. is a human imperative. It relies on agency as the
reason for its existence; urgency is only found in situations where humans are depending on
a speciﬁc outcome. Given that event log messages and the static automata that generate
them lack their own agency, what remains in its absence?
To strip away context, dynamism, knowledge, opinion, and all other characteristics of
sentience and culture, leaves us only one third of the semiotics representational triangle
(see Figure 2.2 on page 39). More precisely, the signs (i.e. syntactics) are all that remain.
Barron's ten features of information systems, shown in Table 2.2 on page 40, oﬀers us
an equivalent term: representation. This is the level of perception of the computer;
encodings as representations, signs without meaning, action without awareness.
The scope of Mitchell et al.'s `urgency' dimension is always limited to a particular claim
or relationship [1], and it additionally appears to be the most temporally-curtailed (i.e.
shortest-lived) dimension of the three. Urgency changes minute-to-minute, decision point
to decision point, giving it the highest granularity in comparison with `power' and `le-
gitimacy'. This point can justify its application to each or any conditional statement in
code.
Yet perhaps most importantly, urgency is forward-looking. Power is grown to be exer-
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cised, legitimacy accumulates only to be drawn down, while urgency anticipates future
success or failure in order to reduce potential risk. The reader may wish to pause here
and contemplate the semiotic signs used to communicate and represent risk. Common
responses might include best and worse cases, margins of error, and statistical likelihoods
(e.g. the percentage of people who will contract a medical condition by age 60). All of
these are representations of (un-) certainty, making `certainty' the unifying concept/notion
for signs which originate at a highly-granular source code level. So, when communicating
the foreseen risks of individual conditional statements that by the very nature of source
code are entirely syntactic, an indication of `risk' would be too overloaded by connotations
of individual investment and agency. Certainty succeeds as a clearer delineation between
risk's contextual concerns, and the syntactic competence and foresight possible in source
code.
4.4 Summary: three dimensions for salience
The sections above have outlined the rationale for adapting Mitchell et al.'s measures
of stakeholder salience into measures of event log message salience. The varying scopes
and other analogous characteristics were ﬁrst compared in Table 4.1. How can these
dimensions be drawn together, though? A mere re-labelling of Figure 2.1 on page 37
leads to Figure 4.2, illustrating the intersection where the most salient messages reside;
identical to Mitchell et al. with their stakeholder claims. This does not suﬃciently portray
the distinctions of scope between the dimensions, though.
Figure 4.3 oﬀers a layered interpretation of the dimensions. `Impact' is the richest con-
text and exists in the human situation surrounding the systems administrator: it is the
larger picture outside the computing system that exerts all the pressures and dictates the
priorities which decide how the sysadmin spends their time. Many of these are outside
the sysadmin's control, but again, the actions of administering the system are controlled
by this context.
Further modifying Weaver's communication theory to illustrate the ﬂow of communication
from scope to scope, the `impact' scope is centred around item ﬁve in Figure 4.4, although
it possibly envelopes item four as well, since the Syslog aggregation and ﬁltering point only
enacts the policies determined by the sysadmin. Typically there will be a few sysadmins
in each organisation; they will be aware of each other's abilities, and policies can serve to
standardise organisational priorities amongst them.
An important distinction between Figures 4.3 (the traﬃc light) and 4.4 (the adapted
communications model) is this: the traﬃc light is hierarchical; it depicts the dimensions
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Figure 4.2: Dimensions possessed by salient event log messages (adapted from [1])
Figure 4.3: Scope and context of each dimension
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Figure 4.4: Adapted version of Shannon & Weaver's communications model; for event log
messaging (with dimensional scopes)
in relation to each other, ordered by relevance to an organisational context. Figure 4.4
depicts the dimensions in terms of their conceptual origin, i.e. where the core scope is
within the communications ﬂow which includes the source and destination for messages.
`Severity' has its origin in the daemon scope - which is what deﬁnes the extremes of
the severity scale - and is therefore often diﬀerent across daemons, as detailed earlier in
this document. It is safe to assume that there will be many sources of messages in an
organisation: between ten and several hundred per server, and at least one per switch,
router, printer or other such embedded device. In comparision, the organisation will
likely have only one `impact' context (due to established policies), but it will be sitting
atop many individual `severity' contexts which originated in other organisations, such as
vendors or open-source developer groups.
`Certainty' still remains as the largest conceptual challenge. It has no known precedent in
event logging. Its scope is in every individual conditional statement that leads to the issu-
ing of an event log message - rather than being calibrated by the entire daemon/program
as whole, in which it resides. With the multitude of programmers and designers involved
with software projects (for example: the Linux kernel, as of 2008, had over 1000 develop-
ers committing code between every release [80]), there are likely to be many individuals
per daemon/program, but more importantly, it is also safe to assume that there are many
conditionals per daemon/program. The designer/programmer writing each statement is
best placed to rate them on `impact' (initial values only) and `severity'. The `certainty'
value simply reﬂects the conﬁdence of that person that the values they have assigned will
be correct for the future situations where the program is being used.
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Chapter 5
Enforcing organisational realities
Faced with a paucity of suitable research related to event logging in organisations, the
question had to be asked; is it possible to adapt successful strategies from other research
areas? Parallels in other established disciplines were thus sought for any examples of use-
ful methodologies. Speciﬁcally; any research which had signiﬁcantly improved outcomes
while dealing with familiar domain limitations. The following characteristics of event log
messages were used in this search:
1. A data set without the statistical nature of a `population', and which therefore does
not accurately match a distribution [26];
2. can be intentionally skewed to provide a distraction or reinforce false impressions;
3. often without documentation or substantiating evidence [25];
4. an unpredictable, rapidly changing (perhaps chaotic) stream of information, at least
on signiﬁcant time scales [18];
5. and thus requires constant work to maintain an automated ﬁlter[10].
The ﬁnancial stock market model was determined to be the best ﬁt for these character-
istics: the eﬃcient market hypothesis certainly makes the case for unpredictability in
stock markets (with perhaps with the exception of very brief, i.e. millisecond, time scales)
[81] - something that can be observed as fashionable market trends take hold and a mar-
ket bubble develops only to pop later, in a cycle which has been recurring since the 1970s
[79] (applies to points 2, 3, 4 above). Stock markets are commonly `attacked' for personal
gain; trying to fathom the whys-and-wherefores of the market is a business in itself; and
the data does not ﬁt any deﬁnition of a natural population but more closely resembles
the Pareto principle [10] (points 1 & 2). A further attraction point lies in the ongoing
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development of automated, autonomous trading agents such as those from Sherstov and
Stone [82]: software designed to extract proﬁt without direct human involvement, and
the rapid iterative cycle involved in trying to gain a competitive advantage in such a
complicated market space (points 4 & 5).
The situation surrounding the stock market is arguably more complex and harder to
comprehend than any computing environment, even leading to attempts (such as Zhai et
al. [83]) to automate the prioritising of such diverse information as media reports. While
there are several parallels to be drawn, such as the widespread industry use of simple
`trading rules' [81] which as signature detectors closely resemble the regular expressions
used with log ﬁltering, one must note the dissimilarities too.
Event log data cannot be placed on a ticker or meaningfully graphed (one only has to
look at the history of dashboards to see how poorly suited a condensed format is to their
presentation of data [14]). There is no quantiﬁed mean, nominal state, or `norm' to tell
a sysadmin the state of their computing systems at a glance, as can be done so trivially
with stock prices and indices; which eﬀectively communicate state according to a shared
(industry) `norm' or perception of value. Event log systems do not contain actors or
autonomous agents that receive feedback and that are presumed to possess motivations
or beliefs [76, 77], nor do they engage in competition. Many of these discrepancies make
the problem of analyzing event logs less hard, whereas the lack of instrumentation and,
therefore, quantiﬁed analysis makes it more diﬃcult. Messages tend to be written in nat-
ural language, cryptic data ﬁeld formats, or both. Yet there is no reliable and automated
way to, on a daily basis, determine which particular messages a systems administrator
would want to see, and therefore ﬁlter out the millions of messages deemed unimportant.
Finally, salient log reports are not yet a reality [62], yet the world's ﬁnancial markets
are increasingly governed by the rules in automated trading agents [84, 85], with some
estimates placing the trading volume controlled by them as high as 90%. These agents
deal with a never-ending and time-critical stream of data; some of the factors behind
their success are examined and those factors' applicability to another such stream of data
(event log messages) is considered in the following section.
5.1 Stock market parallels
The afore-mentioned `trading rules' are analogous to the regular expressions most com-
monly used to ﬁlter log messages (e.g. in Logcheck [20]): mechanised rules which apply
a simplistic conditional test. Such rules can optionally be clustered together to make use
of tuples [82] and incorporated into automated `agents'. Evolutionary algorithms can be
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used to then select the best agents across many thousands of generations, as done in [81],
or they can be selected through the results of tailored, empirical testing, from distinctly
diﬀerent, handcrafted algorithms, as in [82].
It is at this point that we run into the ﬁrst of several distinctions between event logs
and stock trading; the ﬁtness test (either automated or manual) for the stock agents is
very simple indeed: did the agent make a proﬁt over the course of a day [82, 81]? The
test for event logs, though, is one of salience [62]; a contextual deﬁnition and not a thing
which can be instantiated in an if statement. Thus, comparisons of `state' are easily
formalised for any trader of stocks (is the price higher now than before?), whereas they
are practically non-existent for computing systems and their event log messages.
Another parallel that was initially identiﬁed, the rapid cycle of iteration, soon turned into
a discrepancy upon closer examination. Stock traders alter their autonomous agents with
the aim of increasing proﬁt, i.e. taking advantage of any change in the price of a targeted
stock, and/or even changing that price through their own actions. A rapid rate of code
revision is driven by the desire to maximize proﬁt versus the competition. The agents also
receive feedback and use reward mechanisms to reinforce proﬁtable behavior [82]. This
is highly distinct from the iteration cycle that systems administrators are accustomed to:
they simply have to accept the messages that are issued and cannot eﬀectively alter the
contents.
It is either impossible or diﬃcult for a sysadmin to fundamentally alter the components
in a running system. For closed-source systems this is a given, in that the end-user
has no ability to change the system, and may very well be legally prevented from doing
so. For open-source systems the only alternatives are submitting a code patch which, if
accepted by upstream developers with diﬀering motivations, represents a global change,
or maintenance of a customised code branch: likely to be a heavy burden indeed. The
examples in Figure 1.1 on page 23 are strong evidence that users of software are not
always able to positively inﬂuence the textual content of what are highly technical event
log messages. The iterative feedback loop, whether automated as a reward mechanism or
involving a human programmer/designer, is the most promising feature of trading agents,
given the comparative absence of this feature in event logging systems.
Software is heavily reliant on standards, whether they be `open' like TCP/IP, or `de-
facto' like the current dominance of the Microsoft Windows® ecosystem on desktop
computers. The systems administrator stands to gain little from non-standard software
- interoperability is diametrically-opposed to competition. Stock-trading systems, on the
other hand, beneﬁt from unique and proprietary approaches in a competitive environment.
It is diﬃcult to imagine a community of Wall Street stock-traders all co-operating on an
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open-source trading algorithm which they then all hoped to beneﬁt from. Nonetheless,
the model of rapid iteration appears an encouraging method for independently honing
and improving an information ﬂow, which in many other respects resembles that of event
log messages.
5.2 Introducing rapid iteration to event logging
The current situation, illustrated in Figure 5.1, involves a third party who usually resides
outside the systems administrator's organisation. This third party is the designer/pro-
grammer (i.e. developer) responsible for the software product being used by the sysadmin.
As the `gateway' for any improvements or reﬁnements to the daemon in question, the de-
veloper should respond in a timely and honest manner to requests from sysadmins. The
`real world' situation rarely reﬂects this ideal, however.
A recent example of a dysfunctional process is the code fork of the FOSS OpenOﬃce.org
oﬃce suite into a separate product now named LibreOﬃce[86]  an action prompted
by the purchase of Sun Microsystems Corporation (which had editorial and trademark
control of OpenOﬃce.org) by Oracle Corporation. This created a perception that changes
originating in the community were less likely to be accepted into the codebase [87, 88]. In
this case, the free software community duplicated the OpenOﬃce.org codebase because
Oracle's corporate culture, organisational priorities and interests appeared to clash with
those of the community. Individual systems administrators, though, are unlikely to possess
suﬃcient time, budget and ability to perform a similar code fork against a free software
project whose log messages they would like to improve. This situation has led to literature
(covered earlier) which presumes that event log messages eﬀectively cannot be altered and
must be accepted as-is.
The key conceptual motivation here is: the developer (a corporation, designer, program-
mer, etc) is most often outside the organisation of the systems administrator and therefore
does not perceive that organisation's priorities, policies, SLAs, and so on. Note that the
word `organisation' can be interpreted here as diﬀerent units within the same entity. The
pressures on the developer, and their motivations, are distinctly diﬀerent from those of
the sysadmin. By introducing a method for sysadmins to directly alter the contents of
event log messages without a patch or code fork, a cycle of rapid iteration can be intro-
duced; entirely within the sysadmin's organisation and consequently responsive to that
organisation's particular requirements.
Current, `normal' processes are shown in Figure 5.1. Sysadmins usually have a degree of
control over the daemons they run, in the form of conﬁguration options, which most often
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Figure 5.1: Model of rapid iteration for improving event log message output (programmer
operating under the auspices of a separate organisation)
allow tweaking of log message verbosity or debug levels  oﬀering the ability to `strangle'
log output to one extent or another. That is; verbosity and debug levels throttle the
number of messages issued in given circumstances but do not allow the messages' contents
to be altered or tuned. To perform any alteration, the sysadmin must provide feedback
to the programmer/designer of the daemon or program in question, hoping that their
feedback will be accepted and result in code changes in a future version of the daemon.
Alternatively (and assuming a FOSS project), the sysadmin can eﬀectively fork the source
code of the project - by maintaining a code patch which changes messages to their liking.
In the case of LibreOﬃce, external end-users and developers of the OpenOﬃce.org project
forked the entire source code repository, duplicating it to form their own project. Such
code-level changes are most likely the only way to modify natural-language messages
simply because they cannot be mathematically/mechanistically transformed.
Bypassing the project's developer (as in the proposed process in Figure 5.1) simply
mirrors the eﬀect of the conﬁguration options already provided by most daemons. An
administrator whose systems are to accept e-mail for a new Internet domain name of course
does not have to ask for a code alteration; the capability is provided in the Mail Transfer
Agent's (MTA) conﬁguration ﬁle. Elevating event log tuning to the same operational
level as established capabilities is little more than an honouring of Buckley's call for
logging to be taken seriously  for it to be seriously regarded as a feature rather than an
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afterthought [26]. Debug levels and verbosity settings are not a suﬃcient conﬁguration
mechanism after all - they merely provide a passive throttling mechanism. An ability
to actively alter messages, pre-transmission, is needed to enforce organisational realities
for event logging. The daemon is presumably only being run to facilitate organisational
goals; why must its messages be otherwise?
The ability to iterate a conﬁguration to match one's needs is hardly new. Autonomous
stock market agents, however, have applied the technique to a data ﬂow with common
characteristics to those of event log messages, and their success has highlighted its use-
fulness when combined with the ability to make changes that actively alter the outcome.
Introducing a mechanism for such tuning, i.e. customisation, is the focus of the next
section.
5.3 Making iteration powerful, with weights
A mechanism for enforcing organisational realities on event log messages has one intended
outcome: moderating notiﬁcations so that only events which can have an impact on the
organisation are passed on. Each organisation would, of course, have diﬀerent human
thresholds and tolerances for impact. For example: events on servers under test will not
have a direct impact on a business simply because those machines are not in production
use. Other cases are less clear-cut, such as whether a database failure will have more or
less impact than a web server failure, and it is in these situations, especially when problem-
solving resources are ﬁnite, that weights can become a useful expression of organisational
priority.
Section 4.2 laid out the reasoning behind appropriating Mitchell et al.'s `legitimacy' scale
and re-naming it `impact'. Knowledge of organisational priorities for the event's com-
ponent was mentioned as one aspect of the scale - such a notion harks back to `legiti-
macy' representing a wider scope than just one person's perception. Indeed, it incorpo-
rates the entire human context `system' of norms, values and beliefs that exist in any
organisation[61]. Yet our computer systems do not know where they ﬁt in to this milieu,
given their lack of those human attributes. Hierarchy, importance of self, quality (of its
own hardware and software) - all these concepts are as foreign to a computing system as
disappointment or satsifaction. The depth of a computer's knowledge of its own char-
acteristics extends only as deep as kernel versions in software and motherboard model
numbers in hardware. Only the systems administrator can think that kernel build has
been great, I couldn't care less if this disk array failed or the whole lot is going to
come crashing down if that jury-rigged network router dies, yet currently there is no
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mechanism for codifying such contextual information.
The basis for these perceptions of importance is easily deduced from the semiotic repre-
sentational triangle (see Figure 2.2 on page 39, or the top-left of Figure 5.2); computers
deal only with signs, humans are the observers/users, leaving the real-world objects -
which are, of course, what humans ﬁnd the most straightforward to base their thinking
on and what we refer to when we use signs [2]. These same objects run the software
created by developers and therefore are the originating point for our event log messages.
Moreover, they (mostly) perform the roles assigned them by humans, such as DNS server,
boundary router, or database server; a system's role determines its place in the hierar-
chy of importance, because the purpose it fulﬁlls forms the relationship to organisational
function rather than the piece of hardware or software itself.
Roles, however, are the abstract constructs of human minds and as such are merely
embodied in particular pieces of equipment; whether virtual or physical, hardware or
software. Then how can the role's organisational importance (which determines its ranking
in the hierarchy of systems) be communicated? Especially given that the ranking is also
an abstract construct (but like roles, still a `real world object' at the social level). The
application of the semiotics representational triangle to roles, rankings and weights is
depicted in Figure 5.2, itself somewhat reminiscent of Barr's designer/user dichotomy
(Figure 2.3 on page 42), to clarify the relationships between these terms.
The ranking can sometimes be thought of as the order in which systems should be restored
in a disaster-recovery scenario. Simply put, conceptually embodying the ranking together
with the software component allows a program/daemon to utilise the ranking for weighting
purposes, i.e. elevating or depressing its own reports based on the ranking which represents
human impressions of its importance. Weights, the expression of the ranking concept,
seek only to modify and shape the programmer/designer's best anticipation for a unique
computing environment: that of the organisation in which the program or daemon is
running.
In keeping with the earlier call to enhance automation through the use of machine-readable
metadata, the ranking must be expressed in a numeric form, i.e. a weighting. The alter-
native (that is, keywords) would limit granularity to pre-deﬁned levels and re-introduce
the ambiguity of RFC 5424 (see Table 2.1 on page 32) with its pre-assigned textual labels.
The entire rationale for the weighting mechanism is that it allows organisations to repre-
sent their own unique hierarchy of importance, so it follows that the granularity should
also be of their choosing. A ﬂoating-point number between 0 and 1 aﬀords a transparent
model wherein the seed value in the original event log message is simply multiplied by
the weighting value to obtain a number which conveys the programmer's knowledge com-
94 CHAPTER 5. ENFORCING ORGANISATIONAL REALITIES
Figure 5.2: Semiotics theory [3] applied to roles, rankings and weights of information/-
computer systems
0 1
Figure 5.3: Floating-point weighting scale for representing roles and rankings as organi-
sational importance
bined with organisational importance. Shown in Figure 5.3, 0 represents the extreme
possession of importance, 1 represents the extreme lack of importance.
These weighting values can be altered without recourse to a code patch or writing a static-
matching ﬁlter to match all the possible messages a program might produce. As with
any other conﬁguration option for a program/daemon, the setting can be experimented
with in an iterative process. At this initial stage it seems appropriate for each daemon to
accept one weighting simply because the daemon performs a role through service provision.
In addition, the machine running the daemon should have its own weighting which is
combined with all the impact values which pass through its Syslog forwarding system
(i.e. forwarding event log messages to a central collection point). Situations such as
a memory leak in a less-important daemon are therefore not obscured on an important
server. The granularity for assigning weighting values must be based on the possible
range of any inﬂuencing factor - the containment barrier, in eﬀect - and this currently is
based on physical or virtual hardware instances. Non Uniform Memory Access (NUMA)
supercomputing clusters with a single memory address space, on the other hand, would
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apply the weighting to each partition of resources.
Organisations assign roles to their computing resources, which then assume a ranking
in the hierarchy of importance, inﬂuenced by factors such as dependencies and business
continuance. The `impact' scope depicted in Figures 4.4 and 4.3 covers these areas by
virtue of its focus on the larger environment surrounding any given system. Rankings
within that scope can then be codiﬁed as weighting values; allowing their direct use
in software to express and incorporate roles and rankings in a human- and machine-
readable form. Scope and context also govern the number of weighting values to assign;
the granularity of `impact' is limited to replaceable components, i.e. daemons, programs,
and the resource partitions they run within.
5.4 Summary
This chapter examined an identiﬁed parallel to event log messages in stock market high-
frequency-trading algorithms. Rapid iteration of a code base is a critical capability for
those carrying out such stock trading as a way of coping with market changes and the
actions of competitors. It was then determined that a direct application of that particular
technique would not be feasible with either open- or closed-source software. Conﬁgurable
weights were then introduced as a method for achieving the goal of a convenient and
low-maintenance method for altering event log output. Weights allow the organisational
knowledge and priorities of the systems administrator to be incorporated into that output.
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Chapter 6
Expressing a three-dimensional scale of
salience
Inspired by the Glasgow Coma Scale (the GCS, a three-dimensional scale used globally
for communication between medical professionals and triage [12]), a scale composed of
`severity', `impact' and `certainty' dimensions is proposed as a metric for communicating
event log message salience. But how should each dimension be deﬁned, at what granular-
ity? The GCS incorporates the gravity of each dimension by using diﬀering ranges: 1 to
4 for eye response, 1 to 5 for verbal response and 1 to 6 for motor response, but we
must bear in mind its purpose before adopting such a technique (i.e. item scaling [ibid]).
The GCS is intended as a tool with the following purposes:
Discrimination Refers to the assessment of the depth of impaired
consciousness and coma in patients with acute
cerebral disorders and involves distinguishing severe
from mild or moderate cerebral dysfunction.
Evaluation Refers to the measurement of change in the level of
consciousness of patients with cerebral dysfunction
while under observation
Prediction Refers to prediction of the outcome of these patients
on the basis of their level of consciousness at the
time of assessment
Table 6.1: Stated purposes of the GCS scale [12, pg. 755]
Any attempt to relate these purposes to the scopes of event log messaging is likely fu-
tile, but they should not be dismissed out of hand, either. `Discrimination' can, for our
purposes , be summed up as `severity'; `evaluation' is equivalent to rate of change and
`prediction' is eﬀectively likely outcome or prognosis. Some distinctions can immedi-
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ately be seen. For example, no attempt has been made to incorporate any rate of change
measurement into the event log messaging proposal here, as Syslog-recorded events tend
to be short-lived points in time with no state to change; and prediction is similar in
that it has been left out of this proposal given that event correlation researchers have
demonstrated little to no success (in real-world situations).
Another blow to prediction is merely the pace of change in computing. The medical
profession has developed slowly over millenia, yet just 150 years ago bleeding was still
considered the go-to treatment despite its propensity for killing the patient [79]. Human
anatomy has not changed appreciably over this timescale, apart from improved environ-
mental conditions and nutrition bringing forth better overall health and taller populations.
It is likely that there are more `anatomical' changes to the Debian Linux unstable soft-
ware repository in a single day than there have been to humans in thousands of years,
to say nothing of the immense variation that might be contained in the umbrella terms
computer or operating system. Medicine is very often able to apply lessons that were
learned many years prior, and is capable of making valid, conﬁdent predictions due to such
a stable and uniﬁed (by comparison) human `platform'. If computing had not changed
appreciably in 40 years  i.e. the only computer available today was a Burroughs B5000
running the original, unmodiﬁed MCP operating system  the computer science discipline
may have had greater success with event prediction and correlation.
Returning to item scaling; the GCS was designed for the dimensions to be added to-
gether to produce a score between 0 (dead) and 15 (normal function), so the relative
importance of each dimension was factored in with numeric constraints on each one.
More recent research has conclusively demonstrated the dimension-summing approach to
be lacking in resolution - it actually discards useful dimensional information, resulting in
poorer outcomes for patients in time-critical situations [12]. Reporting each dimension
separately has become more common as a result.
The advantages of separated dimensions can easily be illustrated with event log messages,
too. A disk fault in a RAID array may produce a log message preﬁx of S:0 I:6 C:3
(for argument's sake) indicating high severity, low impact and middling certainty. To add
these dimensions together would produce 9 from an event which has been catered for
with the provision of redundant disks and is highly likely to be imperceptible for end-
users. For comparison: a disk volume/partition ﬁlls up, preventing a volume snapshot
from being created, and therefore an overnight backup process fails (which generates the
event log message); this event may produce a preﬁx of S:3 I:2 C:4 - indicating much
less severity, greater organisational impact, but greater uncertainty. The dimensions still
add up to 9 but for an event which hasn't been catered for and could even result in
contractual or legal consequences. The other events in the chain would generate their own
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Would you tend to agree or disagree with the following 























































Figure 6.1: Example Likert-type scale
messages and preﬁxes.
Reporting the dimensions separately allows discrimination between the three factors of
event severity, organisational impact, and programmer/designer certainty. To combine
them would result in one scale ranging from, for example: 0 (apocalypse) to 21 (incon-
sequential and uncertain), obscuring the source of the score, therefore limiting usefulness
to events at either extremity. The `middle ground' would be impossible to analyse as
their scores could have come from any of the three dimensions. In essence a colour pho-
tograph would be converted to grayscale: red, green and blue become indistinguishable
and luminance is all that remains.
6.1 Arguments for scale length and type
With seed values intended to be implemented in code (by the programmer/designer who
is the individual best-informed about the algorithm and its assumptions), there is a valid
argument that any given scale should conform to research conclusions on response scales.
Such scales are meant to elicit unbiased responses from members of a population, as with
surveys, and to dovetail with the cognitive nature of human beings when attempting to
quantify opinions/attitudes [89]. That is; they oﬀer two extremes and a mid-point. The
`Likert-type' scale (see Figure 6.1) typically does this with opinions/attitudes of preference
or approval.
The underlying problem with applying response scales to the event logging context is this:
they rely on sampling a natural population that will (with a large enough sample) return
a bell-shaped standard distribution of results. The concept of the mid-point represents
the average  and this is why the Likert-type scale, or similar ones such as the linear-
numeric scale, consists of an odd number of response items (most often ﬁve or seven [89]).
Event log messages do not conform to the standard distribution [10] nor can statistical
techniques be used to predict them [26]. At the time of writing, they contain no usable
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and meaningful metric, either.
To propose a Likert or linear-numeric scale for an event logging metric would be to
suggest that most messages should reside near the middle of the scale. Standard deviations
and other statistical tools simply can't be applied to a domain where the data much more
closely resembles the Pareto principle (i.e. a few messages occur frequently while most
messages occur rarely, but neither frequency nor `severity' is any indicator of salience)
[10]. It is therefore more logical to follow Buckley's [26] advice and implement a linear
scale calibrated by the extreme possibilities yet with no notion of a mid-point to imply a
`norm'. The purpose here is not to dictate a `norm' to developers or the organisations and
their systems administrators that run daemons on their servers; but rather to allow the
developers' norms to be perceived and the organisation's norms to be imposed on their
running systems.
RFC 5424 is only the most recent RFC to document the Syslog severity scale (see Ta-
ble 2.1 on page 32) but the scale itself has existed since the 1980s, with its ﬁrst oﬃcial
documentation in 2001's RFC 3164[90]. Encoded into three bits (to most eﬃciently pack
it into one byte with ﬁve bits left for the logging `facility'), it features eight levels of
severity numbered 0 through 7. In reality there are undoubtedly millions of lines of
software code, even when only counting FOSS projects, which already incorporate sever-
ity values according to RFC 5424. Simply discarding such an immense body of work,
when those severity values could potentially alleviate by one-third the workload involved
in implementing a three-dimensional logging scale, would be folly at best. This is not to
deny that future work could evaluate the validity of the Syslog severity scale vs linear-
numeric or another type. A priority in this work is to ease any possible integration into
real-world software and re-using the Syslog severity scale dovetails with that aim. More-
over, it features suitable extremes, no explicit notion of a mid-point, and what shall next
be explained as a feature: beginning with 0. A disadvantage is that its ordering requires
a marginally more complex weighting function.
6.2 The application of organisational salience
At ﬁrst sight, it appears that any numeric scale must start with a 0 value representing
the least important end, in order to incorporate weightings (see Section 5.3 on page 92)
via fractional (0...1) multiplication, and this is correct. The RFC 5424 scale, however, re-
gards 0 as the most severe extreme - meaning that weighting with fractions produces the
inverse of the intended outcome. That is, the scaling `asymptote' resides at zero when it is
meant to be 7, the least severe extreme, because the mechanism of weighting is primar-
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(a) Incorrect scaling: elevating minimum impor-
tance rather than suppressing maximum impor-
tance
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Figure 6.2: Weighting results graphs
ily meant as a straightforward method for suppressing spurious/unimportant messages
(where spurious or unimportant is deﬁned by the organisation running the program
or daemon). In eﬀect, the least important events would be elevated in importance. This
scenario is illustrated in Figure 6.2a.
As can be seen in Figure 6.2b, the `correct' scaling has the eﬀect of suppressing the reports
from components judged less important. A system or daemon with a weighting of 1 will
always report its events as being of minimum impact while a weighting of 0 results in
no suppression. Whether the scaling should be characteristic of a straight line or not
across all seed values in the code would be a worthwhile topic for future research. A
parameter for specifying a curved scaling line could certainly be devised, perhaps at the
cost of introducing some complexity and administrator uncertainty about the results.
Another research question regarding the weights might be: what distribution are the
weights themselves likely to form? If we accept, for argument's sake, that an organisation
might deﬁne the mid-point of 0.5 as the appropriate weighting for the archetypal average
system, then is it possible or likely for the distribution of weights to resemble a standard
distribution? Such a distribution would permit the usage of diverse existing theories and
analysis tools. It would represent the combined assessments of importance for messages
issued by all the source components included in it, regardless of its shape, meaning the
application of the weighting algorithm is almost inevitably going to transform the Pareto-
like distribution of event log messages into an as-yet unknown form.








Figure 6.3: Process of applying a normal distribution of weights to Wallin et al.'s Pareto-
like distribution [10, pg. 10] of event alarms & tickets; the result is unknown (see text)
Note: the alarms graph extends out to 3500 alarm types [10], indicative of the `long tail' in this problem
domain.
Depicted in Figure 6.3, the application of weights (which are per-message-source, reﬂecting
the importance of each component in the organisation's context) to the previously deﬁned
three-dimensional scale would likely produce a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent distribution of event
log messages. It is important to remember that the number of message types will not
change as the output will not be `throttled'; Wallin et al.'s alarms domain, with only 3,500
unique types, more closely resembles the less packed space of the Munin monitoring tool
(see Table 3.1 on page 72) than more general event logs with higher ratios for Weaver's
H. Instead, the change will be in the plotting of the % of tickets dashed line as a
result of source importance being incorporated via scaling. Possible outcomes are as yet
unknown since trials would have to be run in valid production environments to gather
suﬃcient data. Such an experiment would entail the patching of source code, compilation
of patched programs/daemons, and the assignment of an importance weighting to all the
participating components. The outcome mockup presented later does not feature enough
data points to demonstrate any transformation.
The scaling function mentioned up to this point was originally intended to be a simple
multiplication of the seed value in code and the source's weight. The re-use of the Syslog
severity scale then required a reversal of the scaling function (as explained above). It
remains a simple function, resulting in the graph shown in Figure 6.2b.
Algorithm 6.1 Simple scaling function for suppressing the perceived impact of messages
from less important sources. Calibrated to `Syslog severity' extremes.
ireported = iseed + w(7− iseed)
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With i as the `impact' metric and w as the per-source weighting value, the scaling
function allows the contextual role of the source system component to be reﬂected in
all its event log messages, even those messages which have never before been issued in
a given organisation. The mechanism avoids any delays attributable to the achieving
of statistical signiﬁcance or a message being placed in the large bin of unknowns, as
happens today with static-matching solutions. On the other hand, it relies on systems
administrators or policy-makers for the assignment of sensible and useful weights, and
the programmer/designer for sensible and useful seed values; neither of these caveats are
new, however, as existing `solutions' place similar burdens on these people today.
6.3 Outcome mockup
To illustrate some of the possible outcomes with the presented design, selected event log
messages will be shown with preﬁx values assigned by the author. The preﬁxes take the
form of a [S?,I?,C?] tuple (hereafter called a SIC tuple) to communicate each mes-
sage's rating according to its severity, certainty and impact. For example, the message
kernel[S4,I6,C4] : ATM dev 0: error -110 fetching device status has been
assigned a severity of 4, an impact of 6 and a certainty of 4. The mockup scenario
includes three server systems representative of several diﬀerent organisational roles:
1. Server A: A critical ﬁrewalling, proxying and external e-mail system, essential for
organisational activities.
2. Server B: An internal server running network authentication daemons, a few internal
databases of average importance, and some internal e-mail storage. Some of this
system's workload can be handled by other machines running redundant services
for fail-over purposes.
3. Server C: An internal web site development machine which is 90% used for testing
and development rather than production sites. Beta sites may occasionally be made
available to a small, selected audience.
Three examples from each server were selected for the sake of brevity and the reader's
beneﬁt, and can be seen in Listing 6.1. The complete data set is contained in Appendix B
on page 155, as Listings 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 (containing 28 messages each). The messages
were chosen, using the author's experience of systems administration, from a genuine ﬂow
of event log messages which accumulated 32.7MB of plain-text data, to demonstrate a






























































































Table 6.2: Summary of outcome-mockup values, extracted from the contents of Listings
10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 in Chapter 10 on page 155
Note: the I value given here is the reported impact derived from the seed impact value
and the conﬁgured weighting for each system being monitored.
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Listing 6.1 Mocked-up event log messages (selected examples)
Jan 30 06:56:56 serverA postfix/smtpd [31944][S6 ,I4,C3]: disconnect from unknown
[190.51.227.124]
Jan 30 06:56:56 serverA postfix/smtpd [31944][S2 ,I5,C6]: lost connection after DATA (0
bytes) from unknown [190.51.227.124]
Jan 30 07:45:58 serverA ntpd [2304][S5,I7 ,C2]: kernel time sync status change 0001
...
Feb 1 19:10:15 serverB krb5kdc [2656][S6 ,I6,C2]: AS_REQ (3 etypes {16 1 3}) 172.16.1.100:
NEEDED_PREAUTH: example@EXAMPLE.COM for krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM , Additional
pre -authentication required
Feb 1 19:10:15 serverB krb5kdc [2656][S7 ,I6,C2]: TGS_REQ (3 etypes {16 1 3})
172.16.1.100: ISSUE: authtime 1296540615 , etypes {rep =16 tkt=16 ses=16},
example@EXAMPLE.COM for host/serverB.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM
Feb 1 19:25:19 serverB cyrus/ctl_cyrusdb [31955][S7 ,I6,C1]: archiving database file: /var
/lib/cyrus/mailboxes.db
...
Feb 6 12:28:53 serverC apache2 [8472][S4 ,I5,C4]: [06/ Feb /2011 12:28:52 20583] [error]
OpenSSL: error :1407609C:SSL routines:SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO:http request [Hint:
speaking HTTP to HTTPS port !?]
Feb 6 13:50:57 serverC kernel: [511040.208020] hub 1 -1:1.0[S7,I7 ,C3]: activate --> -19














































(c) Server C; impact weight 0.9
Figure 6.4: Outcome-mockup values sorted by Impact, then Severity, then Certainty
range and variety of SIC tuple values that would occur in real systems, while avoiding
copious numbers of repetitive messages.
Summarising the tuples from the mockup yields the information shown in Table 6.2 on the
facing page, after incorporating a per-system weight for the impact column. For example,
the Server B event for cyrus/ctl_cyrusdb at 19:25:19 on February 1 has a seed impact
of 6 and server B has a weighting of 0.6, so the reported impact (using Algorithm
6.1) is 6.6. When graphing these values, as can be seen in Figure 6.4 for the purpose
of comparison, each line is sorted ﬁrst by Impact, then by Severity within each Impact
bracket, then by Certainty within the two preceding brackets. The eﬀect of the simple
weighting algorithm can be observed in the `impact' plot line curve.
Consolidating event log messages from (potentially) many systems is of course the goal
here and the combined graph is in Figure 6.5 on the next page. The horizontal axis shows
a fairly even distribution of impact values from the most important system (server A) to
the least important (server C). Another point to note is the wide variation of the severity
and certainty values with respect to impact; no stable relationship appears until impact
and severity both reach 7. At this point, only `certainty' can vary, whereas earlier no

































































































Figure 6.5: Consolidated outcome mockup values, sorted by Impact, then Severity, then
Certainty
clear correlation appears between the three variables. This ﬁnding is closely aligned (for
severity and impact) to Wallin et al.'s determination that severity correlates poorly with
real-world priority [10].
With the three-dimensional metric in place, several simple if/then/else conditionals
could be used to apply organisational policies (e.g. Service-Level-Agreement-speciﬁed
responses) based on considerations of each dimension. For example, an if statement
might page a systems administrator if severity ≤ 2, impact ≤ 2 and certainty ≤
4. This statement would automatically activate for only one message in this example:
+3.3V: +3.12 V (min = +3.13 V, max = +3.45 V), which shows one of server A's
motherboard voltages outside of its acceptable range. The same message on servers B or C
would not page the administrator because those machines are not considered as important;
naturally another conditional could be written to pick up such an event on B or C (e.g.
severity ≤ 2 and certainty ≤ 4) and add it to a daily e-mail report. It is likely
that 5-10 conditional statements could handle many environments, while also handling
messages which were not anticipated, and yet not require the regular maintenance that
existing solutions do.
6.4 Summary: outcome mockup conclusions
The capabilities demonstrated with the mockup appear to be unique; namely the notions
of organisational importance and policy implementation (as those notions were presented
in a NASA paper by Schreckenghost et al., [45], although that eﬀort focussed on HCI
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etiquette for information presentation to astronauts1). A similar set of capabilities with a
ﬁltering solution utilising regular expressions would require the maintenance of separate
sets of regexes for each and every server. No policy or organisational-importance capability
was noted in any of the literature reviewed on data mining or other statistical approaches
(including neural networks). Could data mining approaches incorporate policies? Would
such algorithms require training for each operational proﬁle or server? These topics would
be worthy avenues for research in that direction.
The graphs produced also open up possibilities for graph analysis to establish a `nominal
state' that additionally takes the volume of events into account. Signiﬁcant data volumes
can be looked at in retrospect, when the state of a server has been conﬁrmed as good,
and tolerances assigned to its graph output, leading to prompt detection of operation
outside of these established norms. Each server would have its own proﬁle represented
by the graphs of SIC tuples it produces and this proﬁle is likely to change with extensive
modiﬁcations to the system such as an operating system upgrade. Once the systems
administrator was satisifed that a suﬃcient amount of `nominally-good' log data had been
collected, the proﬁle graph could be regenerated. As for what could be protected against
with this approach, one example would be a volume-based attack such as a distributed-
denial-of-service or dictionary attack, which would quickly distort the shape of the SIC-
metric graph. This is not a new is bad technique: the metric portrays the salience of
the information, not its raw volume or newness.
`Leaky buckets' are another mechanism in this regard: a rate limit (e.g. 200 per minute) of
messages with a certain SIC metric, when exceeded, could trigger actions within seconds
of an attack beginning. These possibilities will not be examined further here but are
left as open questions for future eﬀorts. It is also acknowledged that they might inherit
some of the disadvantages of statistical approaches; principally, a time lag between initial
detection and suﬃcient signiﬁcance being achieved to warrant action being taken. The
advantage of the presented approach is the machine-readable metadata which can inform
such algorithms.
1Where `etiquette' refers to the need to follow established conventions such as chains of command and
sleep schedules, i.e. taking into account the larger context outside the computer system.
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Chapter 7
A survey of systems administrators
Throughout this thesis the paucity of academic research into the situation of systems
administrators has frequently been raised. In short, it appears that these software and
hardware users has been regarded as the `expert' population and therefore not in need
of help when it comes to interfacing with computing technology. Their level of systems
knowledge would surpass that of the academic community in many or most cases. Ev-
idently, though, complexity and information overload is catching up with our coping
abilities and techniques [29, 15, 91, 58, 59, 62, 10, 38, 18].
A lack of research into the opinions or priorities of sysadmins has led to anecdotal ev-
idence being cited and unjustiﬁed thresholds being used, as demonstrated in Wallin et
al. [10] and Yamanishi & Maruyama [18]. To an extent, this is understandable: systems
administrators are often under very signiﬁcant pressure given their responsibility for an
organisation's computing infrastructure. There is no one industry body with membership
being legally obligated, as is the case with the medical and legal professions. There isn't
even a centralised ethical standard by which systems administrators must abide. Such is
the state of a profession which only emerged within the last few decades and is perpetually
in ﬂux as the industry changes (e.g. due to outsourcing).
7.1 Demographics
The New Zealand Network Operators Group's (NZNOG) [92] annual conference in Jan-
uary 2011 presented an opportunity to conduct such a survey. NZNOG is not an organi-
sation per se, but rather a mechanism for network, Internet-Service-Provider, and systems
administrators to communicate with each other and collaboratively work through chal-
lenges facing themselves and the industry, primarily through a mailing list. The annual
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conference is aimed at developing face-to-face relationships and disseminating knowledge
about upcoming products, Internet standards, Internet governance, and the like. The
NZNOG membership is highly technical in nature and not aﬃliated with any academic
goals or institution. Participation in the conference is entirely voluntary (although re-
stricted to registered attendees); as a result the audience is likely to vary from day to day,
due to external commitments.
The audience was therefore a mix of systems administrators, network administrators, ISP
staﬀ (often overlapping with the previous two categories), telecommunications workers,
managers, marketing staﬀ and vendor representatives. It cannot be overemphasised that
these people are usually diﬃcult to gain access to, and are often under great pressure,
due to their pivotal roles in their organisations [10]. NZNOG has a tradition of technical
discussions held under `Chatham House Rules', wherein any details given that may betray
competitive plans or technology are held in conﬁdence, and are never to be attributed to
the speaker. An entirely anonymous survey that does not solicit any identifying informa-
tion is therefore the appropriate choice for facilitating a free and fair discussion.
7.2 Procedure
The survey was administered following a preliminary 25-minute presentation of this re-
search. These actions were carried out in a hotel conference room, beginning at 11:45 on a
Friday morning; the second day of presentations made at the conference. Responses were
collected as the participants broke for lunch after a subsequent, unrelated presentation;
the author held out a large labelled box and thanked participants as they returned the
forms. The chaotic pile of forms was then shued, checked for any identifying information
such as names (there were none) and stored. The box was left in place, unobserved by the
author, until the end of the lunch break to allow any further responses; ﬁve were received
in this manner. As shown on the form itself in Figure 7.2, the forms will be held securely
for one year and then disposed of. Destruction will be via shredding.
The audience numbered roughly 120: 50 responses were received, giving a response rate
of around 42%. This is higher than the average organisational response rate of 35.7%
(std. dev. 18.8) reported by Baruch & Holtom, in 2008, [93] for surveys. As noted above
regarding the demographics surveyed, the audience did not consist entirely of systems and
network administrators or people with equivalent experience.
7.3. THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT 111
7.3 The survey instrument
The research goals for the survey were aimed largely at deducing what kind of event
log information systems administrators found to be salient. Secondary to this goal were
the desires to establish the prevalence of event log ﬁltering, the techniques used and
the eﬀectiveness of those techniques. Validation/support for the concept of the three-
dimensional scale (severity, impact, certainty) was also sought.
The instrument used is shown in Figures 7.1 and 7.2. It was printed on both sides of
one sheet of A4 paper. Alreck & Settle's resource The Survey Research Handbook [89]
was heavily consulted during the creation process. Linear-numeric scales were used for
three items where the average response was expected to be around the scale's mid-point.
One notable omission only realised after the survey had been completed was the lack of
calibration information for the rankings item (number seven on page two of the form).
Around 18% of respondents seemed to reverse the order of the Syslog scale and used 10
as the most important extreme when that was intended to be 0 (as was explained in the
presentation immediately beforehand).
The vast majority of those responses appear to have reversed both extremes, rating items
such as the UPS check - an entirely innocuous message simply noting a successful self-test
- as 0 and the disk fault, a failure likely to cause immediate and severe problems for
the system, as 10, exactly the opposite of most other responses1. The Syslog scale, as
explained on page 32, regards 0 as the most important, and 7 as the least important.
The survey used 1-10 merely as ranks.
This two-page response form was approved under Section 4.7 of the Victoria University
of Wellington Human Ethics Policy [94], avoiding the need for a formal Human Ethics
Committee approval process. Section 4.7 sets out conditions that were taken into account
when designing the instrument, and the relevant excerpt can be viewed in Chapter 11 on
page 161.
7.4 Raw survey results
The raw results are presented in tabular form in Chapter 12 on page 163. The size of the
data set requires a multi-page format, with each response spread over two pages. One
duplicate was noticed: form 28 appeared to be an exact facsimile of form 27, right down
to the handwriting. Form 28's results were therefore omitted.
1See Section 7.5.3 for a discussion on the data cleaning process that was carried out.
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Figure 7.1: Survey instrument, page 1
































































































































































Figure 7.2: Survey instrument, page 2



















































































































































































































































































Figure 7.3: Response item 1 results
7.5 Analysis of results
7.5.1 Techniques in use
Figure 7.3 shows us that the most common `technique' for dealing with log ﬁles is simply
to leave them alone until they are needed after a speciﬁc event. That is; they are reserved
for reactive use instead of proactive interpretation. Only 27% of participants regularly
monitored or ﬁltered their log ﬁles. Notably, static matching techniques are over four
times more likely to be employed than data-mining.
An impression of `comfort' with the existing situation can be garnered from Figures 7.4
and 7.5. Both data sets have medians of four, and means signiﬁcantly towards the right:
4.43 for item 2, 4.35 for item 3. The audience in general appears somewhat ambiva-
lent to raw event logs with the most-expert feeling right at home. Certainty about the
eﬀectiveness of their chosen `coping method' for log ﬁles, however, drops oﬀ rapidly above
5, with comparatively few participants willing to state unreservedly their belief in the
method they employed. One might posit that this reﬂects an awareness that much of the
information generated at system level is simply never examined, but that conclusion must
be considered in light of the survey being held immediately after the author's presentation
about the issues created when using event log messages for system monitoring.
The vision presented in Figure 7.6 on page 116 (mean rated eﬀectiveness for each tech-
nique) incorporates averages with as few as two data points and this should be kept in
mind. An important conclusion is the small range within which the means reside; from
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Figure 7.4: Response item 2 results












































Figure 7.5: Response item 3 results
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Figure 7.6: Mean rated eﬀectiveness for each technique
4 to 5 for eﬀectiveness of each technique. This certainly does not suggest any great
dissatisfaction (on average) with the choices that systems administrators have made, but
neither does it display great satisfaction.
7.5.2 Motivations
Figure 7.7 shows the `desire' of sysadmins to monitor their systems more closely; only
one participant indicated that they did not have any interest in log ﬁle information. Note
that kernel messages was not included as an option, as messages from the kernel are
typically treated according to cause, such as disk failures under hardware monitors and
stack-smashing attacks under security notices. The two most heavily-favoured response
items were service-related (37) and hardware monitors (34) - both of which are critical
to service availability, and therefore potentially require the most urgent response from
a systems administrator; if a provided service (e.g. e-mail, web proxy) or hardware
component (e.g. ISP border router) is no longer available, there can be an impact on
those who rely on `our service'.
The other two response items in the majority were security notices (33) and authenti-
cation (30). Neither of these are directly related to immediate service availability (except
perhaps via individual account compromises or corrupt/deleted data after-the-fact) and
are closer to the concept of system integrity, i.e. maintaining a consistent and known
state without rogue actors or processes. System integrity creates trust in the system's
output; which will be deterministic in nature. For example, a serious security notice with

















































Figure 7.7: Response item 4 results
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evidence of an SQL injection means the aﬀected database is fundamentally compromised
and will likely have to be either entirely restored from a prior backup or have all recent
transactions rolled back to before the time of the injection. The service itself, however,
will most likely remain available until sysadmin intervention occurs.
The notion of benign system state is perhaps most lucidly conveyed by the usage item
(23) : the primary metric here is what are people doing with the system, which can
include factors as diverse as thread/fork load, UNIX load averages, memory and disk con-
sumption, distributed-denials-of-service, percentage of spam e-mail vs legitimate, or even
whether Bob in accounting is viewing unsavoury content with organisational resources.
Rather abstractly, usage can have an eﬀect on service availability, and it is here that
sysadmins may need to obtain statistics about performance and resource consumption,
for example, in order to forecast new hardware purchases or additional budget for cloud
computing. Usage as such is probably the least bad of the items presented but was
important enough, at least to organisations, for slightly less than half of the participants
to select it. It is also emblematic of the densely-packed information space of event log
messages (see Section 3.4.1 on page 71) in that usage can be interpreted from so many
diﬀerent possible angles in normal event logs with a high value for Weaver's H, while a
more uniform log such as one that is application-speciﬁc (e.g. Munin) will have a much
lower value for H and be much more straightforward to judge for usage purposes.
Authorisation is evidently (with only 17 responses) a less serious response item. It must
be noted that authorisation is the mechanism which regulates what an authenticated
identity can or cannot do. This authorisation often takes the form of a permissions
mechanism (such as ﬁle and directory permissions in a ﬁlesystem) that discriminates on
a basis of identity  which requires authentication ﬁrst to verify that identify.
The primary conceptual gap between authorisation and authentication is authorisa-
tion's lack of a challenge-response motif. It is just a check against a pre-deﬁned list of
allowed/disallowed actions. For example, an authenticated user may try to open a ﬁle that
they are not allowed to, such as the password hash ﬁle on a UNIX or UNIX-like system;
/etc/shadow. This action will fail, and will always fail, unless permission is manually
granted by the superuser. Authorisation therefore cannot be teased, gamed, experimented
with, or brute-forced. It is either buggy and broken, or not - there is no concept here
of authentication mechanisms' strength or weakness. Similarly, it is also much more
ﬁnely-grained (e.g. per-ﬁle permissions vs per-system authentication). Authorisation vi-
olations indicate that `bad behaviour' has been caught and entirely prevented; yet the
bad behaviour, and therefore motive, still exists. System integrity is maintained when
authorisation is violated and the sysadmin can be notiﬁed of possible/probable intent. [95]
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From the above analysis, it should be possible to synthesize a list of motivations that
would drive almost all sysadmins to monitor their systems more closely if they could.
The reader should not necessarily be surprised at the position of the last motivation in
Table 7.1: systems administrators cannot ever assume the Internet is a `safe' place.
1 Service availability
2 System integrity
3 Resource consumption levels
4 Intent of attack or compromise
Table 7.1: Motivations in evidence among systems administrators
7.5.3 Indicators of salience
With 41 responses, the source of the message leads the pack of salience indicators for
systems administrators in Figure 7.8 on the next page. This ﬁnding lends support to
the `impact' dimension and related weighting mechanism presented earlier, in that sysad-
mins discriminate (perhaps most heavily) by source, independent of the message content.
Current systems have no method for including the importance of the source into the log
messages issued by that source.
Textual content and correlation were the same, at 37 responses. While automating
the analysis of correlation remains a hard problem [10], and higher quality and more
consistent log ﬁles have been called for to help with correlation (as in Buckley [26]),
another interesting distinction exists between the responses for textual content and nu-
meric content (16). The diﬀerence between the response levels (i.e. 37 vs 16) shows the
weighting assigned to the two types of log message content by sysadmins; yet no such
diﬀerence could be identiﬁed in the literature on automated log ﬁle analysis. Data mining
algorithms, neural networks, and static-matching ﬁlters of course regard the content as
binary streams to either match or analyse for patterns. They do not incorporate even the
evidently-higher regard for textual content vs numeric that humans do, yet they attempt
to achieve human-like eﬀectiveness.
One base which appears to be relatively frequently utilised by automated mechanisms,
perhaps due to its statistical obviousness, is the number of occurences of a particular
message (29). The Logwatch software project [19] uses this as one of its primary met-
rics; displaying to the administrator the daily counts of matches for each static pattern-
matching regular expression it uses (such as logins and logouts recorded in log ﬁles and
then later being matched and counted). Outside of well-deﬁned/unchanging and common
cases, however, the usefulness of this approach is undermined by trivial diﬀerences (to a

































Figure 7.8: Response item 5 results
human observer) that nonetheless greatly degrade any automated mechanism. Atwood
[56] pointed out this diﬃculty with the tools produced by the computer science discipline,
in relation to genetic pattern databases (as explained on page 46).
The log ﬁle mechanism itself appears highly salient, as can be seen in Figure 7.9; not one
participant had gone without the use of a log ﬁle in the past year. The overall relevance
of event log messages is therefore conﬁrmed for a professional, technical audience.
Asking the audience to rank ten diﬀerent log messages in terms of their importance raised
an issue which has already been alluded to (the likelihood of participants reversing the
1-10 scale). Figure 7.10 on page 122 displays the raw rankings as a stacked bar graph -
items with usually-long bar sections were ranked less important and items with shorter bar
sections were ranked more important. 13 participants did not provide any rankings while
four provided incomplete rankings and two provided rankings with duplicated ranks (e.g.
two 9 's). Figure 7.10 contains this raw data, and the (absent) rankings of the duplicated
form 28.
In order to maintain as many data points as possible (necessary with such a small sample),
duplicate and missing ranks were altered while maintaining the overall mean. Cleaning
























Figure 7.9: Response item 6 results
the data entailed these actions:
 deleting blank rankings
 duplicate ranks were altered to maintain a per-participant mean rank of 5.5
 missing ranks were ﬁlled in to maintain a per-participant mean rank of 5.5
The altered forms are detailed in Table 7.2, with the actual alterations in bold italics.
These alterations maintain the per-participant ranking mean of 5.5.
Examining the per-item mean and median rankings after these alterations produces the
graph in Figure 7.11. Surprisingly (for the author at least) the Name daemon: clients-
per-query... item was ranked the least serious, with both its mean and median rankings
signiﬁcantly above the standard deviation. Correspondingly, and as expected, the Kernel:
Buﬀer I/O error on device... item was ranked as signiﬁcantly the most important, again
outside the standard deviation. It therefore follows that these two items can be considered
the `endpoints', or the extremes of importance, of the items available to be ranked.
Stage two of the cleaning process will eliminate the responses where both the endpoints
appear to have been reversed; i.e. where the Name daemon: clients-per-query... item
was ranked as 1 (most important) and where the Kernel: Buﬀer I/O error on device...
item was ranked as 10 (least important). This is not intended to ensure a `perfect' data
set where the only responses are consistent with the author's expectations, but rather to
retain the largest sample while eliminating the very-likely outliers and enhancing the mean
values for each ranking. Reversed rankings act as `noise', obscuring the true picture. The
decision to perform this cleaning was taken as a result of advice from Victoria University
of Wellington's consulting statistician.
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Figure 7.10: Response item 7 results (raw rankings)
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Response item _ Form 7 9 10 16 23 37
Name daemon: clients-per-query decreased
to 14
4 7.2 5.25 8.5 2 10
Time daemon: no server suitable for
synchronization found
9 9 3 4 5.2 4.5
Secure shell daemon: Accepted publickey
for root from 192.168.1.1 port 43152 ssh2
8 7.2 10 5 5.2 4
Mail daemon: max connection rate 1/60s
for (smtp:unknown) at Jan 20 10:13:54
4 1 5.25 6 7 9
Kernel: Buﬀer I/O error on device sdj,
logical block 51323504
10 3 8 7 9 1
UPS monitoring daemon: UPS Self Test
completed: Battery OK
1 7.2 1 8.5 5.2 8
Name daemon: zone 'example.com' allows
updates by IP address, which is insecure
7 7.2 5.25 3 7 7
Kernel: ATM dev 0: error -110 fetching
device status
4 4 5.25 2 5.2 5
VPN daemon: TLS Error: incoming packet
authentication failed from 1.2.3.4:53151
4 7.2 5 1 4 4.5
Kerberos authentication: TGS_REQ (3
etypes {16 1 3}) 192.168.2.68:
PROCESS_TGS...
4 2 7 10 5.2 2
Table 7.2: Statistical corrections to participant responses (ﬁrst stage of data cleaning)
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Response item _ Form 2 15
Name daemon: clients-per-query decreased
to 14
1 1
Time daemon: no server suitable for
synchronization found
6 9
Secure shell daemon: Accepted publickey
for root from 192.168.1.1 port 43152 ssh2
8 8
Mail daemon: max connection rate 1/60s
for (smtp:unknown) at Jan 20 10:13:54
5 6
Kernel: Buﬀer I/O error on device sdj,
logical block 51323504
10 10
UPS monitoring daemon: UPS Self Test
completed: Battery OK
2 3
Name daemon: zone 'example.com' allows
updates by IP address, which is insecure
9 7
Kernel: ATM dev 0: error -110 fetching
device status
7 2
VPN daemon: TLS Error: incoming packet
authentication failed from 1.2.3.4:53151
4 5
Kerberos authentication: TGS_REQ (3
etypes {16 1 3}) 192.168.2.68:
PROCESS_TGS...
3 4
Table 7.3: Responses deleted due to endpoint reversal (second stage of data cleaning)
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Figure 7.11: Mean and median item rankings after ﬁrst stage of data cleaning (std. dev.
displayed)
The two responses which ﬁtted the end-point criteria (i.e. opposite values given for
the response items whose means and medians were outside of one standard deviation)
were forms 2 and 15. Those responses are shown in Table 7.3. It is expected that the
participants responsible for forms 2 and 15 simply inverted the 1-10 importance scale,
which is entirely understandable; as noted earlier, the endpoints were not detailed or
ennumerated on the response form. Further surveys could test the acceptance of scales
in each direction, with clear instructions about which endpoint is which; or other scale
characteristics such as the presence of midpoints and length (number of scale positions).
For comparison, the raw data at each stage is presented in Figure 7.12 on the following
page. Note that the vertical axis shows the form numbers independently for each graph,
and these numbers cannot be compared across graphs.
A ranking of the importance of the events can be obtained, as shown in Figure 7.13; which
is sorted by mean due to there being several identical median values. To validate the list
of motivations in Table 7.1 on page 119, the event items will be categorised according to
motivation. Table 7.4 shows the outcome of the categorisation. With this small num-
ber of event log messages, no conclusive outcome can be drawn; but the distribution of
event items still appears to be generally in-line with the order of the motivations. In
other words, event log messages which portray service availability or system integrity is-
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Raw data
Data cleaning; stage 1
Data cleaning; stage 2
Figure 7.12: Comparison of raw data across stages of cleaning (response item 7)

























































Figure 7.13: Mean and median item rankings after second stage of data cleaning (std.
dev. displayed, sorted by mean)
sues are considered more important, while resource consumption and intent of attack are
considered less important.
In addition, the distribution of importance may warrant further investigation. To the ex-
tent that it has been limited by the small sample size presented here, a larger investigation
would provide evidence for a more accurate plotting of systems administrators' concerns.
As it is, a curve has been plotted in Figure 7.15, which shows a sharp increase in impor-
tance assigned to a small proportion of messages, and a mirrored decrease in importance
towards the other end of the scale. Hypothetically, this curve may represent a cognitive
model of perception that could be compared to the existing Pareto-like distribution of
event log messages.
An ideal event log message handling solution might indeed transform the existing distri-
bution into the identiﬁed curve; eliminating the long-tail problem and instead presenting
messages on a basis of overall importance or salience, as perceived by the sysadmin, and
this hypothesis would need to be investigated. The mechanism of weights applied to the
impact metric (discussed earlier) is an initial attempt to realise this goal.
The ﬁnal response item gathered feedback from the audience as to their disposition to-
wards the proposed severity, impact, certainty scale. Figure 7.14 depicts a positive
disposition with a mean of 4.89 and median of 5 where 4 is the midpoint.. We must
bear in mind that this is an opinion solicited from end-users of the proposed scale and not
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UPS monitoring daemon: UPS Self
Test completed: ...
Service availability (but with no
impact)
Mail daemon: max connection rate
1/60s for...
Resource consumption levels/Intent of
attack or compromise
VPN daemon: TLS Error: Incoming
packet authentication...
Intent of attack or compromise
Name daemon: zone 'example.com'
allows updates by...
System integrity (but with no impact)
Kerberos authentication: TGS_REQ
(3 etypes {16 1 3})...
System integrity/intent of attack or
compromise
Kernel: ATM dev 0: error -110 fetching
device status
Service availability
Secure shell daemon: Accepted
publickey for root from...
System integrity
Time daemon: no server suitable for
synchronization found
Service availability/system integrity
Kernel: Buﬀer I/O error on device sdj,
logical block...
Service availability (likely impact)
Table 7.4: Categorisation of event log message per-motivation (sorted by mean ranking)






















Figure 7.14: Response item 8 results
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Figure 7.15: Hypothetical comparison of `message importance curve' and Pareto-like event
log message distribution
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the program developers who would be responsible for implementing the scale as a preﬁx
on the log messages in their source code. It does perhaps indicate a willingness on the
part of the audience to improve on the status-quo.
7.6 Summary
The survey, as conducted, has provided what is most likely the ﬁrst evidence of systems
administrators' preferences for event log message processing. Motivations were deduced
from the data; these are `service availability', `system integrity', `resource consumption
levels' and `intent of attack/compromise', with SA being most important. While sysad-
mins appear largely content with the status quo, they also perceive that the situation
could be improved. Certainly any improvement could have a signiﬁcant impact, given
that all sysadmins surveyed made (usually extensive) use of their log ﬁles.
Chapter 8
Discussion and conclusion
This thesis began with the following premise: event log messages are growing in quantity
but the tools available for processing them have not seen anything like an equivalent
increase in capability. Regular expressions may have added the occasional improvement
in syntax, however, they remain largely identical to their 1980s cousins. Data mining
and other statistical approachs (neural networks included) are still probabilistic at best -
and only show true promise when painstakingly tuned over long periods of time against
a hermetically-sealed data set kept in stasis. The only constant is change, though, and
such algorithms simply do not cope with change; often retreating to a position of new
must be bad. A lack of useful metadata only compounds the situation.
In proposing a metric to improve the event logging landscape, it is worthwhile recalling
these motivations and their accompanying responses:
 A data set containing poorly-deﬁned textual descriptions, prone to change, and very
densely-packed `information' content (high ratios for Weaver's H ).
à Provide an embedded, machine-and-human-readable scale. This avoids the
need to reverse-engineer human impressions of meaning into the data set - a
need created by the discarding of context and background knowledge that is a
natural consequence of the event log messaging paradigm.
 Include a notion of context in the larger computing environment.
à The scale should include a programmer-assigned seed value for the potential
impact of the event mentioned in the message. This value is then manipulated
according to the systems administrator's preferences and experience in their
particular environment.
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 Improve the iterative process by drawing on observations of another sector faced
with a not-dissimilar problem.
à Allow systems administrators to rapidly-iterate their impact weights/manipu-
lations on a per-service, per-server/cluster basis. This metric would be exposed
to log-analysis tools as a simple scale preﬁx on existing message text. Other
disciplines have recognised the value of splitting scales into multiple dimensions
to distinguish between inﬂuences on the output value; sysadmins can be better
informed if they additionally perceive the programmer's view of severity and
certainty for each particular message.
The argument for the scale values being deﬁned in code was developed in [62] and is based
on the logic that the programmer or program designer is the person best-acquainted with
the problem domain surrounding the issuing of an event log message. `Severity' as a value
in code is already facilitated by RFC 5424 [11] but with less-than-complete uptake since
the value is, by default, discarded by Syslog daemons after routing each message. The
scope of `severity', however, is limited to each individual message and simply conveys
how bad it is on a scale of 0 (worst/most consequential) to 7 (least worst/most
inconsequential), as shown in Table 2.1 on page 32.
Unfortunately, such a unidimensional scale cannot hope to accurately convey information
about either the consequences for the larger computing environment, or the developer's
certainty that their coded values will actually apply in every situation. Even the tex-
tual messages themselves do not include this information and it must be added by a
human (as was done in Listings 6.4a, 6.4b and 6.4c, beginning on page 156). Person-to-
person communication has been enhanced with multi-dimensional scales before; specif-
ically, medicine's Glascow-Coma Scale (GCS) [49] which has been tested and accepted
globally as a method for quickly and unambiguously conveying patient triage priority and
likely outcome, but there are reservations about summing the dimensions into a single
number (e.g. [12]).
The GCS was adopted, in part, to improve information retention when patients were being
brought into hospital emergency rooms and then possibly being seen by many diﬀerent
individual medical professionals. Information was prone to being lost; one could charac-
terise this as being like the childhood game of `Chinese Whispers'. Event log messaging
faces a similar challenge caused by the loss of context and background knowledge, not to
mention information-overload thanks to `noise', as information is passed from the mind
of the program developer to the mind of the end-user (the systems administrator, in this
case). Shannon and Weaver's information model can accurately portray the lossy process
and is discussed from page 57 onwards.
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8.1 Metric considerations
Any proposed metric for event log messages should aim to facilitate improved informa-
tion retention by mitigating the eﬀects of ﬁltering (i.e. loss of context, false negatives and
positives), noise (false negatives and positives) and volume (cognitive overload). Main-
tenance demands should also be minimal; continual change can lead to disenchantment
with continual maintenance.
As discussed in Chapter 6 on page 97, the metric is designed to improve the lot of the
systems administrator. By creating metric seed values in code, the salience-encoding work
is performed once (globally) as opposed to millions of sysadmins needing to maintain ﬁlters
(e.g. lists of regular expressions) which are painstakingly matched to their own needs.
Machine-readable metadata reduces the ﬁltering task to a near-trivial exercise.
The metric as presented in this thesis takes the form of a three-dimensional scale, featuring
the following dimensions:
 Severity: an existing concept drawn from RFC 5424 [11]. Some existing projects,
such as OpenVPN [13], have implemented `severity' to the extent where it is oﬀered
as a throttling option for the daemon's logging output; OpenVPN can be conﬁgured
to discard all log message output which has been seeded with a `severity' value above
this conﬁguration integer (remembering that 0 is the most important endpoint).
Many projects, perhaps the majority, do not oﬀer any similar capability and their
severity values, where they exist, should therefore be treated with a degree of skep-
ticism as they may have been inserted simply to satisfy the logging programming
interface. Developers are aware that severity values are simply discarded by default
Syslog server conﬁgurations.
The domain scope of `severity' is limited to the program or daemon issuing the
message and as a result the extremes of the scale are calibrated according to the
best and worst possibilities for that one entity.
 Impact: a synthesis of ideas from X.733 (perceived severity) [43], Wallin et al.
(priority correlating poorly with severity) [10], Mitchell et al. (stakeholder salience)
[1] and semiotics (the social level above that of mere signs) [6, 54, 3, 61], among
others. It refers to the consequences for the larger computing environment of a
given event and how these consequences aﬀect humans' real-world priorities. Some
events can be very severe in themselves but of minimal impact (e.g. a failed disk
in a redundant array) while others can be minimally severe but potentially of great
impact (e.g. individual portions of a distributed-denial-of-service attack).
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The domain scope of `impact' is the forest rather than the trees; it refers to ser-
vice provision and availability/organisational-viability overall. The endpoints are
calibrated according to the best and worst possibilities for the organisation as a
whole.
 Certainty: drawn from sources as diverse as Mitchell et al. (urgency/conﬁdence)
[1], Matheus et al. (certainty of information reported in battleﬁeld scenarios) [9],
Reason (knowledge of human failings with active and passive errors) [60] and Mol-
loy et al. (acknowledgement of the consequences of automation on humans) [58].
`Certainty', as a scale, is an explicit indication of doubt, which exists no matter how
much we might crave absolute certainty [79]. Each and every log message is subject
to pre-conceived notions when it is coded and depending on the quality of the input
data to the preceding conditional statements, and the associated assumptions, the
information contained therein may or may not be accurate in an as-yet-unknown
real world event.
The domain scope of `certainty' is as small each individual log message, or perhaps
as large as each code block under a given conditional which is acknowledged as re-
lying on less-than-perfect assumptions. For example, a large switch-case structure
makes each of its cases, no matter how involved they are, subject to the validity of
the initial switch conditional.
The 0-7 scale utilised here is based on the volume of pre-existing software already featuring
valid `severity' values (as documented in RFCs 5424 and 3164), and a desire to facilitate
re-use wherever possible. The 0-7 scale does not feature a midpoint as Likert-type scales
do (a scale commonly used for opinion surveys in populations, as explained on page 99);
it is not a classical response scale where the results are expected to form a standard
distribution, as no such distribution is either anticipated or in evidence with event log
messages.
8.2 Applying weights to the metric
The incorporation of the wider scope associated with `impact' naturally requires a mech-
anism which can be customised for each organisation (see Chapter 4 on page 75). Here,
this mechanism takes the form of a weighting which expresses the relative importance of
daemons (i.e. according to the services they provide) and also hosts/servers. It is hypoth-
esized that a suﬃciently large number of such weightings, honestly assigned, may begin
to resemble a standard distribution: where the distribution is such that most services
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and machines are average, a smaller number are more important than average and a
similarly small number are less important than average. Such a distribution would be
distinctly diﬀerent from the Pareto-like distribution of event log messages with its long
tail of rarely-encountered issuings.
Weights readily-conﬁgurable by the systems administrator also present an opportunity
for rapidly-iterated tuning of the log message output. There are two existing methods
for tuning that are both problematic and therefore remain largely theoretical, in that
they are hardly ever, if ever, utilised. The ﬁrst entails submitting a source code patch to
the program developer (and acceptance is far from guaranteed) or maintaining one's own
code repository - but obviously these do not apply to closed-source products. The second
is the only available avenue for closed-source, although it can also work for FOSS, is a
cumbersome string-replacing engine conﬁgured with long lists of regular expressions. Such
an engine simply recognises pre-conﬁgured signatures and either replaces strings or adds
information for other tools to make use of later. Weights, in contrast, simply take the
form of an integer value in a conﬁguration ﬁle, one per service daemon and one for each
server's Syslog forwarding daemon (which scales all impacts across the other daemons
according to the importance of that machine).
Note that weights are only proposed here for the `impact' dimension. The much more
tightly-scoped `severity' and `certainty' dimensions are intended to enhance communica-
tion from developer to end-user on the topics of how bad a message was for the issuing
entity, and the degree of conﬁdence the developer has in their tests and associated assump-
tions, respectively. Therefore, at this time, it is diﬃcult to perceive how end-user weights
could be valid in those contexts due to the depth of source-level knowledge required to
meaningfully inﬂuence or second-guess the provided values. Any mechanism for weight-
ing `severity' and `certainty' may also be greatly burdened by their ﬁner granularity: the
smaller scopes would entail unique serial numbers on each message-issuing statement in
the source code and a (potentially very large) lookup table for conﬁguring each and every
one.
8.3 Evidence supporting a change to the status-quo
As can be seen in Chapter 7, event logs are used very extensively by systems (including
network) administrators, to the point where no respondents denied their use. Automated
ﬁltering is uncommon, however, with only one third of the audience making any use of such
tools. Larger samples from statistics-gathering eﬀorts like the Debian Popularity Contest
[21] showing uptake of less than 10% (for FOSS packages installed from distribution
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repositories). Increasing the awareness of important event log messages is no doubt a
worthy goal and one that can be aided by useful, conﬁgurable ﬁltering producing timely
and relevant results.
The general attitude to existing solutions could perhaps best be characterised as ambiva-
lent to positive. Distinctly few respondents indicated high or very high conﬁdence in
their solutions, though, according to Figure 7.5 on page 115. This may indicate awareness
of shortcomings or even simply a lack of familiarity with the tools at hand. By far the
largest proportion of respondents only use their log ﬁles in a reactive manner, leading to
knowledge of just how much information is available, but results from other response items
(speciﬁcally Item 4 on page 117) would imply they then ﬁnd themselves without suﬃcient
time, motivation or budget to implement a worthwhile mechanism for automated ﬁltering.
A quick, eﬀective/straightforward, and free solution is likely to be the proverbial Holy
Grail, even though it violates the similarly-proverbial fast, good, cheap; pick two rule.
Any of the existing solutions, however, require a signiﬁcant investment of time to imple-
ment well. An absence of metadata means messages very often contain no indication of
their importance - certainly not beyond the scope of their own issuing entity (i.e. `sever-
ity' values, in those cases where they have been responsibly implemented in code: such
as in OpenVPN). This means the solution provider has to have interpreted the messages
for meaning and importance. Naturally, this interpretation may not match up with the
priorities and organisational realities of the systems administrator, yet a statistical or
regex-based approach does not allow for tuning without very deep knowledge of the ﬁlter-
ing mechanism itself. Lowering this barrier to entry has not been a primary academic aim
other than when Buckley [26] circled around the topic in 1992, and again when writing
with Siewiorek [25] in 1995.
Both the academic and technical communities needs to remove the barriers to eﬀective
event log message ﬁltering to improve system-level awareness; any progress can be as-
sessed against the percentage of systems administrators utilising the relevant tools in
anger. Survey response item 7.8 on page 120 identiﬁes source, textual content and event
correlation as the top-three factors in a sysadmin's mind when deciding the importance of
messages; yet current solutions ignore such prioritisation of input. Indeed, the relatively-
few eﬀorts that have thus far emerged from the computer science discipline focus on
statistical heavy-lifting (e.g. [96, 30, 67, 15, 97, 42, 28, 33, 16, 17, 18, 34]) and black-box
neural networks (e.g. [10]). It could be said that we have been making our task more
diﬃcult through a desire to apply our favoured tools, trying to ﬁnd a problem for our so-
lution, when in fact the problem in event log messaging is right at the source: inadequate
communication from the message's originator (the mind of the designer/developer) to the
end-user, thanks to a lack of metadata reﬂecting real-world concerns. This is an interface
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shortcoming and we have eﬀectively been trying to use approaches such as data mining
to judge inadequate interface output - reconstructing meaning where none yet exists.
8.4 But how can this be improved?
The fundamental issue facing all those who attempt to usefully ﬁlter event log messages
is a highly-packed, ever-changing data stream (i.e. low redundancy [8]) full of noisy and
incomplete communications. Context is critical and yet diﬃcult, at best, to preserve - this
is reﬂected in the challenges encountered in event correlation (e.g. [29, 91, 72]). Improving
the lot of event correlation is admittedly not a central goal here although the SIC metric
may help.
What is the ﬁrst step? Upgrading the various aspects (highly packed, cryptic, incomplete,
etc) starts with the provision of human- and machine-readable metadata to remove the
need to reverse-engineer meaning into messages that can be as short as two characters.
This not only relieves a human systems administrator of the research burden involved in
ﬁnding out whether or not she needs to be concerned about a given message, but also
relieves pressure on the academic community to provide a ﬂawless data mining algorithm
or even strong AI. The use of a three-dimensional metric is consistent with well-established
precedents like medicine's Glasgow Coma Scale.
The second step comes through an incorporation of organisational realities. As imple-
mented in this thesis, these realities are represented with weights which, due to reasons of
scope compatibility examined earlier, are applied to the `impact' dimension. The mech-
anism comfortably facilitates the relative positioning of message sources as more or less
important than others: a method for reﬂecting the per-source criteria selected by sysad-
mins in survey response item ﬁve (see page 120). It also plays a role in highlighting the
types of messages that sysadmins are interested in (from survey response item four) by
allowing them to select the daemons which they consider to have potential impact on their
organisation. Rapid iteration becomes possible with easily-conﬁgured numeric weights,
so the output can be customised according to personal and/or organisational preference.
The message types themselves were broadly categorised into four motivations in Table
7.1; service availability, system integrity, resource consumption levels and intent of attack
or compromise, which should be of help to developers seeking to provide useful seed values
in their source code.
Thirdly and ﬁnally, after metadata has been added to event log messages and weights
taken into account, the question of exactly how to best utilise this metric remains. Regular
expressions cannot usefully reference the metric's values due to combinatorial complexity.
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Listing 8.1 Example stanza of rules for ﬁltering event log messages with the SIC metric
if (S<=2 && I<=2) then pageSysAdmin;
if (S<=2 && C<=5) then emailSysAdminImmediately;
if (S>2 && S<=6 && I<=5 && C<=5) then emailSysAdminDaily;
if (S=7 && I<=6 && C<=4) then emailSysAdminWeekly;
if (S<=4 && I>=6 && I<=7 && C<=2) then emailSysAdminMonthly;
Data mining/neural networks would likely not produce output of any higher determinism
either - the addition of more information to an already highly-packed space simply in-
creases the number of possible cases - and these techniques already produce results that
their authors often admit are probabilistic, at best.
We should leave the task of interpreting cryptic textual messages meant for human con-
sumption, to humans. Instead, a metadata metric that is machine-readable can itself
be used independently of the message's textual content. This step away from textual
pattern-matching and statistical analysis (including the various permutations such as
corpus construction, data mining, ontological data fusion, neural networks and so on) is
core to realising a low-maintenance, tunable alternative which reduces, on a global scale,
needless duplication of eﬀort among users of event log messages.
8.5 Realising the alternative
The eﬀective ﬁltering of event log messages remains the aim of this example; a small
stanza of pseudo-code rules is shown in Listing 8.1 as a realistic mockup. These rules
would largely or entirely replace the regular expressions (which number more than 1000
in a default installation of Logcheck on Debian Linux v5.0), or the algorithms used in
data mining or other largely-academic solutions. Note that the scheduled daily, weekly
and monthly e-mails have mutually-exclusive content thanks to the bracketing of their
`severity' and `impact' conditions. The top two rules are for emergency situations and
may produce duplicate notiﬁcations - this is likely to be acceptable given that multiple
modes of contact increase the chances of reaching a systems administrator in a timely
manner.
Applying the stanza of rules to the outcome mockup presented in Section 6.3 is an ex-
ercise that is useful for gauging the feasibility of an `importance curve', which itself was
hypothesised from the survey results in Chapter 7. The importance curve is a worthwhile
goal even if for only one reason: it eliminates the long tail which features prominently in
plots of event log messages - the large number of messages that occur rarely but make up
such a signiﬁcant proportion of the data stream due to their high degree of variation. It
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Figure 8.1: Outcome mockup results after ﬁltering with an SIC rule set (with `importance
curve' superimposed)
also represents a possible avenue for further research into human value judgements when
faced with such data streams.
The results of the rules' ﬁltering is shown in Figure 8.1. The action to be taken is shown on
the X axis, preﬁxed with the name of the server (A, B or C) which generated the message.
The rows of graph data were sorted as they were for the mockup graphs: impact ﬁrst,
severity second, certainty third. It should also be remembered that the rules are only for
notiﬁcation purposes; all messages would still be stored on disk by default, as they are
today. Finally, while it might appear anomalous, the ﬁrst two items (A: Page and A:
E-mail immediately) are the same event selected twice by diﬀerent rules. The message
itself is for the motherboard voltage out-of-bounds event. Only the e-mail rules were
chosen to produce exclusive output between themselves, as mentioned above; this is due
to the identical method and destination of communication.
With the mockup's sample of only 84 messages, no authorititive correlation was expected,
and the correlation observed between the `importance curve' and `impact' is not strong.
Indeed, the mockup sample does not contain any events of 0 severity or impact, but these
are highly likely to be observed (albeit rarely) in any large-scale logging environment. One
claim that might be made seems at ﬁrst to be a negative allegation: that values can be
intentionally selected via a stanza of rules so that the impact plot line conforms to this,
or any other, `importance curve' - yet this is exactly the capability intended. Systems
administrators should be able to manipulate their log ﬁltering results to achieve their
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Figure 8.2: One root cause resulting in many notiﬁcations
desired outcome but such ﬁne-grained control eludes them with the current toolset. With
a suﬃcient sample of event log messages (e.g. up to one year's worth), and rule tuning,
any given `importance curve' is likely achievable.
One point requiring further work would be whether or not duplicated events should be
included in any consideration of an importance curve. This author's initial response was
that duplicated events should not be included. But what of the duplicated events which
share a root cause? For example, it is increasing common for many servers in a datacentre
to rely entire on a centralised Storage Area Network (SAN) for disk space, rather than
having locally-attached disks in each server's chassis. If the SAN were to fail, or merely
respond somewhat slowly to servers' requests for data, a hailstorm of event log messages
may result from many machines due to the one root cause, as portrayed in Figure 8.2.
Reliably and automatically eliminating such duplicated messages is a hard problem when
each server vendor or operating system revision may issue distinct and non-comparable
messages about the event. Given these diﬃcult circumstances, is it correct to delete
only the duplicated messages caused by overlapping SIC rules, and not others, when
considering a plotted line representing importance? To put this question in other words,
should an importance curve portray or suppress the notiﬁcations which are caused by
the use of multiple communication/notiﬁcation methods? This would be an interesting
topic for future research. In any case, duplication of notiﬁcation is left as a decision
for each systems administrator via simple changes to the pseudo-code rules; they could
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take advantage of the best-match rule principle with break, else-if, or switch-case
clauses, for example.
The nature of the three-dimensional SIC metric appears to justify itself when focussing on
the right-hand half of Figure 8.1. When it comes to selecting a method of communication
(i.e. paging, e-mail over diﬀerent timeframes, etc) in addition to whether or not a message
is important in and of itself, the `severity' and `certainty' dimensions can be considered
in the decision. Thus, server B's message regarding a safe and normal MySQL database
shutdown being completed (rated S2, I4, C3) can be selected for immediate e-mailing
despite server B not being particularly important. Moreover, the preceding message about
beginning the database shutdown (rated S2, I1, C6) is never selected for notiﬁcation even
though it is a worse message - simply because the stanza of rules considers the certainty
of the message content - with the result of the systems administrator not being needlessly
distracted by information about server B which is highly uncertain. This scheme almost
permits us a degree of `atomic operation' when it comes to event log messages: systems
that are relatively unimportant can only send more urgent notiﬁcations when system state
has been established with greater certainty, i.e. after a potentially long and involved
operation such as a database shutdown has concluded.
Similarly, the very-certain but low impact messages (rated S4, I6, C2) from server B
about SQUAT failed... are included in a monthly e-mail so these errors are not entirely
discarded. SQUAT is an indexing system for the Cyrus IMAP e-mail server software
which can improve performance but is by no means necessary for a functioning system.
Server C also contributes one message (rated S3, I6, C2) to the notiﬁcations: a 404 not
found web server error due to a missing image ﬁle. Such an error is highly certain but
is an example of an event which alone has minimal impact whereas many (i.e. thousands
per day) of these errors may indicate a conﬁguration error or denial-of-service attack,
or in the case of tens or hundreds, perhaps a search-engine web spider such as Google
or Bing trawling for common ﬁles like robots.txt. Messages similar in nature to this
404, from system components that are open to malicious attack, may be very certain in
relation to each individual message and only gain importance when their rate increases.
`Leaky buckets' or graph analysis could be applied to these quite-severe, minimal-impact,
very-certain messages; but this is another topic for future study.
Some readers may query the rate of `false negatives' which were not selected for notiﬁcation
by the stanza of rules. One of these might be server B's message about a Kerberos
authentication failure; the second [d]ecrypt integrity check failed one in particular. By
itself this message does not indicate any system compromise whatsoever and there may
be many hundreds of them daily on any given Kerberos server in a large organisation, all
legitimate and due to mistakes when typing passwords. In that sense it is not an error
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- no permanent and deterministic failure can be identiﬁed, unlike the 404 error above
which will always fail when that (likely valid) HTTP request is made. Kerberos errors
are extremely likely to be caused by human factors and therefore highly variable in rate,
i.e. depending on which individuals are using the system; the 404 is extremely likely to
have an automated cause in an HTML page which contains the broken link, or another
automated system probing/trawling the web server.
Given these varied scopes, it would be beneﬁcial if the Kerberos server could scale its
own message metadata based on event rate - a form of internal and highly-speciﬁc `leaky
bucket', perhaps. If suﬃcient research had been performed, the Kerberos server could even
incorporate a conﬁguration parameter for the number of people in the organisation and
use established statistical data to anticipate a normal number of failed authentication
attempts within a certain time period: operation outside these bounds would cause the
SIC metric to ramp up the `impact' and `certainty' dimensions, resulting in steadily-more-
urgent notiﬁcations as the situation (such as a password dictionary attack) became more
clear.
8.6 Contributions
Here, the objectives presented at the beginning of this thesis will be reviewed and delin-
eated.
1. Determining the criteria used by systems administrators when assessing
system state, including their awareness of the challenges they face with
their current automated-ﬁltering toolsets: Beginning with the concept of a
mental understanding informed by intuition, this was reﬁned with the help of survey
evidence into a set of four motivations: `service availability', `system integrity', `re-
source consumption levels', and `intent of attack or compromise'. They may not be
a deﬁnitive list of categories under which all awareness factors can be categorised,
but represent a substantial improvement in this area. Evidence was also gathered
regarding the uptake of log-ﬁltering technology. Both extensive reasoning and anal-
ysis were presented as rationale for introducing architectural modiﬁcations to ease
diﬃculties created by the present pace of change.
2. Distilling the impediments for automated ﬁltering due to communication
diﬃculties and context loss: Shannon and Weaver's theory of communication
was applied in the context of event log messaging; it exposed latent issues in the
communications process between the developer of a program deployed on computing
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systems, and the systems administrators responsible for said systems. Semiotic
principles were also examined for their contribution to a domain which has seen little,
if any, academic consideration of such fundamentals - and helped to strictly deﬁne
both the modes and methods of communication we currently use, and the nature of
the shortcomings. Parallels were identiﬁed in other disciplines, and their responses
considered as avenues for future improvement in log messaging, in particular; the
Glasgow Coma Scale, stakeholder salience theory, military communications, and
industrial monitoring.
3. Based on the impediments identiﬁed above, designing representative
metadata that can survive a diﬃcult communications process and the
loss of surrounding context: Drawing primarily on two of the established ap-
proaches mentioned immediately above (the GCS and stakeholder salience), a three-
dimensional metric was proposed: Severity, Impact, Certainty (SIC) with each
dimension indicated on a separate scale from 0 - meaning the most severe, most
profound impact, or least level of certainty - to 7, meaning the least severe, smallest
impact, or highest level of certainty. The GCS provided the template for this metric,
given that the GCS was developed for medical triage and prognosis communication
purposes in an environment where quick and unambiguous communication is criti-
cal. Stakeholder salience, originally meant for identifying the highest priorities for
managers in businesses to allocate their time to, was morphed into a systems form,
while retaining its useful notions of multiple scopes. Knowledge of each diﬀerent
scope has been utilised to replace the varying dimensional size inherent to the GCS
(where each of the three dimensions has a diﬀerent upper bound).
4. Including real-world factors that inﬂuence decision-making about sys-
tems and services: A simple recognition of diﬀering requirements among individ-
uals and organisations was developed further using semiotics, speciﬁcally Stamper's
representational triangle, and can be substantiated with evidence from the survey in
Chapter 7. The representational triangle takes information from the human/social
level (i.e. roles and importance), represents it using numeric weights, and applies
it to the real-world-objects that we use as computing systems (i.e. programs/dae-
mons, servers). The human notion of `the bigger picture' surrounding computing
systems, i.e. their context, is thus represented to a certain degree and used to trans-
form the logging output. This is, as far as this author can establish, the ﬁrst time
that a feedback or tuning mechanism has been included in an event-logging system
architecture.
5. Integrating all the steps above into a deterministic ﬁltering alternative
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that oﬀers potential improvements compared to existing approaches: This
item refers speciﬁcally to the software improvement goals listed in Section 1.4 on
page 27.
(a) Reduced duplication of eﬀort.
Achieved. The existing approaches require each site or systems administrator to
customise a substantial list (over 1000 items by default) of regular expressions:
the burden of interpretation and action is largely on the end-user, rather than
the developer. Shifting a very small proportion of this burden back to the
developer, through the creation of simple numeric preﬁxes for each message,
removes a much greater proportion of the workload from the collective user
base (i.e. systems administrators) by eliminating much or all of the duplicated
interpretation, and additionally distilling the method of action into a simple
conditional statement.
(b) Deterministic and reproducible output.
Achieved. An architecture based on numeric thresholds and a simple scaling
function will produce identical output given identical input. The same cannot
be said for statistical approaches such as data mining or neural networks. The
architecture presented here evalutes every line separately, leaving the higher-
level relationship analysis either to a human or a downstream system, whereas
data mining, neural networks, and the like attempt to employ poorly- or un-
directed relationship analysis at the ﬁrst stage and are therefore burdened by
the message-interpretation problem.
(c) Minimised maintenance requirement in normal operation.
Likely achieved, but this remains to be proven. Systems based on regular ex-
pressions require maintenance upon many of the changes that are necessitated
by running a computing environment of any substance (security updates or
patches, for example). Until such maintenance is carried out, any altered mes-
sages are likely to be tagged as possible attacks. Statistical algorithms require
time for new events to cross a threshold of experience and/or statistical sig-
niﬁcance as well as a constant time investment in training to obtain optimal
eﬀectiveness. Neural networks combined with trouble-ticket databases (as in
Wallin et al. [10]) are an attempt to re-purpose existing data as a training set,
but inevitably hit problems due to mismatches in data-set purpose with the
result of a correct output rate of only 50%.
In comparison with `the competition' above, the SIC architecture has a minis-
cule amount of conﬁguration to deal with: only the stanza of rules and a single
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weighting value for each contributing component such as a daemon or server.
Interpretation metadata in a machine-readable form frees an event-log-message
ﬁlter to simply ﬁlter - resulting in a compact and maintainable stanza of rules
for laying out personal or organisational thresholds. The SIC architecture has
yet to be deployed in a large-scale environment, though, so cannot be regarded
as proven.
(d) Customisable policies that manipulate the output according to personal/organ-
isational preferences and support multiple modes of communication determined
by an event's real-world priority.
Achieved. The stanza of rules is a mechanism for enacting such policies. Its
capabilities are limited only by those of the language used to code it, e.g. Perl
or Python, and the modes of communication which can be scripted. Service
Level Agreement (SLA) policies could be enacted as graph tolerances around
an established known-good history, such as operation outside a 5% tolerance
shall be considered to be in fault, if graph analysis techniques were applied
to the three dimensions of the SIC metric. At perhaps the most basic level,
means and medians for each dimension could be tracked within windows of one
hour, one day, one week, one month, or any other given timeframe, to detect
abnormal activity.
(e) Improved communication, with greatly reduced ambiguity, from programmer/pro-
gram designer to end-user/systems administrator.
Likely achieved. While the SIC metric was designed with input from literature
on triage, salience identiﬁcation and priority management, to deal with the
communication deﬁcit eluciated with the help of Shannon, Weaver, and semi-
otics in general, it has not been formally considered from a psychological point
of view. SIC attempts to encode the contextual background knowledge of the
programmer/program designer so that a deeper context can be included with
each message and in a form which survives the ﬁltering process. It has been
largely supported by the results of a small survey, but this is not a rigorous
examination.
What is clear is that SIC does provide a machine-readable piece of metadata
which can be assessed without the need for background research into the mean-
ing of the message. A systems administrator can therefore save time by ﬁltering
out messages with trivial content. The unambiguous nature of numeric scales
allows for more eﬀective communication across cultures and languages, reduc-
ing or eliminating the reading of source code (the action of which is itself a
reversion to a standardised and less-ambiguous form of communication) and
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other forms of second-guessing.
8.7 Future work
The research and premises set out in this thesis lead directly and indirectly to some
interesting avenues for future work.
 Deploying the SIC metric in a large-scale trial. For example: the writing
of patches applied to source code to create SIC-enabled daemons which are then
deployed at an Internet Service Provider. A signiﬁcant trial would provide invaluable
data with which to test the concept of the `importance curve', as well as elucidating
a possible distribution that server and daemon weights conform to.
 Further analysis of SIC's dimensions, particularly validity testing against es-
tablished psychological/cognitive guidelines. It should be remembered that the di-
mensions are not currently intended to be response scales suitable for gathering data
expected to conform to a standard distribution; but rather they should represent, as
far as is possible, a linear progression from endpoint to endpoint. From a numeric
viewpoint this is of course trivial. The situation becomes more challenging, however,
once one seeks to enrich the scale with sets of example events for guiding program
developers in assigning their seed values.
 Optimisation of rule stanzas: is there a valid default setting? Following
on from a large-scale trial, an interesting research topic would be the evaluation of
a variety of `importance curves' produced by their associated rule stanzas. That is,
which curve represents the best overall starting point, or default setting, for a SIC-
enabled logging system? Or is the curve too closely associated with an individual's
personal preference to be separately discerned or indeed generalised across systems
administrators? Optimisation should also consider the role of `leaky buckets', du-
plicated messages (whether from an identical root cause or rule overlap) and other
issues pertinant to dealing with a variety of systems issues.
 Investigating the eﬀectiveness of a straight-line scaling function. As shown
in Section 6.2 on page 100, the proposed scaling function (for applying the assigned
weights to the `impact' dimension) achieves an entirely linear result, in the name of
simplicity. It remains to be seen if this is actually the best outcome: there may well
be scenarios where a logarithmic result is preferable, for example. Certain system or
daemon roles may be best served by particular scaling functions - this is unknown
at the present moment.
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 A deeper analysis and cross-correlation of the survey results. This author
does not have suﬃcient experience with survey analysis to have produced an `exhaus-
tively interpreted' set of results. There may be underlying nuances and correlations
which have not been identiﬁed.
 Evaluation of SIC beside academic alternatives such as data mining al-
gorithms, on the same data set. With a large sample of SIC-enabled data, the
usefulness of the metric to other academic approaches could be evaluated. Data
mining or neural networks may indeed be able to produce improved ﬁltering results
when SIC metadata is present; having a common source data set would allow direct
comparisons to be drawn.
8.8 Publications
The research conducted for this thesis was the basis for one publication:
 Radford, P., Linton, A., Welch, I. Accepted for publication. Event log messages as
a human interface. Proc. OZCHI Brisbane 2010.
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Chapter 9
Appendix A: Logcheck README
The following README ﬁle is located at:
/usr/share/doc/logcheck-database/README.logcheck-database.gz
following installation of the logcheck-database package (version 1.2.69) on Debian Linux
v5.0 [8]. The package is released under the terms of the General Public License (GPL),
version 2. As with all software, this information is subject to change.
SYNOPSIS
Logcheck-database provides the egrep patterns required by the package "logcheck"; they are
used to ﬁlter recent log messages (collected using "logtail") into a mailed news summary.
SETS OF RULES
There are three layers of sets of ﬁltering rules, all of which are normal egrep pattern-matches,
applied in turn.
1. the "SECURITY ALERTS" layer, designed to detect the traces of active intrusion at-
tempts. Patterns raising the alarm go in "/etc/logcheck/cracking.d"; any event that
matches one of these patterns turns the report into an urgent "Security Alerts" report,
with the relevant event moved to a special section. The cracking.d standard keywords ﬁle
is seeded with known symptoms of hostile activity (see logcheck's README.keywords
ﬁle). Patterns cancelling such maximum-priority alarms are not used in the default
logcheck conﬁguration, but if the local administrator enables this layer of ﬁltering in
logcheck.conf, then the rules go in the directory "/etc/logcheck/cracking.ignore.d".
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Matches with cracking.ignore rules will then reclassify the alert as a false alarm (compare
violations.ignore below). Note that this means they are totally ignored - log messages
handled at one layer are not carried over to lower layers.
2. the "SECURITY EVENTS" layer, designed to detect less critical events still considered
worthy of special attention. Patterns raising the alarm go in "/etc/logcheck/viola-
tions.d"; matches with these result in a "Security Events" alert, with the relevant event
moved to a special section. Patterns cancelling such alarms go in the standard direc-
tory "/etc/logcheck/violations.ignore.d"; apparent "Security Events" that match with
violations.ignore patterns are discarded as false alarms.
3. the "SYSTEM EVENTS" layer, handling leftover log messages. This layer doesn't have
an equivalent to the alarm-raising cracking.d and violations.d; instead _all_ remaining
lines from the logﬁles are considered for inclusion in the main "System Events" section.
Patterns in the three "/etc/logcheck/ignore.d.*" directories again function to overrule
alerts; the log messages that match them are excluded from the report as trivial. The
speciﬁc directories consulted depend on the prevailing logcheck "REPORTLEVEL" (for
details see the corresponding README for logcheck). The bare minimum is the set of
ﬁlters in ignore.d.paranoid. When _no_ logged events make it through the ﬁlters no
report is mailed.
FILES WITHIN EACH DIRECTORY
Each of the rules-directories can contain pattern ﬁles of the following kinds:
./<packagename> The rule ﬁlename must only contain characters compatible with run-
parts(8). As of this writing, this includes alphanumeric characters, underscore, and hyphen.
Contains ﬁlters relevant to only one Debian package - for example if "fooserver" logs sus-
picious events like this: "$DATE $HOSTNAME fooserver[$PID]: $USER is up to no good"
then a line in "/etc/logcheck/violations.d/fooserver" with an appropriate pattern will pro-
mote it from a mere "System Event" to a full "Security Event" in a subsection of the mailing
headed "fooserver". Or then again if that kind of log message is more trivial than it looks
(maybe "foo" is a networked game of spy-and-counterspy) then a line in "/etc/logcheck-
/ignore.d.server/fooserver" will turn it into a nonevent for all but the most assiduous of
administrators. Sometimes a package will have not only special alarm calls which _do_
need to be "Security Events" triggers but also exceptional variants which _don't_ - maybe
it logs either $DATE $HOSTNAME fooserver[$PID]: $USER barred" or $DATE $HOST-
NAME fooserver[$PID]: none barred". In this situation the alarm can be overruled by a
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violations.ignore ruleﬁle named "fooserver" which ﬁlters "none barred". This will _not_ af-
fect other "Security Events" featuring the words "none barred" (that might allow crackers
to use those words to cover attacks on ssh). Instead, any <packagename> ignore-ﬁles only
aﬀect the log messages that would have been in that package-speciﬁc report section. Apart
from anything else this limitation reduces the number of rules that need to be processed.
./logcheck or ./logcheck-<packagename> Standard "generic" rules go in each directory's
"./logcheck" ﬁle; thus for instance any log message at all matching "ATTACK" (listed in
"/etc/logcheck/cracking.d/logcheck") _always_ triggers a "Security Alert", unless you de-
liberately tamper with "cracking.ignore.d" rules. ** Debian Note: we emptied out ./logcheck
and merged all ./logcheck-<packagename> ﬁles into the ignore.d.*/<packagename> ﬁles.
This was done because the standard rules in ./logcheck matched too many false positives (see
e.g. #449028) and resulted in a lot of rule duplication (#254542).
Remember that package-speciﬁc "ignore" ﬁlters will _not_ override non-package-speciﬁc
"ﬂagging" patterns! Thus for instance if "fooserver" outputs syslog messages like this:
"$DATE $HOSTNAME fooserver[$PID]: 3 attempts 0 rejected" then the standard keyword
"reject" listed in the generic "/etc/logcheck/violations.d/logcheck" ﬁle will trigger frequent
"Security Events" reports. Putting a ﬁltering pattern in
"/etc/logcheck/violations.ignore.d/fooserver"
won't help here! The solution is to use a ﬁle named in the specially-privileged ./logcheck-
<packagename> format:
"/etc/logcheck/violations.ignore.d/logcheck-fooserver".
This can contain patterns provided by that particular package which nonetheless need to take
precedence over the generic rules.
./local or ./local-<packagename> Sysadmins can use the "local-*" ﬁlenames to create their
own additions to the "logcheck-*" pattern lists. If you have "ippl" logging network connections
verbosely into syslog then you can put custom "Security Events" keywords in
"/etc/logcheck/violations.d/local-ippl" and exceptions in
"/etc/logcheck/violations.ignore.d/local-ippl".
WRITING RULES
Be careful when editing local rule ﬁles; logcheck will preprocess them to eliminate dangerous
blanks (since "egrep  syslog" matches every line) and comment lines, but some attention is
needed when composing custom patterns to avoid excessively generous ﬁltering. The objective
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in logcheck rules is to match precisely the target log messages and no more, using all the
resources of Extended Regular Expressions. If you're sick of reading log messages like this:
Apr 6 19:30:24 oempc wwwoed[11763]: WWWOFFLE Online.
Apr 6 19:31:54 oempc wwwoed[11763]: WWWOFFLE Oine.
...then the local ignore pattern you need is something like this:
^\w{3} [ :0-9]{11} oempc wwwoed\[[0-9]+\]: WWWOFFLE (On|Oﬀ)line\.$
The characters ".?*+[](){}^$|\" are "special" in extended-regexps, so they need to be escaped
if intended literally (like the ﬁnal stop in the example above). Be especially wary of unbalanced
brackets, which can choke egrep. Local administrators can aﬀord to be more speciﬁc than
the package maintainers who provide ﬁlters for "fooserver" etc. You can take the locale for
granted, saying "[a-zA-Z]" where package maintainers should be using "[[:alpha:]]"; and you
can write out things like hostnames explicitly - hence "oempc" above, rather than the pattern
"[._[:alnum:]-]+".
TESTING RULES
To test new rules, you can grep your log ﬁle, and remove trailing space with something like
this:
sed -e 's/[[:space:]]*$//' /var/log/syslog | egrep \ '^\w{3} [ :0-9]{11} oempc wwwoed\[[0-
9]+\]: WWWOFFLE (On|Oﬀ)line\.$'
If the log line is displayed, then your regex works. Pass all rules ﬁles through "sort -u"
to simplify maintenance, then ensure they have a ﬁnal end-of-line carriage return so that
they "cat" nicely. Since System Events aren't subdivided by package, it makes no diﬀerence
whether ignore.d.*/local rules are split up into "local-x", "local-y" and "local-z" or merged
into one "local" ﬁle; use whatever's convenient. Another safety-net is provided by the fact
that the process that collates all the applicable rules uses "run-parts", the standard Debian
utility also used for iterating through "/etc/cron.d", "/etc/ppp/ip-up.d" etcetera. It therefore
automatically ignores ﬁles with names such as "fooserver.disabled" or "local~".
SUBMITTING RULES
If there are messages which are not ignored by logcheck that should be, ﬁle a bug against the
package logcheck-database in the Debian Bug Tracking System (BTS). If you're new to the re-
porting bugs using the Debian BTS, you can learn more at: http://www.debian.org/Bugs/Reporting
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Unfortunately, we don't have the time to add and update rules for everything, therefore the
following exceptions apply:
 Debug messages
 Messages produced by software not included in Debian
 Temporary messages which are due to a bug in the package
 Messages related to daemon startups and shutdowns
Please do not ﬁle bugs related to these messages.
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Chapter 10
Appendix B: Outcome mockup
The messages in this appendix are genuine and have been modiﬁed to contain preﬁxes
with S, I, C metric values. Full-size versions of the per-server graphs on page 105 are also
included here. The tuples which were graphed were ﬁrst sorted by their `impact values',
then each impact bracket was sorted by their `severity' values, then each impact+severity
bracket was sorted by their `certainty' values. This is eﬀectively a zooming-in by scope,
where `impact' is the largest scope and `certainty' is the smallest scope.
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Listing 10.1 Server A: mocked-up event log messages
Jan 30 06:56:45 serverA postfix/smtpd [31944][S6 ,I4,C3]: connect from unknown
[27.57.212.209]
Jan 30 06:56:45 serverA postfix/smtpd [31944][S3 ,I5,C5]: warning: 27.57.212.209: hostname
Static -209.212.57.27. airteldataservices.com verification failed: Name or service not
known
Jan 30 06:56:50 serverA postfix/smtpd [31944][S6 ,I4,C3]: connect from unknown
[190.51.227.124]
Jan 30 06:56:50 serverA postfix/smtpd [31944][S6 ,I4,C3]: disconnect from unknown
[27.57.212.209]
Jan 30 06:56:50 serverA postfix/smtpd [31944][S2 ,I5,C6]: lost connection after CONNECT
from unknown [27.57.212.209]
Jan 30 06:56:50 serverA postfix/smtpd [31944][S3 ,I5,C5]: warning: 190.51.227.124: hostname
190 -51 -227 -124. speedy.com.ar verification failed: Name or service not known
Jan 30 06:56:54 serverA postfix/smtpd [31944][S2 ,I5,C4]: NOQUEUE: reject: RCPT from
unknown [190.51.227.124]: 554 5.7.1 Service unavailable; Client host [190.51. 227.124]
blocked using bl.spamcop.net; Blocked - see http ://www.spamcop.net/bl.shtml
?190.51.227.124; from=<hiblancheg@yowzahost.com > to=<account@example.com > proto=ESMTP
helo=<hm5slz4q.yi>
Jan 30 06:56:56 serverA postfix/smtpd [31944][S6 ,I4,C3]: disconnect from unknown
[190.51.227.124]
Jan 30 06:56:56 serverA postfix/smtpd [31944][S2 ,I5,C6]: lost connection after DATA (0
bytes) from unknown [190.51.227.124]
Jan 30 07:45:58 serverA ntpd [2304][S5,I7,C2]: kernel time sync status change 0001
Jan 30 08:26:02 serverA postfix/smtpd [2539][S7 ,I4,C3]: connect from bulkmail1.freecycle.
org [94.102.157.234]
Jan 30 08:26:04 serverA postfix/cleanup [2543][S7,I5,C3]: 0617 DB6A5: message -id=<E1PjGQo
-0001Er-G6@bulkmail1.freecycle.org >
Jan 30 08:26:04 serverA postfix/qmgr [28214][S7 ,I5,C3]: 0617 DB6A5: from=<post
-12594045 -8691005 @bounces.freecycle.org >, size =2626, nrcpt =1 (queue active)
Jan 30 08:26:04 serverA postfix/qmgr [28214][S7 ,I6,C3]: 0617 DB6A5: removed
Jan 30 08:26:04 serverA postfix/smtpd [2539][S7 ,I6,C1]: 0617 DB6A5: client=bulkmail1.
freecycle.org [94.102.157.234]
Jan 30 08:26:05 serverA postfix/smtpd [2539][S7 ,I4,C3]: disconnect from bulkmail1.
freecycle.org [94.102.157.234]
Jan 30 08:29:25 serverA postfix/anvil [2541][S7 ,I7,C1]: statistics: max cache size 1 at
Jan 30 08:26:02
Jan 30 08:29:25 serverA postfix/anvil [2541][S7 ,I7,C1]: statistics: max connection count 1
for (smtp :94.102.157.234) at Jan 30 08:26:02
Jan 30 08:29:25 serverA postfix/anvil [2541][S7 ,I5,C1]: statistics: max connection rate
1/60s for (smtp :94.102.157.234) at Jan 30 08:26:02
Jan 30 08:45:01 serverA CRON [3057][S7,I7,C1]: pam_unix(cron:session): session closed for
user root
Jan 30 08:45:01 serverA CRON [3057][S7,I7,C2]: pam_unix(cron:session): session opened for
user root by (uid=0)
Jan 30 08:45:01 serverA CRON [3059][S7,I7,C1]: pam_unix(cron:session): session closed for
user root
Jan 30 08:45:01 serverA CRON [3059][S7,I7,C2]: pam_unix(cron:session): session opened for
user root by (uid=0)
Jan 30 08:47:21 serverA sensord[S7,I6,C1]: +12V: +11.94 V (min = +11.38 V, max = +12.57
V)
Jan 30 08:47:21 serverA sensord[S1,I2,C3]: +3.3V: +3.12 V (min = +3.13 V, max = +3.45 V
)
Jan 30 08:47:21 serverA sensord[S7,I6,C1]: CPU Temp: 34.3 C (limit = 65.3 C, hysteresis
= 60.2 C)
Jan 30 14:57:30 serverA squid [3123][S2,I6 ,C2]: Squid Parent: child process 3125 exited
with status 0
Jan 30 14:59:37 serverA squid [3118][S6,I6 ,C1]: Squid Parent: child process 3120 started
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Listing 10.2 Server B: mocked-up event log messages
Feb 1 16:04:51 serverB krb5kdc [2656][S7 ,I6,C2]: AS_REQ (3 etypes {16 1 3}) 172.16.1.100:
NEEDED_PREAUTH: example@EXAMPLE.COM for krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM , Additional
pre -authentication required
Feb 1 16:04:51 serverB krb5kdc [2656][S4 ,I4,C5]: AS_REQ (3 etypes {16 1 3}) 172.16.1.100:
PREAUTH_FAILED: example@EXAMPLE.COM for krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM , Decrypt
integrity check failed
Feb 1 16:04:51 serverB krb5kdc [2656][S4 ,I4,C5]: preauth (timestamp) verify failure:
Decrypt integrity check failed
Feb 1 17:53:35 serverB spamd [8148][S7,I7,C1]: prefork: child states: II
Feb 1 17:53:35 serverB spamd [8206][S7,I6,C1]: spamd: clean message ( -3.5/5.0) for nobody
:65534 in 1.7 seconds , 8715 bytes.
Feb 1 17:53:35 serverB spamd [8206][S7,I5,C3]: spamd: result: . -3 - AWL ,BAYES_00 ,
HTML_IMAGE_RATIO_08 ,HTML_MESSAGE ,MIME_HTML_ONLY ,MIME_QP_LONG_LINE ,RCVD_IN_DNS WL_MED
scantime =1.7, size =8715, user=nobody ,uid =65534 , required_score =5.0, rhost=localhost ,raddr
=127.0.0.1 , rport =56269 , mid=<31 f101$a0vuv3@tmmta2.akl.trad eme.local >,bayes =0.000000 ,
autolearn=ham
Feb 1 18:15:16 serverB cyrus/imap [28222][S7,I7,C1]: executed
Feb 1 18:15:16 serverB cyrus/imapd [28222][S7 ,I5,C3]: accepted connection
Feb 1 18:15:16 serverB cyrus/master [28222][S7 ,I7,C1]: about to exec /usr/lib/cyrus/bin/
imapd
Feb 1 18:15:18 serverB cyrus/imapd [28222][S4 ,I6,C5]: TLS engine: No CA file specified.
Client side certs may not work
Feb 1 18:15:18 serverB cyrus/imapd [28222][S6 ,I6,C3]: starttls: TLSv1 with cipher AES256 -
SHA (256/256 bits new) no authentication
Feb 1 18:15:19 serverB cyrus/imapd [28222][S7 ,I5,C3]: login: station.example.com
[172.16.2.3] example plain+TLS User logged in
Feb 1 18:15:20 serverB cyrus/imapd [28222][S7 ,I7,C1]: open: user example opened INBOX
Feb 1 18:15:20 serverB cyrus/imapd [28222][S7 ,I7,C1]: seen_db: user example opened /var/
lib/cyrus/user/e/example.seen
Feb 1 18:25:13 serverB cyrus/imapd [28472][S4 ,I6,C2]: SQUAT failed
Feb 1 18:25:13 serverB cyrus/imapd [28472][S4 ,I6,C2]: SQUAT failed to open index file
Feb 1 19:10:15 serverB krb5kdc [2656][S7 ,I6,C2]: AS_REQ (3 etypes {16 1 3}) 172.16.1.100:
ISSUE: authtime 1296540615 , etypes {rep=16 tkt=16 ses=16}, example@EXAMPLE.COM for
krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM
Feb 1 19:10:15 serverB krb5kdc [2656][S6 ,I6,C2]: AS_REQ (3 etypes {16 1 3}) 172.16.1.100:
NEEDED_PREAUTH: example@EXAMPLE.COM for krbtgt/EXAMPLE.COM@EXAMPLE.COM , Additional
pre -authentication required
Feb 1 19:10:15 serverB krb5kdc [2656][S7 ,I6,C2]: TGS_REQ (3 etypes {16 1 3})
172.16.1.100: ISSUE: authtime 1296540615 , etypes {rep =16 tkt=16 ses=16},
example@EXAMPLE.COM for host/serverB.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM
Feb 1 19:25:19 serverB cyrus/ctl_cyrusdb [31955][S7 ,I6,C1]: archiving database file: /var
/lib/cyrus/mailboxes.db
Feb 1 19:25:19 serverB cyrus/ctl_cyrusdb [31955][S7 ,I6,C1]: archiving log file: /var/lib/
cyrus/db/log .0000000011
Feb 1 19:25:19 serverB cyrus/ctl_cyrusdb [31955][S7 ,I6,C1]: checkpointing cyrus databases
Feb 1 19:25:19 serverB cyrus/ctl_cyrusdb [31955][S7 ,I7,C1]: done checkpointing cyrus
databases
Feb 1 19:25:19 serverB cyrus/master [31955][S7 ,I6,C1]: about to exec /usr/sbin/
ctl_cyrusdb
Feb 1 19:25:19 serverB cyrus/master [4799][S7 ,I7,C1]: process 31955 exited , status 0
Feb 1 20:12:15 serverB ntpd [2933][S5,I7 ,C2]: kernel time sync status change 0001
Feb 2 13:30:51 serverB mysqld [2754][S2,I1,C6]: Feb 2 13:30:51 serverB mysqld [2754]:
110202 13:30:51 InnoDB: Starting shutdown ...
Feb 2 13:30:51 serverB mysqld [2754][S2,I4,C3]: 110202 13:30:51 [Note] /usr/sbin/mysqld:
Normal shutdown
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Listing 10.3 Server C: mocked-up event log messages
Feb 6 00:57:30 serverC kernel: [1069432.548709] md[S7 ,I5,C2]: data -check of RAID array
md5
Feb 6 00:57:30 serverC kernel: [1069432.548715] md[S7 ,I7,C1]: minimum _guaranteed_
speed: 1000 KB/sec/disk.
Feb 6 00:57:30 serverC kernel: [1069432.548724] md[S7 ,I6,C1]: using maximum available
idle IO bandwidth (but not more than 200000 KB/sec) for data -check.
Feb 6 00:57:30 serverC kernel: [1069432.548735] md[S7 ,I7,C1]: using 128k window , over a
total of 979840 blocks.
Feb 6 00:57:30 serverC kernel: [1069432.551279] md[S7 ,I7,C1]: delaying data -check of md6
until md5 has finished (they share one or more physical units)
Feb 6 00:57:30 serverC kernel: [1069433.022527][S7,I7,C1] --- wd:2 rd:2
Feb 6 00:57:30 serverC kernel: [1069433.022527][S7,I7,C1] disk 0, wo:0, o:1, dev:sdb2
Feb 6 00:57:30 serverC kernel: [1069433.022527][S7,I7,C1] disk 1, wo:0, o:1, dev:sda2
Feb 6 00:57:30 serverC kernel: [1069433.022527][S7,I7,C1] RAID1 conf printout:
Feb 6 00:58:00 serverC kernel: [1069462.353975] md[S7 ,I5,C2]: md5: data -check done
Feb 6 12:28:53 serverC apache2 [8472][S4 ,I5,C4]: [06/ Feb /2011 12:28:52 20583] [error] SSL
handshake failed: HTTP spoken on HTTPS port; trying to send HTML error page (OpenSSL
library error follows)
Feb 6 12:28:53 serverC apache2 [8472][S4 ,I5,C4]: [06/ Feb /2011 12:28:52 20583] [error]
OpenSSL: error :1407609C:SSL routines:SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO:http request [Hint:
speaking HTTP to HTTPS port !?]
Feb 6 13:50:57 serverC kernel: [511040.208020] hub 1 -1:1.0[S7,I7 ,C3]: activate --> -19
Feb 6 13:50:57 serverC kernel: [511040.208092] usb 1-1[S7,I7,C3]: USB disconnect ,
address 3
Feb 6 13:50:58 serverC kernel: [511040.320035] usb 1-1[S7,I7,C3]: new full speed USB
device using uhci_hcd and address 5
Feb 6 13:50:58 serverC kernel: [511040.440024] usb 1-1[S3,I4,C6]: device descriptor read
/64, error -71
Feb 6 13:50:58 serverC kernel: [511040.664035] usb 1-1[S3,I4,C6]: device descriptor read
/64, error -71
Feb 6 13:50:59 serverC kernel: [511041.848038] usb 1-1[S3,I4,C6]: device not accepting
address 5, error -71
Feb 6 13:51:00 serverC kernel: [511042.368098] hub 1 -0:1.0[S3,I4 ,C6]: unable to
enumerate USB device on port 1
Feb 7 11:19:20 serverC apache2 [16971][S7,I7,C2]: example -client.net.nz - - [07/ Feb
/2011:11:19:20 +1300] "GET / HTTP /1.1" 200 2784 "-" "Mozilla /5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel
Mac OS X 10_6_6; en -us) Apple WebKit /533.19.4 (KHTML , like Gecko) Version /5.0.3
Safari /533.19.4"
Feb 7 11:19:20 serverC apache2 [16971][S7,I7,C2]: example -client.net.nz - - [07/ Feb
/2011:11:19:20 +1300] "GET /css/main.css HTTP /1.1" 200 2669 "http :// example.example.
com/" "Mozilla /5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_6; en-us) AppleWebKit /533.19.4
(KHTML , like Gecko) Version /5.0.3 Safari /533.19.4"
Feb 7 11:19:20 serverC apache2 [16971][S7,I7,C2]: example -client.net.nz - - [07/ Feb
/2011:11:19:22 +1300] "GET /images/bg_guests.gif HTTP /1.1" 200 91 "http :// example.
example.com/" "Mozilla /5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_6; en-us) AppleWebKit
/533.19.4 (KHTML , like Gecko) Version /5.0.3 Safari /533.19.4"
Feb 7 11:19:22 serverC apache2 [16971][S7,I7,C2]: example -client.net.nz - - [07/ Feb
/2011:11:19:22 +1300] "GET /images/heading_guests.gif HTTP /1.1" 200 2241 "http ://
example.example.com/" "Mozilla /5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_6; en-us)
AppleWebKit /533.19.4 (KHTML , like Gecko) Version /5.0.3 Safari /533.19.4"
Feb 7 11:19:24 serverC apache2 [16971][S7,I7,C2]: example -client.net.nz - - [07/ Feb
/2011:11:19:23 +1300] "GET /images/bg_guests_bottom.gif HTTP /1.1" 200 475 "http ://
example.example.com/" "Mozilla /5. 0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_6; en-us)
AppleWebKit /533.19.4 (KHTML , like Gecko) Version /5.0.3 Safari /533.19.4"
Feb 7 11:19:24 serverC apache2 [16971][S3,I6,C2]: example -client.net.nz - - [07/ Feb
/2011:11:19:23 +1300] "GET /images/bg_uplight.jpg HTTP /1.1" 404 216 "http :// example.
example.com/" "Mozilla /5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10_6_6; en-us) AppleWebKit
/533.19.4 (KHTML , like Gecko) Version /5.0.3 Safari /533.19.4"
Feb 7 14:59:27 serverC kernel: [ 28.704024][S4,I6 ,C5] Clocksource tsc unstable (delta
= -334799556 ns)
Feb 7 15:10:35 serverC kernel: [ 696.379037][S7,I5 ,C3] XFS mounting filesystem dm -0















































(c) Server C; impact weight 0.9
Figure 10.1: Outcome-mockup values sorted by Impact, then Severity, then Certainty
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Chapter 11
Appendix C: Victoria University of
Wellington Human Ethics Policy
This is an excerpt from Section 4.7 of the VUW HEP [94], under which the survey was
approved without a formal Ethics Committee hearing.
(a) Research in which the subject's participation is restricted to the completion of a writ-
ten questionnaire in a manner not requiring the disclosure of the subject's identity,
and which meets the criteria for questionnaires in section 4.7(b), may be approved
in writing by the Head of the School...
(b) The questionnaire must:
(i) Be totally anonymous (responses should be returned anonymously and there
should be no coding or other means of identifying respondents from the re-
sponse);
(ii) Not contain questions on sensitive topics (e.g. sexual practices, drug taking,
illegal activities);
(iii) Be designed to meet the research goals set;
(iv) In the case of student projects, be subject to appropriate supervision;
(v) Normally state the purpose of the questionnaire, the use to which the results
will be put, the disposal of the questionnaire forms, and the fact that the
questionnaire is anonymous.
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Chapter 12
Appendix D: Raw survey results
The horizontal axis is participant/form, the vertical axis is response item. Response
item seven has two caveats: participants who appear to have reversed the rankings (i.e.
used 10 to indicate the most important message) are noted with red cells, while the
presence of optional comments is indicated with yellow cells. These optional comments
were not included for brevity as well as consistency reasons: only two participants ﬁlled
in all the comment spaces for response item seven. Any author comments are in green
cells.
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Table 12.2: Raw survey results, page 2































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12.4: Raw survey results, page 4


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12.6: Raw survey results, page 6






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12.8: Raw survey results, page 8




























































































































































































































































































Table 12.10: Raw survey results, page 10
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Chapter 13
GPL License
This license is included here as a legal requirement, given that GPL-licensed code has
been included in this document.
GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 2, June 1991
Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc. 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor,
Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this license document,
but changing it is not allowed.
Preamble
The licenses for most software are designed to take away your freedom to share and change
it. By contrast, the GNU General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom
to share and change free softwareto make sure the software is free for all its users. This
General Public License applies to most of the Free Software Foundation's software and
to any other program whose authors commit to using it. (Some other Free Software
Foundation software is covered by the GNU Lesser General Public License instead.) You
can apply it to your programs, too.
When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not price. Our General
Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you have the freedom to distribute copies
of free software (and charge for this service if you wish), that you receive source code or
can get it if you want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it in new free
programs; and that you know you can do these things.
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To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid anyone to deny you
these rights or to ask you to surrender the rights. These restrictions translate to certain
responsibilities for you if you distribute copies of the software, or if you modify it.
For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether gratis or for a fee, you
must give the recipients all the rights that you have. You must make sure that they, too,
receive or can get the source code. And you must show them these terms so they know
their rights.
We protect your rights with two steps: (1) copyright the software, and (2) oﬀer you this
license which gives you legal permission to copy, distribute and/or modify the software.
Also, for each author's protection and ours, we want to make certain that everyone un-
derstands that there is no warranty for this free software. If the software is modiﬁed by
someone else and passed on, we want its recipients to know that what they have is not
the original, so that any problems introduced by others will not reﬂect on the original
authors' reputations.
Finally, any free program is threatened constantly by software patents. We wish to avoid
the danger that redistributors of a free program will individually obtain patent licenses,
in eﬀect making the program proprietary. To prevent this, we have made it clear that
any patent must be licensed for everyone's free use or not licensed at all.
The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and modiﬁcation follow. TERMS
AND CONDITIONS FOR COPYING, DISTRIBUTION AND MODIFICATION
0. This License applies to any program or other work which contains a notice placed
by the copyright holder saying it may be distributed under the terms of this General
Public License. The "Program", below, refers to any such program or work, and a "work
based on the Program" means either the Program or any derivative work under copyright
law: that is to say, a work containing the Program or a portion of it, either verbatim or
with modiﬁcations and/or translated into another language. (Hereinafter, translation is
included without limitation in the term "modiﬁcation".) Each licensee is addressed as
"you".
Activities other than copying, distribution and modiﬁcation are not covered by this Li-
cense; they are outside its scope. The act of running the Program is not restricted, and
the output from the Program is covered only if its contents constitute a work based on
the Program (independent of having been made by running the Program). Whether that
is true depends on what the Program does.
1. You may copy and distribute verbatim copies of the Program's source code as you
receive it, in any medium, provided that you conspicuously and appropriately publish on
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each copy an appropriate copyright notice and disclaimer of warranty; keep intact all the
notices that refer to this License and to the absence of any warranty; and give any other
recipients of the Program a copy of this License along with the Program.
You may charge a fee for the physical act of transferring a copy, and you may at your
option oﬀer warranty protection in exchange for a fee.
2. You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any portion of it, thus forming
a work based on the Program, and copy and distribute such modiﬁcations or work under
the terms of Section 1 above, provided that you also meet all of these conditions:
a) You must cause the modiﬁed ﬁles to carry prominent notices stating that you changed
the ﬁles and the date of any change. b) You must cause any work that you distribute
or publish, that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any part
thereof, to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this
License. c) If the modiﬁed program normally reads commands interactively when run,
you must cause it, when started running for such interactive use in the most ordinary
way, to print or display an announcement including an appropriate copyright notice and
a notice that there is no warranty (or else, saying that you provide a warranty) and that
users may redistribute the program under these conditions, and telling the user how to
view a copy of this License. (Exception: if the Program itself is interactive but does not
normally print such an announcement, your work based on the Program is not required
to print an announcement.)
These requirements apply to the modiﬁed work as a whole. If identiﬁable sections of that
work are not derived from the Program, and can be reasonably considered independent
and separate works in themselves, then this License, and its terms, do not apply to those
sections when you distribute them as separate works. But when you distribute the same
sections as part of a whole which is a work based on the Program, the distribution of the
whole must be on the terms of this License, whose permissions for other licensees extend
to the entire whole, and thus to each and every part regardless of who wrote it.
Thus, it is not the intent of this section to claim rights or contest your rights to work
written entirely by you; rather, the intent is to exercise the right to control the distribution
of derivative or collective works based on the Program.
In addition, mere aggregation of another work not based on the Program with the Program
(or with a work based on the Program) on a volume of a storage or distribution medium
does not bring the other work under the scope of this License.
3. You may copy and distribute the Program (or a work based on it, under Section 2) in
object code or executable form under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above provided that
you also do one of the following:
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a) Accompany it with the complete corresponding machine-readable source code, which
must be distributed under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above on a medium customarily
used for software interchange; or, b) Accompany it with a written oﬀer, valid for at least
three years, to give any third party, for a charge no more than your cost of physically
performing source distribution, a complete machine-readable copy of the corresponding
source code, to be distributed under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above on a medium
customarily used for software interchange; or, c) Accompany it with the information
you received as to the oﬀer to distribute corresponding source code. (This alternative
is allowed only for noncommercial distribution and only if you received the program in
object code or executable form with such an oﬀer, in accord with Subsection b above.)
The source code for a work means the preferred form of the work for making modiﬁcations
to it. For an executable work, complete source code means all the source code for all
modules it contains, plus any associated interface deﬁnition ﬁles, plus the scripts used to
control compilation and installation of the executable. However, as a special exception, the
source code distributed need not include anything that is normally distributed (in either
source or binary form) with the major components (compiler, kernel, and so on) of the
operating system on which the executable runs, unless that component itself accompanies
the executable.
If distribution of executable or object code is made by oﬀering access to copy from a
designated place, then oﬀering equivalent access to copy the source code from the same
place counts as distribution of the source code, even though third parties are not compelled
to copy the source along with the object code.
4. You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute the Program except as expressly
provided under this License. Any attempt otherwise to copy, modify, sublicense or dis-
tribute the Program is void, and will automatically terminate your rights under this Li-
cense. However, parties who have received copies, or rights, from you under this License
will not have their licenses terminated so long as such parties remain in full compliance.
5. You are not required to accept this License, since you have not signed it. However,
nothing else grants you permission to modify or distribute the Program or its derivative
works. These actions are prohibited by law if you do not accept this License. Therefore, by
modifying or distributing the Program (or any work based on the Program), you indicate
your acceptance of this License to do so, and all its terms and conditions for copying,
distributing or modifying the Program or works based on it.
6. Each time you redistribute the Program (or any work based on the Program), the
recipient automatically receives a license from the original licensor to copy, distribute or
modify the Program subject to these terms and conditions. You may not impose any
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further restrictions on the recipients' exercise of the rights granted herein. You are not
responsible for enforcing compliance by third parties to this License.
7. If, as a consequence of a court judgment or allegation of patent infringement or for any
other reason (not limited to patent issues), conditions are imposed on you (whether by
court order, agreement or otherwise) that contradict the conditions of this License, they do
not excuse you from the conditions of this License. If you cannot distribute so as to satisfy
simultaneously your obligations under this License and any other pertinent obligations,
then as a consequence you may not distribute the Program at all. For example, if a
patent license would not permit royalty-free redistribution of the Program by all those
who receive copies directly or indirectly through you, then the only way you could satisfy
both it and this License would be to refrain entirely from distribution of the Program.
If any portion of this section is held invalid or unenforceable under any particular cir-
cumstance, the balance of the section is intended to apply and the section as a whole is
intended to apply in other circumstances.
It is not the purpose of this section to induce you to infringe any patents or other property
right claims or to contest validity of any such claims; this section has the sole purpose
of protecting the integrity of the free software distribution system, which is implemented
by public license practices. Many people have made generous contributions to the wide
range of software distributed through that system in reliance on consistent application of
that system; it is up to the author/donor to decide if he or she is willing to distribute
software through any other system and a licensee cannot impose that choice.
This section is intended to make thoroughly clear what is believed to be a consequence
of the rest of this License.
8. If the distribution and/or use of the Program is restricted in certain countries either by
patents or by copyrighted interfaces, the original copyright holder who places the Program
under this License may add an explicit geographical distribution limitation excluding those
countries, so that distribution is permitted only in or among countries not thus excluded.
In such case, this License incorporates the limitation as if written in the body of this
License.
9. The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions of the General
Public License from time to time. Such new versions will be similar in spirit to the present
version, but may diﬀer in detail to address new problems or concerns.
Each version is given a distinguishing version number. If the Program speciﬁes a version
number of this License which applies to it and "any later version", you have the option of
following the terms and conditions either of that version or of any later version published
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by the Free Software Foundation. If the Program does not specify a version number of
this License, you may choose any version ever published by the Free Software Foundation.
10. If you wish to incorporate parts of the Program into other free programs whose dis-
tribution conditions are diﬀerent, write to the author to ask for permission. For software
which is copyrighted by the Free Software Foundation, write to the Free Software Foun-
dation; we sometimes make exceptions for this. Our decision will be guided by the two
goals of preserving the free status of all derivatives of our free software and of promoting
the sharing and reuse of software generally.
NO WARRANTY
11. BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO
WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLI-
CABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPY-
RIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS
IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MER-
CHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE
RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH
YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST
OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
12. IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAWOR AGREED TO IN
WRITINGWILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTYWHOMAY
MODIFY AND/OR REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE
LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCI-
DENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR IN-
ABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS
OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED
BY YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPER-
ATE WITH ANY OTHER PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER
PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. END
OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs
If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest possible use to
the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it free software which everyone can
redistribute and change under these terms.
To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest to attach them to the
start of each source ﬁle to most eﬀectively convey the exclusion of warranty; and each ﬁle
should have at least the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.
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one line to give the program's name and an idea of what it does. Copyright (C) yyyy
name of author
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms
of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY
WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along with this
program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth
Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail.
If the program is interactive, make it output a short notice like this when it starts in an
interactive mode:
Gnomovision version 69, Copyright (C) year name of author Gnomovision comes with
ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'. This is free software, and
you are welcome to redistribute it under certain conditions; type `show c' for details.
The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate parts of
the General Public License. Of course, the commands you use may be called something
other than `show w' and `show c'; they could even be mouse-clicks or menu itemswhatever
suits your program.
You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or your school, if any,
to sign a "copyright disclaimer" for the program, if necessary. Here is a sample; alter the
names:
Yoyodyne, Inc., hereby disclaims all copyright interest in the program `Gnomovision'
(which makes passes at compilers) written by James Hacker.
signature of Ty Coon, 1 April 1989 Ty Coon, President of Vice
This General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into proprietary
programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you may consider it more useful to
permit linking proprietary applications with the library. If this is what you want to do,
use the GNU Lesser General Public License instead of this License.
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